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From the time of the First Pan American Conference in
'Washington in 1889-1890, the peaceful settlement of disputes
has been one of the objectives of the inter-American system.
The adoption of a plan for a multilateral arbitration treaty
by that conference, though it was never ratified, presaged other,
more successful efforts in the years following. By 194-0, there
were nine different treaties, protocols, and conventions in
force covering the various procedures of pacific settlement.
But because this collection of peace instruments had not proven
satisfactory in practice, and because the unity of the western
Hemisphere in the face of the war in Europe might be threatened
by inter-American disputes, the government of Haiti proposed
at the Second Meeting of banisters of Foreign affairs in Havana
the creation of a new peace instrument. The Haitian proposal
was adopted and became Resolution XIV of that conference. The
committee which was created as a result of that resolution be-
came a highly useful tool of inter-American dispute settlement,
the Inter-American Peace Committee.
This paper is divided into two parts. The first part des-
cribes the Peace Committee's organization and structure, the
history of its operations, the effect upon it of national for-
eign policies, and compares its peaceful settlement efforts
with those of other regional organizations. The second part
analyzes the necessity for a community peaceful settlement
mechanism in the development process, the efforts made to
achieve such a mechanism, and the possible future direction
such efforts may take.

ii
The peaceful settlement of disputes in the inter-American
community is a deep and complex subject. Research on it suf-
fers from the limited availability of source material as well
as the complicated issues. This paper attempts to uncover and
analyze as much as possible of the background and issues in-
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The Inter-American Feace Committee
As an Agency of Dispute Settlement and Peaceful Change
1948-1965

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND, ORGANIZATION khD STRUCTURE
Since the first International Conference in 'Washington in
1890, the pacific settlement of disputes has been one of the
major goals of the Pan American movement. An arbitration treaty
was drafted on the basis of the Flan of arbitration of that con-
ference, but it never went into effect because of lack of ratifica-
tion. However, the treaty presaged further attempts at sub-
sequent conferences. After several limited treaties on arbitra-
tion of pecuniary claims had been signed, the American states
produced a series of eight treaties between 1923 and 1936 cover-
ing most of the existing procedures of pacific settlement. These
treaties included: the Treaty to Avoid or Irevent Conflicts
between the American States— the Gondra Treaty—of May 3» 1923
»
providing for a commission of inquiry to conduct an impartial
investigation of the facts in all disputes not settled by dip-
lomacy or arbitration and which did not involve constitutional
provisions or matters previously settled by other treaties;
the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation of January
5, 1929 » providing for a conciliation procedure based on and
using the commissions of the Gondra Treaty; the General Treaty
of Inter-American Arbitration and Additional Protocol of Progress-
ive Arbitration, of January 5» 1929 » providing for the arbitra-
tion of all justiciable disputes; the Anti-War Treaty of Non-
Agression and Conciliation, of October 10, 1933, providing for
an alternative procedure of conciliation to that of the 1929
treaty; the Additional Protocol to the General Convention of
Inter-American Conciliation, of December 26, 1933, providing
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for permanent rather than ad hoc commissions of Investigation
and Conciliation for the Gondra Treaty and the 1929 conciliation
treaty; the Inter-American Treaty on Good Offices and Mediation,
of December 23 , 1936, providing for mediation of disputes by
an eminent citizen of the American states chosen by the disput-
ants from a list compiled by the Fan American Union; the Treaty
on the Prevention of Controversies of December 23, 1936, pro-
viding for a system of preventing future disputes through the
use of bilateral mixed commissions to study possible causes of
controversies and to propose measures for the application of
treaties in force between the parties; and the Convention to
Coordinate, Extend and Assure the Fulfillment of the Existing
Treaties Between the American States, of December 23 » 1936,
providing a reaffirmation of previous treaty commitments.
The patchwork peacekeeping system created by the above
treaties was unsatisfactory. They were difficult to apply in
practice, both because no treaty was ratified by all of the
American states and because of the extent of the reservations
attached by many states in ratifying the treaties. In most
cases, the precedures established were neither compulsory nor
binding; while the complex procedure and inherent delays in the
selection of ad hoc conciliation commissions was to be corrected
by the Additional Protocol of 1933 to the 1929 Conciliation Con-
vention, only two of these permanent commissions were ever or-
pganized in practice. The unsatisfactory state of the "system"
of peaceful settlement existing in 194-0 can be seen in the fact
1. Ann van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., The Organization
of American States (Dallas: Southern Methodist University






that only one dispute is known to have been settled by resort
to any of these treaties. This was a Haiti-Dominican .Republic
border dispute in 1937* settled through use of the Gondra Treaty
3
and the Conciliation Convention.
The Second Meeting of the Ministers of .Foreign Affairs of
the American Republics took place at Havana, Cuba, from July
21-30, 194-0. The danger of the European war to the Western
Hemisphere had increased with the fall of France, and. the sense
of solidarity of the American states led the Foreign Ministers
to agree to the Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance and Coopera-
tion for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas. This
declaration provided that an attack on any American state by
a non-American state would be considered as an attack on all
the signatories. It did not cover any case of aggression be-
tween American states. While aggression between American states
was not likely, even an unresolved dispute could endanger the
hemisphere's solidarity in the face of the .European threat.
For this reason, Haiti submitted a resolution to the conference
which called for the creation of "a committee composed of repre-
sentatives of five countries, which shall have the duty of
keeping constant vigilance to insure that States between which
any dispute exists or may arise, of any nature whatsoever, may
solve it as quickly as possible, and of suggesting, without det-
riment to the methods adopted by the parties or to the procedures
which they may agree upon, the measures and steps which may be




p. 4-8?, n. 21.
4. Ibid ., p. 210.
3. The Department of State Bulletin , August 24, 1940, p. 136.
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XIV and was accepted with only one reservation—Peru felt that
the Committee should function only at the request of the inter-
ested parties. As will be seen later, the Peruvian reserva-
tion was eventually incorporated into the 1956 Statutes of
the Peace Committee.
Resolution XIV was a distinct departure from previous prac-
tice in the inter-American system. It created a community
organ, the committee, to take cognizance of and encourage the
settlement of disputes, rather than rely solely on the fortuitous
possibility that one of the existing procedures of pacific settle-
ment would be applied, ^nd its grant of power to the Governing
Board of the Pan American Union to organize and select the Com-
mittee' s membership, coupled with the powers given to the Govern-
ing Board with regard to the calling of meetings of consultation
of the foreign ministers, came close to and perhaps did extend
the Board's powers into the political field from which it was
7previously barred. as the Committee itself noted later, the
creation of a committee for the purposes stated in Resolution
XIV "filled a gap left by the previous inter-American treaties,
which did not establish any real organ for conciliation or medi-
Q
ation within the regional system." The Committee's establish-
ment did not, however, create any new obligations for disputing
parties. «Vhile the Committee was to be constantly aware of the
occurrence of disputes and was to suggest to the parties appro-





7. Thomas and Thomas, Organization
, pp. 99-100; Arthur P. Whit-
aker, ed., Inter-American Affairs-1941 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1942,), pp. 35-36.
8. OAS, Second Special Inter-American Conference, Report of the
Inter-American Peace Committee on the Amendment of its Statutes
.
Submitted to the Second Special Inter-American Conference
,





parties to a dispute were to be under no legal obligation to
c
accept or act upon the Committee's suggestions. The Committee
was, in short, to be a permanent conciliation commission on a
multilateral basis, instead of on the merely bilateral basis of
the commissions established under the 1929 Conciliation Conven-
tion or its 1933 Additional Protocol.
The Governing Board of the Pan American Union, acting on
December 4, 1940, in accordance with Resolution XIV, established
Washington, D.C., as the seat of the Committee. It selected the
Committee membership geographically, choosing two northern coun-
tries (the United States and Mexico), two southern countries
(Argentina and Brazil), and one country from Central America
and the Antilles (Cuba). Although the member countries were
selected, no representatives were appointed at that time. Since
the Committee was not constituted, no organization or operating
rules were established. The Committee existed on paper only,
and this situation continued throughout World War II.
The Committee of .Resolution XIV continued its paper exist-
ence after World War II until its formal activation in 1948.
Wo mention of the Committee was made in either the Charter of
the Organization of American States or the American Treaty of
Pacific Settlement (Fact of Bogota) both of which were produced
by the Ninth International Conference of American States at
Bogota in 1948. The fact that the Committee was overlooked at
Bogota is usually attributed to the reason that it was not yet
9. Thomas and Thomas, Organization
, p. 125
•
10. OAS, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Second Report of the
Inter-American Peace Committee^ Submitted to the Tenth Inter-
American Conference , Doc. 11, SG-11 , 3 February, 1954
(Washington: Pan American Union, 1954), p. 4.
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constiduted at that time. Yet a request had been made for
the installation of the Committee by the Ambassador of the
Dominican Republic in a note sent to the Director General of
the Pan American Union on September 23, 194-7 • And the Committee,
to be known as the "Inter-American Committee on Methods for the
Peaceful Solution of Conflicts," was installed by the Chairman
of the Council of the OaS on July 31, 1948, only three months
12
after fche Bogota Conference. Since Resolution XIV of 1940
was not one of the eight treaties, conventions, and protocols
made ineffective by Article LVI1I of the Pact of Bogota with
respect to the ratifying parties, the legal basis of the Com-
mittee was still valid, although there was some question as to
its relationship to the GAS. To clarify the relationship, and
since the Inter-American Conference is the organ responsible
for policy formation and determination of structure and function
of GAS organs, the Council later decided to include a study of
the status of the Committee on the agenda of the Tenth Inter-
13American Conference. *
Pending a determination of its exact legal status, the Com-
mittee began work. Cn the day of its installation, it elected
its first Chairman, Ambassador Luis Quintanilla, the Represent-
14
ative of Mexico. On August 13, 194-8, almost 11 months after
the Dominican Ambassador had requested installation of the Com-
mittee, it met to consider its first controversy, involving the
Dominican Republic and Cuba. ^ The Committee operated without
11. Annals of the Organization of American States , Vol. II (1950)*
p. 23.
12. OAS, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Second Report , p. 4.
13 • Thomas and Thomas, Organization
, p. 126.
14. OAS, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Second Report , p. 4.
15» ibid . , p. 5» The nature of the controversy and action taken
by the Committee will be considered in Chapter 2.
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a formal set of rules until August 24, 1948, when it adopted
its "Bases of Action" for the conduct of its work and delibera-
16
tions. The "Bases" included the following powers and pro-
cedures: The Committee was to have jurisdiction over a dispute
between two or more states when direct negotiations or usual
diplomatic procedures had failed or when circumstances made nego-
tiations impossible. It could meet at any American state's re-
quest or on its own initiative, but could act in the considera-
tion of disputes between two or more states only at the request
of one of the parties. The Committee could offer its good
offices to the parties before suggesting more specific methods
and steps to them, and could recommend that the parties make
their pleas conform to the provisions of international law.
The meetings of the Committee were to be closed, but all Com-
mittee actions and all documentation received were to be placed
at the disposal of all parties. At the conclusion of the Com-
mittee's study of the claims and reports, it was, if it deemed
advisable, to suggest methods and actions for achieving a friend-
ly settlement. If the parties were able to reach agreement,
the Committee was to deliver to them only the minutes containing
the text of the agreement. However, if no agreement was reached,
the minutes delivered were to contain a full account of the
negotiations and the Committee's work. The Committee was to
determine in each case the nature and timing of the publication
of information. Committee reports on its work were to be made
zo each Meeting of Consultation and Inter-American Conference
as required by Resolution XIV of 1940, and the Committee mem-





bership was designated as the representatives of Argentina,
Brazil, the United States, Mexico, and Cuba in conformity with
the decision of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union
in 194-0. Majority vote was specified for both decisions on
17
normal Committee business and amendment of the Bases of Action. '
On July 6, 194-9* the Committee decided to simplify its
name. The "Inter-American Committee on Methods for the Peace-
ful Solution of Conflicts" became simply the Inter-American
Peace Committee. The Committee's permanence was furthered on
May 24, 1950, by adopting a set of statutes to replace the
"Bases of Action" of 1948, and copies were sent directly to
"I Q
all the American republics. There was evidently no question
of obtaining Council approval of the Statutes, since, although
the old Governing Board of the Pan American Union had been author-
ized to establish and select the members of the Committee, the
Committee was made responsible by Resolution XIV only to the
Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and to the Inter-
American Conferences.
In the 1950 Statutes, the Committee made several changes
which considerably extended its competence and powers. Whereas
in a dispute between two or more states the 1948 Bases of Action
had limited the Committee to acting only at the request of any
one of the parties (although it could meet on its own initiative
or at the request of any American state), the 1950 Statutes
17. Ibid .
18. GAS, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Second Report
, pp. 5»
20-23. The 1950 Statutes may also be found in OAS, Second
Special Inter-American Conference, Report on Amendment
,
pp. 29-32, and Annals of the OaS , Vol. 2, pp. 320-321.
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imposed no such limitation. Faragraph 7 states:
The Committee may take action at the request
of any American State, when the recourse of
direct negotiations has been exhausted, when
none of the other customary procedures of dip-
lomacy or of pacific settlement is in process
or when existing circumstances render negotia-
tion impracticable. 19
Paragraph 12 further states:
Any American State, whether or not it is a
directly interested Party or is represented
in the membership of the Committee, may, at
any time, call the attention of that body to
any inter-American dispute that, in the judg-
ment of the said State, merits consideration
by the Committee. The Committee shall pro-
ceed to study the corresponding petition, for
which purpose it may request the cooperation
of the directly interested States; and in due
time it shall make known its opinion on the
subject. 20
In extending its powers to consider and take action in
a dispute without necessarily having the concurrence of the
parties, the Committee was bringing its competence more into
conformity with Resolution XIV of 1940 which required that it
keep "constant vigilance to insure that States between which
any dispute exists or may arise . . . may solve it as quickly
21
as possible ....'• That Resolution XIV did not intend
that the consent of the parties necessarily be required may
be deduced from the fact that Peru's reservation was specific-
22ally on this point. The statement of the Committee's duties
incorporated into paragraph 6 of the Statutes was, in fact,
taken verbatim from Resolution XIV. Submission of a dispute
19. OAS, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Second Report
, p. 20.
20. Ibid ., p. 21.





by a directly interested party did make a difference in the
way it v/as handled, however, in that the Charman was in that
case to call for an immediate meeting of the Committee and to
23
notify the other party or parties involved. "
The new Statutes did not specifically name the member
countries on the Committee, stating only that it was "com-
posed of Representatives of five American countries . . . ."
Although this might have been construed to permit countries
other than the original members to serve on the Committee,
no procedure for election or replacement of members was pro-
vided. Frovision was made for the office of Chairman with
a term of one year and rotation among the member countries
25in an order determined by drawing lots. y This provision
merely formalized the arrangement which the Committee had
been following since 194-8. Most of the Committee procedures
remained the same as they were under the Bases of Action,
but meetings were hanceforth to be public rather than closed
unless the Committee decided otherwise. In addition to in-
forming Meetings of Consultation and Inter-American Confer-
ences of disputes examined and action taken to effect settle-
ment, the Committee was also to inform the CAS Secretary
26General and the UN Security Council.
Though the 1950 Statutes clarified and formalized the
Committee's own concept of its function and powers, there
was still question as to the exact relationship of the Com-
mittee to the CAS. The OAS Council had approved a resolution







26. 1015 ., pp. 21-22.
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to include a study of the Peace Committee on the Agenda of the
Tenth Inter-American Conference to be held in Caracas in 19-54-*
In view of this fact, the Committee decided that it should
make known to the Conference its own views concerning its
organization and operation. The Committee therefore included
a Lraft Resolution on the Organization 'and Operation of the
Inter-American Feace Committee in the report which it sub-
mitted to the Tenth Inter-American Conference. Approval of
its suggestions would, the Committee felt, "ensure acceptance
of the Committee as an even more representative agency of the
community of American nations and enable it to carry on its
27duties more effectively." '
The Committee's Draft Resolution contained a number of
very interesting changes from the 1950 Statutes. The most
surprising of these changes were the restrictions which the
Committee proposed to put on its competence to handle dis-
putes. With regard to the consent of the parties, the Draft
Resolution was even more restrictive than the 19^-8 Bases of
Action had been. Once again, the Committee would deal with
a dispute when requested to do so by only one of the inter-
ested parties. It could also act when the request came from
an American state not a party to the dispute, but in such
cases prior consent of the directly-interested parties would
have to be obtained. The Committee was to be "limited to
suggesting measures or steps conducive to the solution of the
disputes or controversies," although "in considering a dis-
27. Ibid ., p. 2.
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pute or controversy, the Committee may investigate the facts,
Pft
with the express consent of the directly-interested Parties."
Rotation of membership was to be provided through the elec-
tion by the Council of one new member each year, to serve for
pq
a five year term, and any member could be reelected.
In its consideration of the status of the Peace Com-
mittee, the Tenth Inter-American Conference proposed no
radical changes. Though it might logically be considered
that the Peace Committee should be incorporated into the pro-
cedures of the Pact of Bogota, no suggestion of doing this
30
was advanced at Caracas. The Conference passed two resolu-
tions concerning the Peace Committee. The first, Resolution
CI, applauded "the fruitful work in the interest of the peace
of the Continent, carried out in a timely and effective manner
and in a lofty American Spirit by the Inter-American Peace
31Committee."^ The second, Resolution CII, expressed the Con-
ference's confidence in the Peace Committee and continued its
existence within the inter-American system. It further re-
quested the Council of the OAS "to prepare ... a new statute
for the Inter-American Peace Committee, based on the draft pre-
pared by the Committee and submitted to this Conference, and
taking also into consideration the various amendments and
observations submitted by the governments to the Conference,
as well as any that their representatives may submit when the
28. Ibid
., pp. 16-17.
29. Ibid" ., p« 15.
30. Thomas and Thomas, Organization , p. 126.
31. OAS, Second Special Inter^American Conference, Report on
Amendment t p. 2,
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32Council discusses the matter."^ The resolution also provided
that the existing (1950) Statutes would continue in effect
until new statutes were approved by the Council and that the
draft statutes were to be submitted to the governments prior
to Council approval.
After the Tenth Inter-American Conference ended, the
Council established a Committee on Juridical-Political Matters
for the purpose of studying the Conference resolutions in these
areas. Among the resolutions to be studied was Resolution
CII. As required by the terras of the resolution, this Com-
mittee prepared a new set of draft statutes. The Council
transmitted these draft statutes to the governments on August
5, 1955* Written observations on this preliminary draft were
submitted to the Council by the governments of Argentina,
Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
and the United States. These observations were, in turn,
referred to the Committee on Juridical-Political Matters.
After further meetings in which the observations were consi-
dered, the Committee drafted a new text and submitted it to
the Council with a report dated February 6, 1956. The Council,
in six meetings from February 15, 1956, through May 9, 1956,
considered the draft statutes and made several changes, finally
approving the new Statutes of the Inter-American Peace Com-
mittee on the latter date.
32. OAS, Inter-American Peace Committee, Report of the Inter-
American Peace Committee to the Second Special Inter-American
Conference on the Activities of the Committee since the
Tenth Inter-American Conference, 1954—1965* OEA/Ser. 1/
III/II. 10 (Washington: Pan American Union, 1965), p. 4.
33* Annals of the Organization of American States, Vol. VIII





The 1956 Statutes of the Peace Committee are by far the
most restrictive under which it has operated. They go further
in this respect than the Committee's own 1954 draft had gone.
The 1954 Committee draft would have permitted a non-party to
bring a dispute to the Committee's attention, though consent
of the parties to the dispute would have been required be-
fore the Committee could act. And if one of the parties to
a dispute requested Committee action, the Committee would have
had power to deal with t;he case even though the other party
or parties did not consent. The 1956 Statutes provide that
only a state directly concerned with a dispute can bring it
to the Committee's attention, and that the Committee can not
even "Chen take up the dispute without the prior consent of
34the other party or parties. The new Statutes provide for
the rotation of members with terms of five years. However,
re-election is prohibited for at least one year after a mem-
ber's term expires. Extension of a member's terra is provided
if it expires while the Committee is acting on a particular
case, but only for the duration of that case. And whereas
under the 1950 Statutes a member of the Committee who was a
national of a party to a dispute being considered was re-
quired only to abstain from voting, the 1956 Statutes require
that under such circumstances that state may not act as a mem-
ber of the Committee; the Committee is to request the Council
to designate a substitute member for the consideration of
35that dispute. If the Committee receives the consent of all
$4. OAS, Inter-American Peace Committee, Report on Activities
,
pp. 5-6; OAS, Inter-American Peace Committee, Statutes , Ap-
proved by the Council of the Organization of American States
on Aiay 9« 3.956 , OEA/Ser. L/III/I.l (Washington; Pan American
Union, 1965), pp. 2-3.
55. Ibid
. , pp. 1-2.
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parties to a dispute to take up the case, it is to do so im-
mediately, If it does not receive such consent, the Committee
is restricted to transmitting all of the communications ex-
changed to the governments of all OAS member states and making
reports to the OAS Council, the Meetings of Consultation, the
Inter-American Conferences, and the UN Security Council. Any
expenses which the Committee might incur in its activities
in a particular dispute are to be defrayed by the parties to
the dispute, although secretarial services and working facil-
ities are still provided by the CAS General Secretariat. Un-
like the 1950 Statutes which provided that amendments to the
statutes could be adopted by a majority vote of the Committee,
the 1956 Statutes provide that amendments are to be adopted
by an Inter-American Conference based on proposals of any OAS
36
member state or of the Peace Committee itself. This last
change has imposed a rigidity on the Feace Committee's struc-
ture which has made it less adaptable to changes in the inter-
national situation while ensuring that any changes in the Com-
mittee's functions or powers reflect the opinion of all of the
OaS member states, rather than just that of the five Committee
members.
No further changes have been made in the Feace Committee's
Statutes since 1956. From 1956 until the Fifth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Santiago in
1959, no requests were made for Committee action. In its
report to the Fifth Meeting, the Feace Committee noted this
fact and stated its opinion that the preference of the govern-
36. Ibid., p. 3.
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ments for other procedures to resolve disputes may have been
due to the changes introduced in the 1956 Statutes. '
As a result of the above comment, the delegation of
Ecuador to the Fifth Meeting proposed a draft resolution for
the revision of the 1956 Statutes. "In order to restore [to}
the Inter-American Peace Committee the effectiveness it former-
ly had," Che draft resolution resolved "to request the Council
of the Organization of American States to revise the present
Statutes of the Inter-American Peace Committee, especially
Articles 2, 7» H» 12, and 15» for the purpose of restoring
to that agency the powers needed to attain the objectives
that inspired its creation at the Second Meeting of Consulta-
'58
tion of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Eavana in 194-0."^
The Fifth Meeting of Consultation, by Resolution VI, trans-
mitted the draft resolution of Ecuador to the Inter-American
Juridical Committee for study and a report.
The Inter-American Juridical Committee, in examining the
Ecuadorian resolution and the past history of Peace Committee
activities, found difficulty in making a concrete recommenda-
tion with respect to the proposed enlargement of the Peace
Committee's powers. The Juridical Committee noted that the
Tenth Inter-American Conference had stated its confidence in
the Peace Committee and had said nothing about restricting
the powers of that committee. It could, instead of provid-
37 • OaS, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee to the
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of I inisters of Foreign Affairs
,
Doc
. 5» 6 August 1959 ( Washington : Pan American Union, 1959)
i
pp. 3-4.
38. OaS, Inter-American Juridical Committee, Study by the Inter-
American Juridical Committee of the Proposal of Ecuador Con-
cerning the Inter-American Peace Committee , Doc. C1J-50
(vVashington: Pan American Union, 1959). p. 3.
39. Ibid ., p. 7.

-17-
ing that the 1950 Statutes were to continue in force until new
ones were approved by the Council, have specified provisional
rules of jurisdiction to the Committee—if, in fact, its inten-
tion was to restrict the Committee's powers. That it did not
do so could be cited, said the Juridical Committee, to show
that, in a sense, the Conference "supported the broader juris-
40diction of the 1950 statutes." The restriction on Committee
action at third-party request proposed in the Peace Committee's
1954 draft resolution was noted, but the Juridical Committee
felt that this proposal "was probably justified on the ground
that thereby the Committee might anticipate any tendency
41toward restricting its jurisdiction." In any event, the
Juridical Committee thought that the 195^- draft resolution
42
was closer to the 1950 Statutes than to the 1956 rules.
The Juridical Committee noted that the Peace Committee derived
its right to existence from .Resolution XIV of the Second Meet-
ing of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. However,
the Committee stated that from the language of .Resolution aIV
it could draw no inference as to which of the two Statutes,
451950 or 1956, conformed more closely. Therefore, the Com-
mittee decided to take no stand with regard to the Peace Com-
mittee' 3 powers. It indicated that it felt that the juris-
diction of the Peace Committee should be more precisely de-
lineated by an Inter-American Conference and, until that time,
"the American governments must decide the question according
40. Ibid ., p. 8.
41. Ibid ., p. 7.
42. TbTd . t p. 8.
43. Ibid" ., pp. 10-11.
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to the greater or lesser success obtained respectively by
applying the statutes of 1950 or those of 1956."
The 1959 Meeting of Consultation was called to study
the international tension in the Caribbean area. The foreign
ministers considered that the Peace Committee was an appro-
priate entity for assisting in the realization of the pur-
poses for which the meeting was convoked, and conferred new
powers upon the Comirittee in Resolution IV of the Meeting.
The Committee was directed to study and report on these topics:
methods and procedures to prevent external activities de-
signed to overthrow existing governments or provoke inter-
vention or aggression; the relationship between human rights
violations or lacK of representative democracy on one hand
and political tensions endangering hemispheric peace on the
other; and the relationship between economic underdevelop-
ment and political instability. y The Committee was empow-
ered in the performance of these duties to take action "at
the request of governments or on its own initiative" and, in
either case, to obtain the express consent of states before
46
conducting investigations in their territories. The new
powers were to be effective only until the close of the
Eleventh Inter-American Conference which would decide whether
47
or not to include them in the Statutes. '
The Peace Committee, after submitting routine reports,
which included its activities under Resolution IV, to the
Seventh and Eighth Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of
44. Ibid
., p. 11.
45. Thomas and Thomas, Organization
, p. 128; CAS, Inter-









Foreign Affairs, submitted a special report concerning Resolu-
tion IV to the Second Special Inter-American Conference at
48
Rio de Janeiro in 1965* In this special report, the Com-
mittee expressed its views concerning the special duties and
powers provisionally granted to it in the 1959 resolution.
Sith regard to the situation of concern to the Council in
1959 and the various security, political, economic, social,
cultural and other problems it was expected to consider, the
Committee pointed out "the difficulty of embarking on the
study of a situation which includes nearly all the problems
of the hemisphere and in which, as regards the Caribbean situ-
ation, the Committee's competence is not clearly defined." y
The Committee noted that the topics which it was to study un-
der paragraph 1. of Resolution IV were being covered in other
ways. The Cuban situation had been handled by the Organ of
Consultation at Punta del Este and Washington, D.C. in 1962
and 1964, respectively; an Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights had been established by the Fifth Meeting of Consulta-
tion and had submitted special reports in its field both for
the Caribbean and for the rest of the hemisphere; and the
agenda of the Second Special Inter-American Conference in-
cluded a topic on the effective exercise of representative
SOdemocracy. The Committee pointed out that clarification
was needed between its functions under Resolution IV and those
48. OAS, Second Special Inter-American Conference, Special Re-
port of the Inter-American Peace Committee called for in
Paragraph 3 of Resolution IV of the Fifth Meeting of Con-
sultation of iViinisters of Foreign Affairs, Submitted to the
Second Special Inter-American Conference , Doc. 39 » 0£A/Ser. E/
XIII. 1 (Washington: Pan American Union, 1965)*





of other committees assigned to deal with security questions.
The Committee felt that it "should not be vested with functions
of an investigatory nature which have no basis in its statutes
or which conflict with its mission of suggesting methods and
procedures for the solution of international differences. "^
As a result of this special report, the Second Special Inter-
American Conference, in Resolution XVIII, terminated the powers
52provisionally vested in the Inter-American Peace Committee.
The Second Special Inter-American Conference also con-
sidered the question of amendment of the Statutes of the Inter-
American Peace Committee. The Conference had before it the
Peace Committee's report concerning the amendment of its stat-
utes, its report pursuant to Resolution IV of 1959, a draft
resolution presented by the delegation of Haiti concerning
the competence of the Peace Committee, and the Inter-American
Juridical Committee's study of Ecuador's 1959 draft resolution.
Considering these reports and resolutions and the minutes of
the meetings of its Committee III, the Conference resolved,
also in Resolution XVIII, to submit all of the documents to
the Council of the OAS for determination, after consultation
with the member states, of the desirability of amending the
Peace Committee's Statutes. April 1, 1966, was set as the
closing date for the consultations with the member states.
If the Council determined amendment to be desirable, it was
to amend the Statutes in accordance with the member states'
observations. However, the Conference specifically instructed
51 * Ibid . , pp. 4—5.
52. OAS, Second Special Inter-American Conference, Final Act
,




the Council not to include any of the powers which the Peace
Committee had been granted under Resolution IV of 1959 and
which had just been terminated." The intent of this final
provision is not entirely clear. The "powers" granted to the
Peace Committee under Resolution IV included the authority
to take action at the request of any government or on its
own initiative. These powers were similar to those which the
Peace Committee had had prior to 1956 and which the various
proposals for amendment were intended to restore. If the Con-
ference intended to preclude the granting of such powers in
any possible amendments to the Statutes, there would seem to
be little point in further attempts to broaden the Committee's
powers. However, it is possible that the intent of the Con-
ference was rather to preclude the granting of competence to
the Peace Committee in any of the three areas with which Resolu-
tion IV had been concerned, that is, security, human rights,
and economic underdevelopment. If this is the case, the Con-
ference's prohibition would be fully in accord with the de-
sires of the Peace Committee itself—as expressed in its
special report to the Conference.
The period of consultation with the OAS member states is
still in progress, and until a decision is made to amend the
Statutes, the Peace Committee will continue to be governed by
the 1956 Statutes—no longer modified by Resolution IV s addi-
tional grant of powers. Under the 1956 Statutes, only two
cases have been considered by the Peace Committee, as opposed
to ten cases under the 194-8 Bases of Action and 1950 Statutes
53. Ibid ., p. JO.
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and six cases under Resolution IV of 1959.
Membership in the Inter-American Peace Committee did not
change from the initial selection of states by the Governing
Board of the Fan American Union on December 4, 1940, until
the adoption of the present Statutes by the Council of the
OaS on May 9, 1956. The initial members were the United States,
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Cuba. On August 6, 1956, the
Council, acting in accordance with the transitory article
of the new statutes, reelected the original five members of
the Peace Committee for terms varying from one to five years
so that one new member would be elected each year thereafter.
The terms were: Cuba—one year, Argentina— two years, Brazil
—
three years, United States— four years, and Mexico—five years.
Since 1957 » the following countries have been elected for










It may be noted that the United States has been a member
)f the Committee for all but one year, 1960-1961. This one
rear period is the mandatory minimum lapse before a particular
country can again be elected under the 1956 Statutes. Since
;he rotation of members began under the 1956 Statutes, only
:wo other countries have been reelected to membership—Argentina




ifter a lapse of five years, and Brazil after a lapse of six
fears.

ChAVTER 2: PEACE COMMITTEE Of ORATIONS
Although the creation of the Inter-Araerican Peace Commit-
tee was authorized by the foreign ministers in 194-0 and selection
of the member countries was made by the Governing Board of the
Pan American Union in December of that year, operations of the
Committee did not begin until the summer of 194-8. The reason
for this lengthy delay in activating the Committee is not clear.
The wording of Resolution XIV of 194-0 gives no indication that
installation of t»he Committee was to depend on the existence of
a specific dispute or the request of a particular nation. The
Resolution's basis lay in the assertion that "it is imperative
that differences existing between some of the American nations
be settled." Use of the phrases "keeping constant vigilance"
and "between which any dispute exists or may arise" would seem
to indicate that the intent of the foreign ministers v/as to have
p
the Committee organized and activated as soon as possible.
The fact that organization of the Committee went no further
than the naming of the member countries could perhaps be attrib-
uted "Co the opinion that the existing differences were not amen-
able to conciliation by such a committee or that they did not,
in fact, endanger the solidarity of the hemisphere. The foreign
ministers meeting at Havana certainly had more to occupy their
interest and concern in the existing extra-hemispheric threat
and its subsequent development. Possibly the inter-American
"differences" that occasioned Resolution XIV so paled in compar-





ison with the existing war in Europe and the World war which
followed that active efforts to settle them were deemed unneces-
sary until "world peace was again achieved. filth one exception,
peaceful relations were maintained between the American nations
during the war, and no occasion was found for activation of the
Committee. The exception was a dispute over boundaries be-
tween Ecuador and Peru which, after Feruvian occupation of the
port of Guayaquil, resulted in signature of a Frotocol of Peace,
Friendship and Boundaries at the Third Meeting of Ministers of
Foreign affairs at Rio de Janeiro in 1942. Efforts of the
committee recommended by Re solution X.1V might have aided in the
solution of this dispute; however, since the foreign ministers
were themselves available at the time, conciliation could be
applied on a higher level, a solution was achieved in the form
of the Protocol referred to above, and, apparently, no question
of activation of the Peace Committee was raised.
Although no situation or dispute arose during World War II
which occasioned activation of the Resolution XIV committee,
the course of post-war events in the Caribbean-Central American
area was to provide numerous opportunities for its employment.
Political instability had always been endemic among the nine
small countries in the area. Disparities in wealth and privi-
lege arising from the existing patterns of monoculture and land
tenure heightened political unrest, and social and economic
pressures for change grew rapidly, encouraged by such declara-
tions of political, economic and social rights as were enunci-
3. The New York Times , March 13 » 1966.; Ann van Wynen Thomas and
A. J. Thomas, Jr., The Organization of American States ,
PP. 314-315, 493 n.~W-
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ated in the Rio Treaty preamble and the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Wan. There were, moreover, poli-
tical and ideological tensions between authoritarian and demo-
cratic or democratically-inclined regimes. This latent sus-
picion and hostility was exacerbated by the activities of poli-
tical exiles, the large unregulated post-war flow of arms into
the area, and poor governmental supervision and control of
borders which made it possible for unauthorized, irresponsible
persons to obtain these arms. Deeply involved in the agitation
causing these tensions was an organization called the "Carib-
bean Legion." This group, tacitly supported by Costa Rica,
Guatemala, and Cuba, was dedicated to overthrowing the area's
dictatorships
—
primarily those of Somoza in Nicaragua and Tru-
jillo in the Dominican Republic. The Legion, composed of poli-
tical exiles, adventurers, and mercenaries, was allowed to use
the territories of Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba for such il-
legal activities as organizing and training invasion expeditions,
arms traffic, and aircraft operations. Nicaragua and the Domin-
ican Republic retaliated by supporting subversive and revolution-
ary movements aimed at overthrowing the Costa Rican, Guatemalan,
c.
and Cuban governments.
The incidents generated by the above activities came to
the attention of the OAS both as requests for action "by the
Peace Committee and for convocation of a Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs— the latter primarily in cases
4. Thomas and Thomas, Organization
, pp. 222-224; fidgar S. Purniss,
Jr., "The Inter-American System and Recent Caribbean Disputes,"
International Organization , Vol IV (1950) » P» 585*
5. Ibid ., p. 586.




where actual armed attacks or invasions by exile groups had
occurred. The first of these cases was the one which brought
to life the long-dormant Resolution XIV of 1940. On September
23, 194-7 » shortly after the conference which created the Rio
Treaty had ended, the Dominican Ambassador presented a request
to the Director General of the Fan American Union for installa-
tion of the Committee. «.t the time, no specific controversy
was mentioned, .after an unexplained 10-month delay—during
which the Ninth International Conference of American States met
at Bogota and created the Organization of American States
—
the "necessary steps" for the appointment of member country
representatives had been taken and the Inter-American Committee
on Methods for the Peaceful Solution of Conflicts was installed
7by the Chairman of the GAS Council. Two weeks later, on August
13, 1948, the Committee met and received a special delegation
from the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic requested
the Committee's assistance in resolving a situation in which
it charged that Cuba was permitting the use of its territory
by persons planning to invade the Dominican Republic. After
informing the Cuban government of the request, the Committee
held a number of meetings both with and without the Parties'
Q
representatives. Finally, in a meeting held on September 9»
19^8, after a plea by the Committee Chairman to attempt to
reach a settlement at that meeting, the Parties agreed to seek
a solution by direct negotiation through normal diplomatic
G
channels. 7
7« CAS, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Second Report of the Inter-









The second case handled by the Committee was an outgrowth
of an attempt by Haiti to invoke the Rio Treaty for the second
time. (The first resort to the Rio Treaty occurred in December,
194-8, when Costa Rica charged that an armed force had invaded
its territory from Nicaragua. In that case, a Meeting of Con-
sultation was convoked without setting a date, and the OAS
Council handled the dispute in its capacity as Provisional
Or^an of Consultation.) In this case, Haiti requested, in a
letter dated February 15 <, 19z*-9» that the Council constitute
itself as a Provisional Organ of Consultation, and then charged
that the Dominican Republic had committed "moral aggression" in
permitting a former Haitian army colonel, Astrel Roland, to
conduct a radio campaign of violent propaganda attacks on the
Haitian government. Roland was holding a Haitian diplomatic
post in Ciucad Tru.jillo when he rebelled, sought asylum from
the Lominican government, and began his propaganda campaign.
The Haitian government, after first protesting to the Dominican
Republic, requested application of the Rio Treaty by the OAS
Council. Since the inviolability or integrity of the territory,
sovereignty, or political independence of Haiti were not affected,
the Council concluded that the dispute did not come within the
provisions of the Rio Treaty. It recommended that the parties
settle the dispute by peaceful means in accordance with existing
treaties.
The case came before the Peace Committee on the basis of
a note from the government of Haiti. The Committee met on
10. Thomas and Thomas, Organization
, pp. 298-299.
11. Ibid
. , p. 299; "Mission Completed: A Dispute Between Haiti




kiarch 24, 1949» to consider the Haitian request and then notified
the Dominican government. The Committee met several times with
the representatives of the Parties and then decided, with the
consent of both governments, to send a delegation to visit both
countries. The delegation, composed of the Argentine, United
States, and Mexican ambassadors, visited Port-au-Prince and
Ciudad Trujillo during the week of Liay 29 to June 4, 194-9.
While in each capital, the delegation conferred with the Pres-
ident, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other high officials.
The delegation succeeded in drafting a joint declaration and ob-
taining the approval of both Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The
declaration reaffirmed the parties' Good Neighbor objectives,
stated their intentions not to tolerate subversive activities
aimed at each other, and promised to resort to direct negotia-
tion or other peaceful procedures in future disputes. The Com-
mittee held a special meeting on June 9» 1949 » at which time the
joint declaration was read. It was published simultaneously in
both capitals on June 10, 194-9. 12
Notwithstanding its pledge, the Dominican government per-
mitted the subversive activities to. continue. After the Haitian
police had put down a armed conspiracy in November and December,
194-9, the Haitian government again invoked the Rio Treaty against
Haiti and several other Caribbean governments. In this case,
the Council did invoke the Rio Treaty and handled the case act-
ing as Provisional Organ of Consultation in the same manner as it
had done in the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan case. ^
12. OAS, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Second Report
, pp. 6-7*
27-29.




The third case was brought before the Committee, now known
(since July 6, 194-9) as the Inter-American Peace Committee, on
August 3» 194-9* The Committee's good offices were requested by
the government of Cuba to assist in finding a solution to a con-
troversy with the government of Feru over the granting of asylum
by the 'Cuban Embassy in Lima to two Peruvian citizens on December
29, 194-8. Committee action was rendered unnecessary and the case
was closed when the Cuban government reported on August 17th
that the asylees had left the Embassy on August 14-th.
The Peace Committee's fourth case was not a specific dis-
pute, but rather the general question of Caribbean political ten-
sions. The Committee met on August 3, 194-9, at the request .of
the United States representative, Ambassador Paul C. Daniels,
to consider the Caribbean situation. The Committee informed
the other 0A8 Council representatives of the situation and re-
quested that it be furnished any information or suggestions
which their governments might with to offer. In reply to this
request, observations and information were sent to the Committee
by the governments of Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican .Republic,
15Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, the United States, and Venezuela. '
The Committee studied the problem carefully and, in a public
meeting on September 14, 1949 » adopted a series of conclusions
concerning the Caribbean situation. In "calling to the attention
of the American conscience the lofty and indispensable postulates
of our international relationships," the Committee stated that
it believed that
14. CAS, Tenth Inter-^merican Conference, Second Peport
, p. 7«
15. Ibid
. t pp. 7-8.
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its duty in this natter is limited to the solemn
reaffirmation of certain standards and principles
that are basic for American peace and solidarity,
principles and standards whose proper observance
would, in the opinion of the Committee, not only
keep such a situation as the one under considera-
tion from arising, but avoid even the slightest
symptom of disturbed relations among the American
States. 16
Among the principles and standards which the Committee
stated in its conclusions were the "basic principle" of non-
intervention; a state's duty to prevent the use of its territory
for preparing or initiating aggression against a state with
which it is at peace—a principle formalized in the Convention
on the Bights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife,
signed in 1928; the CAS Council Resolution of December 24, 194-8,
in the Costa Rican-'nicaraguan case, recommending that states rid.
their territories of such conspiratorial groups; the desirability
of avoiding hostile and systematic propaganda against other
countries or governments; the desirability of maintaining friend-
ly diplomatic relations among the American States; the "common
denominator" of democracy in American political life; and the
various methods within the inter-American system for the pacific
17
settlement of disputes. '
This case was the first one in which a general situation
of unrest rather than a specific dispute between particular par-
ties was brought before the Peace Committee. Three of the five
Representatives on the Committee made statements concerning the
Committee's competence under Resolution XIV to handle such gener-
al situations. Ambassador Luis ^uintanilla, the Representative
16. Ibid
. , p. 30; Annals of the OAS , Vol. I, p. 393.




of Mexico and Chairman of the Committee, expressed his delega-
tion's doubt as to the Committee' s juridical competence to deal
with general situations, since Resolution XIV of 1940 had
charged the Committee only with insuring the solution of dis-
lft
putes which exist or may arise between states. This inter-
pretation of Resolution XIV is open to question, however, since
in "Keeping constant vigilance" zo insure that disputes which
may arise in the future are quickly settled, the Committee could
logically be expected to consider general situations of tension
from which a dispute might arise. The question of interpreta-
tion in this case may be compared to that discussed in Chapter
1 in which the Inter-American Juridical Committee declined to
interpret Resolution XIV with respect to the provisions of the
1950 an<i 1956 Statutes regarding consent of the parties to a
19dispute. y In the absence of a decision on the matter by an
Inter-American Conference or Meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, neither interpretation can be proven correct. The
Argentine Representative, Ambassador Enrique Corominas, after
nis delegation had considered the question of the Committee's
competence in this case, would make no observations on it regard-
ing the Committee's conclusions. The third statement, by the
Cuban Representative, Ambassador Gonzalo Guell, presented the
opposite view to that of Mexico, and supported the "inter-
20American universality" of the Committee's work. (The Mex-
ican delegation's doubts concerning the Committee's competence
did not preclude its active participation in the Committee's
discussion and conclusions on the Caribbean question.)
18. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
19. Supra
, p. 17.




The fifth case handled by the Peace Committee resulted
from allegations made in news reports from official Dominican
government agencies that preparations were being made on Cuban
territory for an invasion of the Dominican Republic. These
21
charges were immediately denied by the Cuban government.
A week later, on December 6, 194-9, Cuban embassador Gonzalo
Guell addressed a note to the Peace Committee outlining and
refuting the Dominican charges, and inviting the Peace Committee
to visit the site of the alleged incidents to confirm the ab-
22
sence of any such activities. The Committee, however, meet-
ing on December 13th, decided to accept Cuba's categorical assur-
ances that it did not and would not tolerate illegal activities
against another government. In a letter dated December 16,
194-9, Ambassador Hildebrando Accioly of Brazil, Chairman of the
Committee since replacing Luis <iuintanilla on November 2nd, de-
23
clined the Cuban government's invitation. y
In this case, as in the asylum case involving Cuba and
Peru, the Committee did not become involved to the extent of
performing an actual conciliatory role. Only one of the par-
ties appeared before the Committee in each case—indeed, the
Committee did not even attempt to bring the parties together,
and the Committee dropped the cases without attempting or achiev-
ing any agreement with the other party.
The brewing Caribbean storm was not quelled, either by the
Peace Committee's study and conclusions on the general causes
of unrest or by its support for Cuba in its budding controversy
21. The New York Times , November 30, 194-9.
22. The New York Times , December 8, 194-9; OAS, Tenth Inter-
American Conference, Second Report





wibh the Dominican Republic. In fact, the day prior to the
Committee's December 13th meeting to discuss Cuba's denial of
the Dominican allegations, President Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic requested from his Congress the power to declare war
on countries which supported movements and activities directed
24
at his overthrow. After a two-week delay, Trujillo received
this power, and still another situation arose in which the Com-
mittee acted without hearing the party against whom a complaint
25
was lodged. y There was no formal complaint in this case, but
the grant to Trujillo of the power to declare war was discussed
by the Committee, and in a letter to Dominican Ambassador Salazar
on December 29 * 194-9 » Chairman Accioly expressed the Committee's
grave concern. lie pointed out the provisions of the Rio Treaty
(Articles 3, 6, and 9) which provide for collective assistance
to an American State which suffers an attack, whether armed or
not, and the formal renunciations of war and pledges of resort
to methods of peaceful settlement of all disputes.
This letter apparently did not have the intended effect on
the Dominican government: As previously noted, Haiti came be-
fore the OAS Council less than a week later to invoke the Rio
Treaty against the Dominican Republic for its complicity in
armed conspiracies against the Haitian government.
The above six cases were the only ones handled by the Peace
Committee under the 3ases of Action which it adopted in 194-8.
On May 24, 1950, the Committee adopted its first Statutes under
which, as noted in Chapter 1, the Committee extended its own
24. The New York Times , December 13, 1949.
25. The Hew York Times , December 27, 1949.





powers enabling it to take action without the request or con-
currence of the parties directly interested in a dispute.
No further cases were considered by the Peace Committee
for almost two years. In the interim, the Korean War began,
and t;he Caribbean area faded from the spotlight. And possibly
the Peace Committee's 19^9 conclusions regarding the Caribbean
situation had some effect in calming the existing tensions.
The tensions did not remain subdued for long, however. In
the first of the four cases it was to handle under the 1950
Statutes, the Cuban- Dominican quarrel erupted again in November,
1951 . On November 25 » 1951 » the Dominican .Republic seized a
group of sailors including five Cubans on an ex-U.S. World War
II landing craft named "Quetzal" and charged them with "plot-
ting." The following day, Cuban Ambassador Guell presented
a note to the Peace Committee requesting its services in solv-
ing the problem that had arisen in obtaining the freedom of the
Cuban sailors. After being informed by the Committee of the
Cuban request, the Dominican government replied on December 7th
with its ov/n request that the Committee suggest a method for
settling its controversies with Cuba dating back to the dispute
which resulted in the Peace Committee's first case in 19^8.
a series of Committee meetings followed, attended by the for-
eign ministers of both governments. A successful culmination
of the Peace Committee's efforts was reached on the night of
December 25, 1951 » when the Cuban and Dominican representatives
signed a declaration in which they stated the intention of their
governments to be guided by the principle of non-intervention,
28. The New York Times, November 26, 1951.
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to maintain normal diplomatic relations, to avoid systematic
and hostile propaganda directed against either country or its
government, and to accept the Peace Committee's offer of good
offices in connection with consideration of the controversies
09
which gave rise to the declaration. J This agreement resulted
in a four-year period of relative calm in Cuban-Dominican rela-
tions.
Two years were to elapse before the Peace Committee was
called upon in another controversy. In this case, the Foreign
Minister of Colombia, Kvaristo Sourdis, personally headed a
special delegation requesting the Committee's services in solv-
ing Colombia's five-year-old dispute with Peru over the asylum
granted by Colombia to the APRA party leader, Victor Raul Haya
de la Torre, at its embassy in Lima, Peru. The Committee sent
a copy of the Colombian note to the government of Peru and of-
fered its good offices. Peru, however, declined the Committee's
offer, invoking its reservation to Resolution XIV of 1940 in
which it maintained that both parties must consent before the
Peace Committee could handle a dispute. The Committee, under
the authority of its Statutes, proceded to study the case with-
out Peru's participation. Cn January 21, 1954, the Committee
adopted a set of conclusions in which it expressed the opinion
that the circumstances were favorable for the parties to reach
31
a settlement through bilateral negotiations.
The Committee's third case under the 1950 Statutes was
perhaps the most confusing of any of the disputes handled.
This was the 1954 controversy between Guatemala, Honduras,





., pp. 12, 41-42.
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and Nicaragua. The case came to the Peace Committee's atten-
tion on the afternoon of June 19, 1954- , when the Guatemalan
Charge d' Affaires in 'Washington, Dr. Alfredo Chocano, delivered
a note to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador ^uintanilla
of Mexico , citing various acts in May and June which violated
both the non-intervention principle and Guatemala's sovereignty.
The note requested an emergency meeting of the Teace Committee
52
to take appropriate action. The Committee met less than
three hours later and transmitted copies of the Guatemalan note
to the Honduran and Mcaraguan ambassadors in Washington. At
midnight that night, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, Dr. Guil-
lermo Toriello, made a personal telephone call to Chairman
^uintanilla to stress the gravity of the situation and request
that the Committee depart for Guatemala the next day, June 20th.
The following afternoon, however, the Charge d*Affaires again
called Chairman ^uintanilla to request that the Committee's
trip be suspended because of the submission of the case to the
United Nations Security Council the previous day. The Guatemal-
an request to the Peace Committee was withdrawn the next day,
June 21, 1954-, thus leaving the Committee with no case before
it. But on June 22nd and 23rd, the Honduran and Nicaraguan
ambassadors, respectively, requested that the Committee be con-
vened for the purpose of clarifying the Guatemalan charges made
against them. Ambassador Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa of Nicaragua
proposed that a subcommittee be designated to visit Guatemala,
32. OAS, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee to the
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
,
p^ b1\ the Peace Committee report on the Guatemala case may
also be found in Annals of the Organization of American States
,
Vol. VI. (1954) ppT~239-245.
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Honduras, and Nicaragua. ' The Guatemalan government was in-
formed of this proposal and asked whether such a visit would
be acceptable. Although Foreign Minister Toriello cabled on
June 23rd—in reference to the Honduran request to the Commit-
tee—that Guatemala would not object to a Feace Committee invest-
igation after the U.N. Security Council's decision of June 20th
(calling for termination of actions lixely to cause bloodshed)
was carried out, a note delivered on June 25th in reply to the
Peace Committee's inquiry stated that "the Government of Guate-
mala does not accept, and is opposed to, the Inter-American Peace
Committee's intervening in a matter like the case of the foreign
interventionist aggression from which Guatemala suffers and
34-
which it has denounced . . . . " Imputations that the Peace
Committee was being used to cover moves of the "aggressors" to
neutralize Guatemala's case before the Security Council brought
a detailed reply from the Committee on June 26th in an attempt
to assure the Guatemalan government of the propriety of the
Committee's actions. Further, Chairman Suintanilla telephoned
Foreign Minister Toriello that afternoon in an effort to convince
him of the Committee's good intentions and of the usefulness
of such a trip. The Prime Minister said that his government
was reconsidering the matter. That night, Charge d'Affaires
Chocano sent a note to the Committee stating that in view of
the postponement of the Guatemalan case by the Security Council
pending a report by the Inter-American Peace Committee, the
Guatemalan government would accept a visit by the Peace Commit-
tee and would provide it with facilities, assistance, and






information. That the visit was still not welcome and was being
accepted under duress may be deduced by the Guatemalan note's
reference to the Feace Committee's investigation being "by its
own decision and on petition of the Governments of Honduras and
35Nicaragua . . . . "•
The following day, Sunday', June 27th, Chairman Quintanilla
laid out an itinerary for the Committee's trip and sent notes
to the Guatemalan Charge d' Affaires and the Honduran and Kicara-
guan Ambassadors. The Committee, set up as a Subcommittee of
Information, planned to spend three days in each country, be-
36ginning in Guatemala. It would leave Monday evening, June 28th.
At this point, the Peace Committee's on-again, off-again case
intered a new phase of uncertainty. The government of Guatemalan
President Jacobo Arbenz fell the night of June 27th. Therefore,
the following morning, Chairman Quintanilla asked the Guatemalan
Gharge d'affaires for confirmation of the invitation extended to
the Committee. The invitation was confirmed that same day, but
the Committee delayed its departure until the 29th, when, a fur-
ther change having taken place in the Guatemalan government, the
Committee again requested and received confirmation of the origin-
al invitation. The Subcommittee of Information, composed of
Ambassadors Luis Quintanilla (Mexico), Gonzalo Guell (Cuba),
Jose Carlos Vittone (Argentina), Fernando Lobo (Brazil), Paul
C. Daniels (United States), and supporting staffs, left Wash-
ington the afternoon of June 29th. When the Subcommittee arrived
in Mexico City that evening, it learned that the Guatemalan
authorities had again changed their minds. The following morn-
35. Ibid
. , pp. 63-64.
36. Ibid" ., pp. 64-65.
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ing, Chairman v^uintanilla received a message from Junta Pres-
ident Colonel lilfego Monzon and Lieutenant Colonels Jose Luis
Cruz Salazar and Kauricio Dubois informing him that the United
States and SI Salvador were mediating between the Government
forces and the invading troops of Colonel Castillo Armas. The
message further requested that the Peace Committee refrain from
37intervening in the conflict. Before cancelling its trip, the
Subcommittee decided to send a telegram to the Junta in an
attempt to clarify its mission and obtain Guatemalan permission
to proceed. The Junta's reply on July 1st still showed mis-
understanding of the purpose of the Subcommittee's trip, though
it did indicate that a visit in the next few days v/ould be wel-
come so that the Subcommittee could "learn at first hand that
38
the problem of Communism does not exist . . • , ny A second
clarifying telegram was sent to the Junta by Chairman C^uintanilla
that same day, but by this time it became clear that the purpose
of the trip could no longer by fulfilled. Telephone consulta-
tions with the Guatemalan Junta and the governments of Honduras
and Nicaragua resulted in joint approval of a bulletin, issued
the night of July 2nd, which announced that the governments in-
volved thanked the Peace Committee for its services and informed
39it that the controversy no longer existed. J The Subcommittee
was thus able to terminate the mission and return to Washington.
The final case handled by the Peace Committee under its
1950 Statutes resulted from a recurrence of the. ill will between
Cuba and the Dominican Republic which had caused the first case
under the 1950 Statutes. On February 27, 1956, the Acting Hep-
W. ibid ., pp. &S-6T.
~~
38. TbTd~






resentative of Cuba on the OAS Council, Dr. Jose T. Baron, re-
quested convocation of the Peace Committee and charged that
activities of the Dominican government indicated preparation
for aggression and interference in Cuban internal affairs.
The Committee, now under the chairmanship of Ambassador John C.
Dreier of the United States, met the following day. Following
its normal procedure, the Committee's first action was to in-
form the Dominican Republic of the charges made against it.
The Committee again met on ft'arch 8, 1956, to consider a note
addressed to it on Inarch 7th by Ambassador Joaquin E. Salazar,
the Dominican Representative on the OAS Council. Ambassador
Salazar stated that no conflict existed between the Dominican
Republic and Cuba and that Cuba had not exhausted the possibil-
ities of direct diplomatic contact with the Dominican Republic
to clarify matters. After discussions of the problem with both
parties during the ensuing month, the Committee was able, on
April 20, 1956, to obtain approval of a statement in which the
parties agreed to resort to regular diplomatic channels to
40
achieve a settlement of the problem.
Prior to the adoption of the 1956 Statutes of the Inter-
American Peace Committee by the Council of the OAS on May 9»
1956, the Peace Committee had handled ten cases in a period of
eight years. In the ten-year period since the 1956 Statutes
were adopted, the Committee has handled only two cases under
its Statutes. The first of these cases occurred in 1961. It
was an indirect outgrowth of the Iv'iay-June, 1957 » conflict be-
40. Ibid., pp. 73-74; OAS, Inter-American Peace Committee, Report
of the Inter-American Peace Committee to the Second Special
Inter-American Conference on the Activities of the Committee
Since the Tenth Inter-American Conference, pp. 12-13*
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tween Honduras and Nicaragua over disputed territory claimed by
Honduras on the basis of the 1906 arbitral award of the King
of Spain. The Rio Treaty had been invoked by Honduras in 1957
»
and the OAS Council had handled the situation acting as Provision-
al Organ of Consultation. As a result of the work of an invest-
igating committee and a later ad hoc committee, the parties
agreed to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice to achieve settlement of the boundary contro-
versy. The International Court decided the case in November,
I960, holding in favor of Honduras and requiring Nicaragua to
41
accept the 1906 arbitral award.
The governments of Honduras and Nicaragua conducted negoti-
ations in December, I960, and January, 1961, in order to agree
upon steps to take in executing the judgment. These negotia-
tions were halted, however, when, on February 8, 1961, Honduras
demanded the immediate withdrawal of the lNicaraguan authorities
from the territory awarded to Honduras. In view of the prob-
lems of border demarcation, transfer of inhabitants, withdrawal
of authorities and other questions still unresolved, the Nicara-
guan government felt that further direct negotiations would be
fruitless and appealed to "Che Inter-American Peace Committee
for assistance in reaching a solution. Nicaraguan Ambassador
Guillermo Sevilla Gacasa presented the request to the Peace Com-
mittee on February 16, 1961. In accordance with its Statutes,
the Committee informed the Eonduran government of the request
and asked for its acceptance of Committee action in the matter.
41. Thomas and Thomas, Organization
, pp. 315-516.
42. OAS, Inter-American Peace Committee, Report of the Inter-
American Peace Committee to the Eighth Meeting of Consultation
oFl.Iinisters of Foreign Affairs 1962 , OWSer. L/III C1P/1/62
(Washington:"" Pan American Union, 1962), p. 3; Part I, Appen-




The Honduran representative, Ambassador Celeo Davila, appeared
before the Committee and submitted a memorandum on February 24,
1961, stating that Nicaragua's delay in withdrawing its author-
ities from the "illegally occupied territory" constituted a
"typical case of aggression" but that, despite this, Honduras
was willing to accept the Peace Committee ' s intercession on the
condition that Nicaragua immediately withdraw all of its author-
43
ities from Honouran territory. y The latter condition was un-
acceptable to Nicaragua, and the Peace Committee's first task
was to overcome this obstacle. After conversations with the
Committee and consultation with his government, Ambassador
Davila informed the Committee on March 1, 1961, that Honduras
would withdraw the condition to its acceptance of Peace Com-
44
mi t tee action.
Upon achieving the agreement of both parties to its action
in the case, the Committee prepared and submitted to the parties
a draft Basis of Arrangement. After discussion and amendment,
the Basis of Arrangement was accepted by both Honduras and Nic-
aragua on March 7» 1961. It provided for withdrawal of Nicara-
guan authorities, the establishment of a Honduras-Nicaragua
Mixed Commission, and the powers of the Commission. The Mixed
Commission was to be composed of the Chairman of the Inter-
American Peace Committee, a representative of Honduras, and a
representative of Nicaragua. It was to assist the governments
in population transfer and nationality problems, fix certain
parts of the boundary, and supervise the marking of the bound-
ary. The Chairman of the Feace Committee was to be the Chair-
43. Ibid





man of the Mixed Commission and was empowered to make final de-
cisions in the event of disagreement between the Honduran and
45
Nicaraguan representatives. '
The Peace Committee, having been invited by the Presidents
of Honduras and Nicaragua to visit their countries, left Wash-
ington on March 16, 1961. The representatives of member states
of the Committee were: Ambassador Vincente Sanchez Gavito of
i.exico, Chairman; Ambassador Jose Antonio Mayobre of Venezuela;
Minister Santiago Salazar Santos of Colombia; Jose Carlos Ruiz
of £1 Salvador; and Pablo Cscar Guffanti of Uruguay. The Com-
mittee spent two days each at Tegucigalpa and Managua, confer-
ring on implementation of the Rasis of Arrangement v/ith Pres-
idents Villeda Morales and Somoza Debayle, respectively. The
Committee proceded to .Vaspam, on the Nicaraguan side of the Hon-
duran border, on March 21st. That evening, the Honduras-
Nicaragua Mixed Commission was installed, consisting of Am-
bassador Sanchez Gavito of the Peace Committee as Chairman, Dr.
Roberto Perdomo Paredes as Honduran Representative, and Dr.
46Ignacio Roman Pachecho as Nicaraguan Representative.
The Peace Committee, except for Ambassador Sanchez Gavito,
returned to Managua en route to Washington on March 22 1 1961.
The Mixed Commission remained to witness the withdrawal of
Nicaraguan authorities, the transfer of Nicaraguan nationals
desiring to live in Nicaraguan territory, and to fix and mark
the border. By April 12, 1961, the last Nicaraguan authorities
had been withdrawn, and by the middle of May the population
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marking the boundary took considerably longer but was satisfac-
47
torily completed in December, 1962. '
The second case handled by the Peace Committee under its
1956 Statutes was that of the United States and Panama in Jan-
uary of 1964. The immediate cause of the controversy was a
riot on January 9, 1964, over an attempt by Fanamanian students
to raise a Panamanian flag at an American high school in the
Panama Canal Zone. But more fundamental causes included the
long-standing controversy over Canal Zone sovereignty, Panaman-
ian rights in the Canal Zone, annual payments to Panama, and
employment of Panamanians in Canal operations.
As a result of the January 9th riots, President Roberto P.
Chiari of Panama suspended diplomatic relations with the United
48
States. The Foreign Minister, Dr. Galileo Solis, sent a
cablegram to the OAS Council President, Ambassador Juan Bautista
de Lavalle of Peru, and an emergency meeting of the Council was
scheduled for four p.m. on January 10th. The United States,
however, strongly desired to avoid a debate of United States-
Panama relations in the OAS Council, and worked to avoid an
invocation of the Bio Treaty. Finally, after six hours of
"hard diplomatic negotiation" which included a telephone call
from President Johnson to President Chiari, the latter agreed
49
to take the situation to the Inter-American Peace Committee. '
A meeting of the Peace Committee was held with Ambassador
Augusto Guillermo Arango of Panama and Ward P. Allen, Acting
U.S. Representative on the OaS Council. By 4:40 p.m., agree-
47. OAS, Inter-American Peace Committee, Report to Second Special
Inter-American Conference
, pp. 50-35»
48. The Hew York Times , January 10, 1964.




ment had been reached on use of the good offices of the Peace
Commit bee by both parties. Ambassador Bnrique Tejara Paris of
Venezuela, Chairman of the Peace Committee, then went before
the CAS Council to report on the agreement. He requested the
election of another member to the Peace Committee to act as sub-
stitute for the United States in accordance with Article 11 of
the Statutes, since the United States, a member of the Commit-
tee, was an interested party in the dispute. The Chilean Am-
bassador was elected to act as a temporary substitute for the
United States.
The Peace Committee was ready to leave for Panama almost
immediately, but departure was delayed because of Chilean Am-
bassador Manuel Trucco's concern over possible action by the
U.N. Security Council in this matter. The Peace Committee,
according to Article 2 of its Statutes, is empowered to act
only when no other procedures for pacific settlement are in
51progress. Clarification was requested and assurance received
from President Chiari that Panama would not request U.N. action
52pending the outcome of Peace Committee conciliation efforts.
Upon receiving this assurance the Peace Committee departed for
Panama. Accompanying Chairman Tejara Paris of Venezuela were
the ambassadors of Colombia, the Dominican .Republic, Argentina, and
Chile. 55
The following day, January 11, 1964, the Committee con-
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)bjective was to assist the parties in re-establishing and main-
taining public order, a Mixed Committee on Cooperation was es-
tablished to achieve this objective. The Mixed Committee was
omposed of one member of the Peace Committee, Ambassador Trucco,
as Chairman, and one civilian and one military representative
54-
frora each party. Through the Committee's mediation, solutions
were quickly found to the problems of the simultaneous raising
of U.S. and Panamanian flags and the free transit of vehicles
and individuals. Persuading the parties to resume diplomatic
relations presented a more difficult problem, but four days
later the parties agreed to resume diplomatic relations and to
begin formal discussions on all existing difficulties 30 days
later. Following this agreement early in the morning of Jan-
uary 15th, the Peace Committee returned to Washington, except
for Ambassador Trucco who remained in Panama as head of the
55
iViixed Committee on Cooperation. ^
Unfortunately, the solution did not prove to be either
simple or swift. The English language version of the press re-
lease, as issued by the Peace Committee, referred to "formal
56discussions" 30 days after resumption. of relations. The
Panamanian interpretation was that the United States had agreed
to formal negotiations . "Negotiations" was, in fact, the term
used in the New York Times version of the press release on
January 15th. ' President Chiari of Panama announced later
that day that Panama would refuse to resume diplomatic relations
54. Ibid
., p. 50.








unless the United States agreed to negotiate substantive
CO
changes in the Canal treaty.
The United States refused to commit itself to negotiations
on the Canal treaty, however, and Panama was adamant in insist-
ing on such negotiations. Panama formally broke its diplomatic
relations with the United States on January 17, 1964 . Continu-
ance of Peace Committee mediation was hotly debated in Panama
after the formal break, but President Chiari agreed on January
20th to let the Peace Committee again attempt mediation, if
Panama did not succeed in obtaining the desired assurances of
negotiation through the Peace Committee's efforts, it would
take the case to the OAS Council under the Rio Treaty; if suc-
cess was not achieved in the OAS, Panama was resolved to go to
60
the U.N. Security Council.
Conversations were resumed at the Peace Committee's head-
quarters in Washington on January 20th with Ambassador Ellsworth
Bunker representing the United States and Ambassador Miguel J.
Moreno representing Panama. By January 28th, Panama decided
to end the negotiations being conducted through the Peace Com-
mittee and take the issue to the CAS Council. Political tensions
were reported to be rising dangerously in Panama, forcing Pres-
61ident Chiari to make this move. The Peace Committee was for-
mally advised of Panama's intentions by Ambassador I.'.oreno at an
emergency session on the morning of January 29th, and a note was
delivered to Secretary General Jose Mora later that day request-
53. The New York Times , January 16, 1964.
59. The New York Times , January 18, 1964.
60. The New York Times , news article by Henry Raymont, January 21,




ing an urgent meeting of the CAS Council.
On January 30 , 1964, the Peace Committee issued a press re-
lease describing its activities in the case and stating that
it considered its action terminated by virtue of Panama's re-
quest for a meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the
65
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. y The investigative and con-
ciliatory action of the OAS Council acting as Provisional Organ
of Consultation finally resulted, on April 3, 1964, in agree-
ment to resume diplomatic relations and adopt procedures for
64
the "prompt elimination of the causes of conflict . . . .
"
Although the Peace Committee has considered only two dis-
putes under its 1956 Statutes, it considered six cases under
the authority granted by Resolution IV of the Fifth fleeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign affairs in 1959 (and since
rescinded by the Second Special Inter-American Conference in
1965)* This 1959 resolution, briefly described in Chapter 1,
directed the Peace Committee to conduct studies on the general
causes of political tensions in the Caribbean area, and to act
either on a specific country's request or on its own initiative
65in performing these duties. ^ The six cases considered all
involved two dictatorships, Cuba and the Dominican Republic,
either directly or indirectly.
The first case under Resolution IV resulted from an un-
successful invasion of Haiti on August 13 , 1959, by forces
which had departed from a Cuban port. The government of Haiti
62. OAS, Inter-iimerican Peace Committee, Report to Second Special
Inter-American Conference, p. 51.
63. Ibid ., pp. 52-53.





requested, in a note to the Chairman of the Feace Committee
dated August 31 » 1959» that the Committee investigate the in-
cident. The Committee took up the case as part of its study of
the general international tensions in the area. A subcommittee
composed of the representatives of El Salvador, the United
States, and Uruguay visited Haiti in October, 1959 • While the
Haitian government was concerned over the failure of Cuba to
prevent the departure of the invaders and the possibility of
another invasion, it did noc desire to present a formal accusa-
tion against the Cuban government. The Feace Committee drew
no conclusions from its investigation in this case except to
point out that no further invasion had occurred, probably due
to the failure of the 1959 invasion and bo the interest and
66
action taken by the CaS on the Haitian appeal.
The second request for Committee action under Resolution
IV was made by Venezuela on November 25 , 1959* It charged
that leaflets inciting the Venezuelan army to rebellion had
been dropped over Curacao on the night of November 19th by a
United States-registered aircraft flown by two Cubans. The
Committee's investigation determined that the loading of the
leaflets had tan:en place at Ciudad Trujillo in the Dominican
.Republic and that neither the loading nor the flight arrange-
ments—the purpose of which was to drop the leaflets over a
Venezuelan city—could have taken place without the involve-
ment of Dominican authorities.
'
In the next case, Committee action was requested on Feb-
ruary 16, I960, by Ecuador. Ecuador's assumption of Venezuelan
66. OAS, Inter-American Feace Committee, .Report to Second Special
Inter-American Conference
, pp. 15-17«
67. Ibid ., pp. 17-18.
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interests after that country's break in diplomatic relations
with the Dominican Republic, and Ecuadorian responsibility
for 13 Dominican citizens who had been granted asylum in the
Venezuelan Embassy, resulted in Dominican harassment of the
Ecuadorian Embassy in Santo Domingo. The Dominican government,
on March 8th, offered to accept the Committee's services on
the basis of its Statutes but not on the basis of Resolution
IV, and stipulated that it would not discuss the question of
the asylees.
V/hen the Committee replied that separation of the problem
of the Ecuadorian Embassy's situation from the status of the
Dominican asylees was not feasible, and then formally requested
the Dominican government's consent to Peace Committee action in
the matter, the Dominican Republic, in a note dated ivlarch 25th,
proposed direct negotiations with Ecuador. This course of
action was rejected by Ecuador and, after further attempts at
agreement, the Dominican Republic, on March 31 » i960, formally
declined to accept the competence of the Committee in the situ-
ation. Despite lack of Dominican cooperation, the Committee
studied the situation under the powers delegated to it by Resolu-
tion IV, and reported to the OAS Council the hope that both
governments would do their utmost to avoid heightening tensions
and to reach a solution.
"
On February 17, I960, the day following Ecuador's request
for Peace Committee action, Venezuela addressed a note to the
Committee requesting an investigation of human rights violations
by the Dominican government. After deciding that it was competent
68. Ibid ., pp. 18-22.
69. Ibid' ., p. .23.
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under Resolution IV to consider the case, the Committee requested
the consent of the Dominican Republic to visit its territory but
was refused. The Committee, however, continued its inquiry
through the use of information obtained from other American
governments, testimony of exiles and recent visitors to the
Dominican Republic, and what it called "extensive and reliable
70
press material*"' In its report to the OAS Council on the
case, the Committee concluded that "international tensions in
the Caribbean region have been aggravated by flagrant and wide-
spread violations of human rights which have been committed and
continue to be committed in the Dominican Republic," and mention-
ed several violations including the denial of free speech and
assembly, arbitrary arrests, and cruel and inhuman treatment
71
of political prisoners.
Cuba's involvement in Caribbean tensions is again apparent
in the Peace Committee's fifth case under Resolution IV. On
June 1, 1961, in a telegram to OAS Secretary General Mora,
Guatemala's Foreign Minister, Jesus Unda Murillo, stated that
the Guatemalan government had learned of the existence on Mexi-
can territory adjacent to Guatemala's border, of Communist
troops being trained for an invasion of Guatemala. On June
2nd, the Mexican representative on the OAS Council, Ambassador
Vincente Sanchez Gavito, requested Peace Committee investiga-
tion of the Guatemalan charge, stating that the "imputations
. . . are totally unfounded."' He further requested that the
Committee visit and conduct an investigation in Mexican terri-
tory to disprove the Guatemalan claims. The Peace Committee,
W. Ibid., pp. 24-25.





after meeting and confirming its competence, requested addition-
al information from Guatemalan Ambassador Carlos Urrutia Aparicio.
The Ambassador stated, however, that Guatemala would not report
any specific circumstatnces since it had already, in a Council
meeting on June 2nd, stated that the telegram to the Secretary
General was for informational purposes only and contained no
73
accusations against Mexico. ' In view of the positions of both
the Mexican and Guatemalan governments in the matter, the Peace
Committee concluded on June 5» 1961, that the Mexican govern-
ment was "fulfilling its international obligations" and that




The sixth and final case considered by the Peace Committee
under Resolution IV was a study and investigation of "facts"
about illegal acts, attributed to the government of Cuba,
condemned before the OAS Council on November 16, 1961, by
75Ambassador Juan Bautista de Lavalle of Peru. ' On November
27, 1961, the Ambassador requested the Peace Committee to
carry out a "study and investigation" of these "facts"
which consisted of such internal acts as executions, imprison-
ments, and maltreatment, and external acts including use of
"diplomatic officers, official missions, and secret agents,
76for the purpose of instigating subversion and revolution . . • •
(The OAS Council, on November 22nd, agreed that the Inter-
73. Ibia ., pp. 20-21, Part II, Appendix 2, pp. 3-4; OAS, Inter-
American Peace Committee, Report to Second Special Inter-
American Conference
, p. 37»
7^. OAS , Inter-American Peace Committee, Report to Eighth Meeting
of Consultation, p. 21, Part II, Appendix 4, pp. 5-6.
75. Text of speech in Ibid
.
, Part III, Appendix 1-B, pp. 4-11.
76. Ibid ., p. 22.
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imerican Peace Committee was an appropriate organ to deal with
77
the acts condemned by Peru.)''
When the Peace Committee invited Ambassador Carlos M.
Lechuga of Cuba to appear before the Committee on November 29th
to present his views, he refused to appear and, in a note to
bhe Committee, rejected the competence of the representatives
:>f El Salvador, Venezuela, Colombia, and the United States,
siting "the frankly hostile attitude of those governments . . . . "
'
Che following day the Committee sent requests to the govern-
nents of all OaS member states, requesting what information
79
they could provide on the Peruvian charges.
On December 7th, the Committee inquired of the Cuban
tmbassador the acceptability to Cuba of a visit by the Commit-
tee for the purpose of carrying out its investigation. The
wording of the negative reply of Ambassador Lechuga to this
request was considered so offensive by the Committee that it
/"oted unanimously to declare the note unacceptable. The
Investigation was subsequently carried out by the Committee
vith the information which was available to it, including docu-
oents published by the Cuban government, radio propaganda pro-
grams, and "plentiful documentation from numerous trustworthy
sources . . . ."
The study covered three basic areas: Cuban ties with the
Dino-Soviet bloc, subversive activities conducted by the Cuban
government, and human rights violations by the Cuban govern-
?7. Ibid., p. 23.
78. Ibid
. . Part III, Appendix 3, p. 14.







ment. Upon completion of the study, the Peace Committee
concluded that: the Cuban political organization and its
identification with the Marxist-Leninist ideology is antagonis-
tic to the OtiS requirement of political organization based on
representative democracy; Cuban human rights violations are a
principal cause of international tension in the hemisphere and
openly contradict various inter-American instruments; Cuban
connections with the Sino-Soviet bloc are incompatible with
regional principles and standards—especially collective securi-
ty; and the subversive activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc and
Cuba constitute acts classified as "aggression of a non-mili-
tary character" and violate fundamental inter-American princi-
t 83pies.
As recounted above, the Inter-American Peace Committee
has, in the period 1948-1965* considered eighteen cases
—
twelve under its 1948 Bases of Action and two Statutes, and
six under the authority of Resolution IV of the Fifth Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. On compari-
son of these cases, the various factors affecting Peace Commit-
tee operations, its methods and conduct of the cases, and the
relative degrees of success which it has achieved will become
more evident.
Very few changes resulted from the broadening of the
Committee's powers under the 1950 Statutes. The added power
to act at the request of any American state, whether or not it
was an interested party, was not, in fact, exercised, because
in each of the four cases acted upon under the 1950 Statutes,
82 • Ibid ., pp. 27-44.
83. Ibid., pp. 45-48.
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one of the directly interested parties made the initial request
to the Committee. The only cases in which an interested party
did not make the initial appeal to the Committee occured in
1949 under the 1948 Bases of Action, and neither case involved
a dispute between specific states. One involved the situation
of general unrest in the Caribbean, and the other expressed
the Committee's concern over the war powers granted to the
Dominican President. The latter action was taken on the
Committee's own initiative as permitted by the 1948 Bases of
action.
Compared to the minimal effect on Committee operations
resulting from the adoption of the 1950 Statutes, the adoption
of the 1956 Statutes proved to be a major turning point for
the Peace Committee. The requirement that only a state directly
involved in a dispute may request Committee action, and that
action may be taken only with the consent of both parties, has
led to a virtual abandonment of use of the Peace Committee as
a conciliation agency . Of the two cases which utilized the
Committee's services under the Statutes since 1956, the first
—
the Honduras-Nicaragua case of 1961—was primarily a matter of
facilitating agreement and supervising the mechanical details
of effecting the International Court's judgment. In the second
case, that of Panama and the United States in the Panama Canal
Zone riots of 1964, agreement to utilize the Peace Committee's
services was a compromise on the part of Panama, which initially
intended to request a meeting of the Organ of Consultation to
invoke the Rio Treaty. And the Committee's efforts eventually
84. Supra
, pp. 30-52, 34.

-57-
ended in failure, because neither party would modify its posi-
tion with regard to renegotiating the Canal treaty. The Peace
Committee observed quite validly in its 1959 report to the
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
that the reason no case had yet been submitted to it under the
1956 Statutes may have been due to the restrictive changes in
those Statutes. Consider the sharp reduction of cases under
the Statutes—ten prior to 1956 and only two afterward. The
The absence of the type of controversy handled prior to 1956
among the cases handled after 1956 certainly does not reflect
the disappearance of that type of dispute. The fact that such
disputes still occurred may be seen in the cases handled under
the more liberal powers granted by Resolution IV in 1959*
An examination of the cases handled prior to 1956 will
show the extent to which lack of a requirement of prior consent
by both parties aided in the Committee's ability to take action.
In none of the eight cases involving disputes was the consent
of both parties obtained prior to resort to the Committee. It
was not required, of course, but nevertheless this shows that
use of the Committee's services was not the chosen path to
settlement for at least one disputant in each case. In five
of the cases, consent was given by the other party subsequent
to initiation of Peace Committee action. The five disputes
include those between the Dominican Republic and Cuba (194-8),
Haiti and the Dominican Republic (194-9) , Cuba and the Dominican
Republic (1951), Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (1954-), and
the Dominican Republic and Cuba (1956). Of the three remaining
cases, no actual complaint was presented to the Committee in
one (Cuba's request for an investigation to disprove Dominican
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charges in 194-9) i "the question of consent was rendered moot
by termination of the problem in one (Cuba and Peru, 194-9)
*
and there was outright refusal to accept Committee action in
one case (Colombia and Peru, 1953). It is of interest to note
that Peru, which attached a reservation to Resolution XIV in
1940 on the ground that the consent of both parties should be
required, did not accept the Peace Committee's services in
either of the two cases in which it was the respondent party.
Any comparison of the cases handled by the Peace Committee
under Resolution IV of 1959 with those handled under the Statutes
must take into consideration the general atmosphere of politi-
cal unrest in the Caribbean; the issues of non-intervention,
human rights, and democracy; and the relationship between poli-
tical stability and economic development, all of which affected
the decision to adopt Resolution IV, making the Committee a
tool for the exercise of political judgments rather than an aid
to conciliation of disputes. An actual dispute did not in fact
exist in most of the cases considered under Resolution IV. The
cases of Ecuador and the Dominican Republic in I960, and of
Mexico and Guatemala in 1961 , are possible exceptions, but in
the former case, no agreement for Peace Committee action could
be reached with the Dominican Republic, and in the latter case
there was no agreement that a dispute even existed. The remain-
ing four cases, however, are of the nature of political condem-
nations of illegal acts. In none of them is there any room for
actual negotiation or compromise.
That the Peace Committee chafed under this imposition of
a political mandate upon it may be seen most clearly in the




American Conference, ' As a result of the Committee's forceful
presentation of its views on the undesirability of retaining
Resolution; IV s duties and powers, the Conference, as noted in
Chapter 1, terminated these duties and powers and forbade their
inclusion in any revision of the Peace Committee' s Statutes.
Conclusions on the success or failure of the Peace Committee
depend largely on the criterion used in measurement. From the
viewpoint of final solutions achieved v/hich actually eliminated
the cause of the dispute, perhaps only one case—that of Honduras
and Nicaragua in 1961—can be said to have been successfully
settled. Certainly the numerous disputes of the late 194-0' s and
early 1950 's involving, particularly, the Dominican Republic,
Haiti, and Cuba, were never definitively settled, and the tension
in the Caribbean continues even today. However, the very fact
that the disputes were brought before the Peace Committee by at
least one of the parties indicate the development of a degree
of community spirit and reliance on community organs. And by
bringing disputes into the open before a group of experienced
diplomats who can quietly but effectively assist the parties
in searching for a solution, the Peace Committee provides a
means for removing the controversy from the more politically-
charged arenas and permitting the passions of irate politicians
and populations to cool.
On a more pessimistic note, the United States-Panama
crisis following the Canal Zone riots in 1964 is a prime example
85. OAS, Second Special Inter-American Conference, Special Report
of the Inter-American Peace Committee called for in Para-
graph 3 of Resolution IV of the Fifth Meeting of Consulta-
tion of i.Iinistor s of Foreign Affairs, Submitted to the
Second Special Inter-American Conference , pp. 1-7*
86. Supra, pp. 19-20.
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of Peace Committee failure. Passions were stirred rather than
cooled, and, in 'the end, the more politically-charged and danger-
ous procedure of the Rio Treaty was invoked. This case is an
example of the type over v/hich Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. expressed
concern in discussing the Caribbean disputes of 194-8-1950*
There v/as, he noted, no certainty that action could be taken
quickly and effectively in cases involving small powers outside
of the Caribbean area, small powers and lar^e powers anywhere
in the hemisphere, or the large powers of South America. And
particularly questionable, according to Furniss, would be a
situation directly involving the United States. '
The Peace Committee's success, or lack of it, in handling
general situations as opposed to specific disputes, does not
generate optimism. The only case of a general situation being
considered prior to 1959 v/as that of the general unrest in the
Caribbean in 19^9* And in that case, it may be recalled, the
Committee was able to do no more than to reaffirm basic princi-
ples including non-intervention and the exercise of representa-
tive democracy. The record of Peace Committee activities in
considering general situations under Resolution IV would appear
to be no more successful. In the two cases of a general nature
considered under Resolution IV—one submitted by Venezuela on
human rights violations in the Dominican Republic in I960 and
the other submitted by Peru on illegal and subversive acts by
Cuba in 1961—the Committee was able to collect testimony and
evidence and to produce an indictment of the countries accused
of the alleged acts. But in neither case was the Committee able
W» Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "The Inter-American System and Rec'ent
Caribbean Disputes," International Organization, Vol. IV (1950)
»
p. 593.
88. OAS, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Second Report , pp. 30-33.
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to obtain the cooperation of the country accused or to visit
the countries and verify the accusations. Further, in consider-
ing its general mandate under Resolution IV to study the questions
of intervention, subversion, human rights violations, etc., the
Committee concluded in its Special Report that these matters
were not clearly defined and were beyond its competence. The
Committee stated its opinion that such investigative duties
had no basis in its Statutes and conflicted with its conciliation
. < 89mission.
In conclusion, then, it may be said that the Peace Committee,
while successful, in varying degrees in the handling of specific
disputes, has been somewhat less successful in resolving general
situations. The handling of such situations of unrest, moreover,
appears to conflict with the fundamental objectives for which
the Peace Committee was established by Resolution XIV in 194-0.
General situations, particularly where heavily charged with
political and ideological interest, would best be reserved for
investigating committees directly responsible to the OAS Council.
89. OAS, Second Special Inter-American Conference, Special Report %
pp. 2, 5-6.

CKAFfER 3: THE PEACE COMMITTEE AND NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY
Few official policy statements have been made concerning
the Inter-American Peace Committee, its use and its place in
the inter-American system. Therefore, evidence- of national
policy will have to "be found by examining the uses made of the
Peace Committee, Rio Treaty, and Pact of Bogota; comments or
reservations made concerning Peace Committee structure or powers;
proposals for revision of the Peace Committee's Statutes or for
the creation of a new organ; and factors affecting national pol-
icy such as the existence of border disputes.
In an examination of the uses made of the Inter-American
Feace Committee, it quickly becomes evident that, with the excep-
tion of the Colombia-Peru case of 195^ dealing with the asylum
of Haya de la Torre, all of the cases upon which Committee ac-
tion has been requested have centered upon the Caribbean area
and its political tensions. In only two of the eighteen cases
—
the Ecuador-Dominican Republic case of I960 and the Peruvian re-
quest on the Cuban situation in 1961—were the requests made by
non-Caribbean countries. Therefore, it is to the Caribbean
countries that we must look for indications of policy through
their use or non-use of the Peace Committee.
Of the 13 nations bordering on the Caribbean Sea, only
two, Costa Rica and El Salvador, have not requested Peace Com-
mittee intercession in at least one case. Cuba has made four
requests, and the United States, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Haiti
have made two each. Thus, most of the countries of the area
have, at one time or another, indicated their general acceptance




by actually requesting its services.
There were a variety of reasons for resort to the Peace
Committee. In general, the cases might be said to follow the
prescription for Committee competence of the 19^-8 Bases of Ac-
tion which stated that the Committee would have jurisdiction
"when direct negotiations or usual diplomatic procedures . . .
have failed, or . . . actual circumstances make any negotiation
impossible . . . ." And the circumstances were more often
the latter than the former. More specifically, the first seven
cases—through the Cuba-Dominican Republic case of 1951—in-
volved Caribbean countries which had either recently rid them-
selves of dictatorships or those in which dictators still held
power. In the first category were Cuba, Guatemala, Venezuela,
^nd Costa Rica, and in the second, Nicaragua and the Dominican
Republic. The antagonism and mistrust on both sides were height-
ened by the activities of political exiles to whom encourage-
ment and assistance were given. While the most serious cases
involving armed attacks (Costa Rica-Nicaragua, 194-9 » &n& Kaiti-
Dominican Republic, 1950) went to the CAS Council and the Organ
of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, most of the situations
were handled by the Feace Committee. Of the first seven Peace
Committee cases, in only one—the first, by the Dominican Repub-
lic—was the request made by one of the dictatorships. Of the
next six cases, Cuba—one of the "democratically-inclined*1 gov-
ernments at that time—requested Committee action in three, and
Haiti, the United States, and the Committee itself in one each.
After the end of 194-9 » when the Committee had handled six cases
1. CaS, Second Special Inter-American Conference, Report of the
Inter-American Peace Committee on the Amendment of Its Statutes
,






and when Haiti and the Dominican Republic were about to bring
the Caribbean situation before the OAS Council under the Rio
Treaty, the requests for Peace Committee action slackened. The
possibility exists that the reason for this lies in the fact
that Peace Committee efforts were successful in settling the
disputes it considered and abating the tensions in the area.
It is more likely, however, that the reason lies in the elimina-
tion of some of the sources of conflict. And the sources elim-
inated were not the dictatorships against which such enterprises
as the Caribbean Legion were mounted, but rather, the "democrat-
ically-inclined" countries which had encouraged and supported
the Caribbean Legion. The rule of the Democratic Action party
in Venezuela was ended by a counter-revolution in November,
1948, and less enthusiastic revolutionaries came to the presiden-
cies of Cuba in 19-48 and Costa Rica in late 1949 in the persons
of Carlos Prio Socarras and Otilio Ulate Blanco, respectively.
Cuba succumbed to Batista again in 1952, and the ^.rbenz regime
in Guatemala lasted only until 195^ • Actually, support for
the Caribbean Legion was diminishing at the time that it made
its only aggressive move— the unsuccessful attempt to invade
p
the Dominican Republic from Guatemala in June, 19^9. With
the failure of the Legion to achieve success and the removal
or change to less aggressive attitudes of some of the govern-
ments involved, in addition, of course, to the beneficial effects
of Peace Committee action and the exposure of the situation to
the light of publicity, the Caribbean situation was calmed.
Policy considerations were rather limited in the request
2. Franklin D. Parker, The Central American Republics (London:





by Colombia for the Peace Committee ' s services in the iiaya de
la Torre asylum case, since the case was one of five years'
standing, and Colombia referred it to the Peace Committee as a
last resort. In the Guatemalan case of 195-^ » however, policy
considerations play an important role. It was apparently
through an initial confusion in the policy of the Guatemalan
government that the request was made for urvgent action by the
Committee. By the time the Guatemalan government decided that
it would obtain a more sympathetic hearing from the United Na-
tions Security Council and cancelled its request to the Commit-
tee, the Committee was becoming actively involved in the situa-
tion. The requests by Honduras and Nicaragua for .Committee ac-
tion in order to vindicate themselves in t&e face of Guatemala's
charges continued the Committee's involvement. It was not, of
course, until the Security Council's decision to defer to CAS
action and Guatemala's subsequent approval of a visit that the
Peace Committee was able to begin effective action in the case.
The issue of revolutionary vs. dictatorial regimes was ap-
parent again in the series of six cases handled by the Peace
Committee under Resolution IV of 1959* There was a difference,
however, between these cases and those of fcne 194-8-1951 period
when only the antagonisms between a few sirall Caribbean countries
was involved. In the Resolution IV cases, a new element—that
of a Communist dictatorship and its efforts to systematically
spread its influence throughout Latin America by means of sub-
versive movements—was added to the relatively more simple ef-
forts of dictators and presidents to unseat each other through
support of exile groups. Concern for the situation was ex-
pressed within the OAS on a higher level— i^hat of the foreign
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ministers—than it had been in the earlier period of Caribbean
turmoil. And it was on the foreign ministers' level that the
policy decision was made to use the Peace Committee as an in-
strument for attempting to resolve the intricate problems in-
volved. That it was unsuccessful in doing so has been dis-
cussed in Chapter 2.
The only two cases upon which the Peace Committee has acted
under the 1956 Statutes serve to indicate the questionable wis-
dom of requiring both parties to agree to the Committee's action
in advance. The first case involved Nicaragua and Honduras,
and is the Committee's only real success to date in achieving
a final and lasting settlement. As indicated in Chapter 2,
the dispute was over the procedure to be used in effecting a
judgment rather than over the basic issues themselves. Agree-
ment to use the Peace Committee would undoubtedly have been
achieved under the 1950 Statutes. The second case involved the
United States and Panama, and the latter was reluctant to util-
ize the Peace Committee from the beginning and eventually with-
drew to take the case to the OaS Council*
In addition to policy approval of the Peace Committee as
indicated by its actual use, other evidence of policy may be
found in the approving resolutions of the OAS Council and the
Inter-Anerican Conferences. Such resolutions include that of
the OaS Council concerning the Committee's 19^9 investigation
of the Caribbean situation, Resolutions CI and CII of the Tenth
3. OAS, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Second Report of the





Inter-American Conference, and Resolution XIX of the Second
Special Inter-American Conference (Vote of Thanks and Congratu-
lations to the Inter-American Peace Committee).-7
Contrasting with the expressions of approval of the Peace
Committee's activities were several which indicated actual dis-
approval. In addition to the doubt concerning the Committee's
juridical competence to deal with general situations expressed
by the iMexican delegation in the 194-9 case on the Caribbean situ-
ation, Costa Hican Ambassador Ivlario A. Esquivel expressed a
similar position in a letter to the Committee Chairman, Ambas-
sador Luis ''^uintanilla of Mexico, in August, 194-9* Since the
Dominican government had categorically stated that it was not
formally accusing any government, said Ambassador Esquivel, no
controversy existed, and the Peace Committee, "created to sug-
gest Liethods for the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts, cannot
feel itself obligated to intervene until such conflicts exist,
because the mandate of the so-often cited Resolution [Resolution
XIV of 194-OJ cannot obligate it to any preventive action . . . . "'
Disapproval of Peace Committee entry into a case may also
be found in the refusals of disputants to accept the Peace Com-
mittee's services. Peru refused to accept Peace Committee inter-
cession in the 1953-54- Asylum Case with Colombia; Guatemala
refused for a period in its 1954- controversy with Honduras and
Nicaragua; Panama refused to continue negotiations through the
Peace Committee in January, 1964-5 and the Dominican Republic
4. Annals of the Organization of American States , Vol. VI,
(Special dumber/ (1954-;, PP. 120-121.




7. Enrique V. Corominas, In the Caribbean Political Areas (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: University Press, 1954-), p. 97.
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and Cuba refused in I960 and 1961, respectively, to allow
c
Peace Committee investigations on their territories.
The extensive use made of the machinery of the Rio Treaty
in settling disputes in the 19^8-1965 period also furnishes in-
dications of national policy. The Treaty was invoked 15 times
and the Council agreed to convoke a meeting of the Organ of
Consultation 11 times. This use of the Rio Treaty was excessive
in the opinion of Dr. william f/.anger, former Assistant Secretary
General of the CAS. Dr. hanger maintains that the Rio Treaty
is primarily a mutual defense pact directed against aggression
from outside the continent. He feels that the use of the Rio
Treaty for other than its primary purpose is of dubious benefit
to the inter-American community and cites as an example the fact
that of the first eight cases in which the Rio Treaty was in-
voked, only in the last, the Venezuela-Dominican Republic case
of I960, was the aggressor determined and sanctions applied.
In the other seven cases, though agression or threat of aggres-
sion was charged, the issue was settled "by a process of nego-
tiation and conciliation that is more appropriate to the Treaty
on Pacific Settlement than to the Treaty of Reciprocal Assist-
q
ance." y
;Vhat bearing do these uses of the Rio Treaty—a treaty for
mutual defense against aggression—have on national policies
for the set clement of disputes? If Dr. danger is right, per-
haps greater use should have been made of the Peace Committee,
since the slow pace of ratification of the Treaty on Pacific
8. Supra, pp. 36, 38, 48-49, 50-52, 53-55-
9. 'William A.anger, Pan America in Crisis: the Future of the OAS
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961), pp. 50-52.
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Set clement (Fact of Bogota) makes the use of that instrument
somewhat difficult. But is Dr. danger really correct in his
prescription for the use of the .Rio Treaty? Perhaps defense
against extra-hemispheric attack was its original basis, but
since provisions were written into the treaty to permit its
use in inter-American conflicts or threats to the peace, such
use must be permissible even though it is a secondary purpose.
The beneficial effects of the evolution of the Rio Treaty into
an instrument used primarily in solving inter-American disputes,
as well as the procedural development of the practice of solv-
ing disputes through the CAS Council acting as Provisional Organ
of Consultation, cannot be lightly dismissed. Furthermore, in
all of the cases in which the Rio Treaty was applied, either an
armed attack or some form of threat to the peace did, in fact,
exist. And although Dr. Manger may be correct in saying that,
while the issues were settled superficially, the Caribbean ten-
sions nevertheless worsened, it is difficult to see how the
situation could have been improved by not resorting to the Rio
Treaty. It must, therefore, be concluded that the uses made
of the Rio Treaty were, with the exception of its invocation
by Panama in 1964, legitimate. In the latter case, although a
resumption of the Canal Zone riots could possibly have been con-
sidered to be a threat to the peace, t^ey had not recurred at
the time of Treaty invocation, and Panama had openly admitted
that resort to the Rio Treaty—and to the U.N. if necessary
—
was being used in order to pressure the United States into









National foreign policies with regard to use of the Amer-
ican Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota) for the settle-
ment of disputes may be deduced from the uses made of the treaty,
the reservations attached at the time of signature, and the slow
pace of ratification of the treaty. The Pact of Bogota has been
invoked on only tv/o occasions. On the first, Costa Rica re-
quested the OAS Council on April 21, 1954 » to convoke a Commis-
sion of Investigation and Conciliation as provided by the Pact
of Bogota to investigate a situation which had arisen between
Costa Rica and Nicaragua. However, as a result of statements
made by representatives of the parties indicating that the mat-
ter could be settled by direct negotiations, the Council took
12
no action on the request. Negotiations were not sufficient,
however, and the second occasion arose when the OaS Council,
after investigating the Costa Rica-Nicaragua dispute in 1955
acting as Provisional Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty,
recommended that the two states, both having ratified the Pact
of Bogota, set up a Commission of Investigation and. Conciliation.
An agreement to do so was signed at the Pan American Union in
Washington on January 9, 1956. ^
The difficulties attendant upon the acceptance and applica-
tion of the Pact of Bogota reflect the nature of the treaty it-
self. The conflict between the two views which had existed at
Bogota on whether to make settlement of all or only legal dis-
putes obligatory by prescribed methods was settled when the for-
14mer view prevailed in drafting the Pact. This is an example
12^ Annals of the OAS , Vol. VI (1954) » P« 169; J* Lloyd ivlecham,
The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 403.
13. Pan American Union, Legal Division, Department of International
Law, Applications of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, 1948-1956 (Washington: Pan American Union, 1957), p. 212
14. Iiiechain, U.S. and Inter-American Security
, p. 311 •
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of the tendency, noted by Dr. Manger, for Pan American assemblies
to "go too far too fast" in incorporating unacceptable provisions
into agreements with the result that the treaties are ineffect-
ive for lack, of ratifications. "It was a foregone conclusion
15
that this would be the fate of the Fact of Bogota." ' Formal
reservations to the Fact of Bogota were made by seven countries:
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, the United States, Paraguay, Peru,
and Nicaragua. The objections ranged from that of Argentina con-
cerning the provision for determination of the question of domes-
tic jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice in case
of disagreement, to Bolivia's insistence that the procedures
should apply to any controversy affecting the vital interests
of a state, to United States objection to the ban on diplomatic
representations for the protection of nationals. The pace of
ratification has been so slow "Chat by 1965* 17 years after the
Pact was signed, only 10 member states had ratified, it, and the
Second Special Inter-American Conference felt constrained to
17issue yet another appeal for ratifications. It is, therefore,
not difficult to see why the Fact of Bogota has been a neglig-
ible factor in the settlement of disputes since 194-8, and will
probably continue to be so. If it ever does become generally
accepted and used, a decline or cessation of resort to the Peace
Committee can be expected, since use of the Commissions of In-,
vestigation and Conciliation of the Pact would seem to preclude
the need for the Peace Committee.
In addition to the national policies reflected in the
15. danger, Pan America in Crisis
, p. 51.
16. Annals of the OAS , Vol. l7~PP« 96-98.
17. Resolution XV: OAS, Second Special Inter-American Conference,
Final Act, pp. 27-28.
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actual use of the various methods of pacific settlement, the
reservations and comments by various governments on questions
pertaining to Peace Committee structure and powers give a good
indication of what are usually permanent and unchanging atti-
tudes. The first specific comment on Peace Committee powers
was, as has been noted, Peru's reservation to .Resolution XIV
of 1940 to the effect that the Committee should function only
-I o
with the consent of the interested parties. Peru maintained
this position and its delegation stated at Caracas in 1954 that,
in voting for the resolutions (CI and CII) on the Inter-American
Peace Committee, it intended that the 19-4-0 reservation would
19
remain in effect. Though it is not generally known, four
other countries indicated in December of 1940 that they had
technical reservations concerning Resolution XIV subsequent to
the Havana meeting of foreign ministers. Argentina indicated
that it approved Resolution XIV on the understanding that the
Committee would act only on the request of the parties concerned
when Argentina was a party; Chile abstained from voting on the
report of the special committee (Venezuela, Guatemala, Haiti)
set up to study Resolution XIV and on the Salvadorean Minister's
suggestion of the countries to be named to the Resolution IV
committee on the ground that the agreements and resolutions of
the Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs had not yet
been ratified by the constitutional bodies of Chile; Honduras
reserved the right to exclude her dispute with Nicaragua over
18. The Department of State Bulletin , August 24, 1940, p. 144.
19« U.S., Department of State, Tenth Inter-American Conference,
Caracas , Venezuela, March 1-28, 1954- , Report of the Delega-
tion of the United States of America with Related Documents ,
International Organization and Conference Series II, American
Republics 14- (Washington: 1955)* P« 175.
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execution of the 1907 Arbitral Award by the King of Spain from
the Committee's intervention; and the Dominican Republic sub-
mitted a sweeping reservation in which she stated that Commit-
tee action involving her would be conditional upon a Dominican
request, retained the right to resort to the treaties she had
ratified, and refused to accept Committee suggestions of meth-
ods for peaceful settlements which conflicted with those speci-
20
lied in Dominican-ratified treaties. Of the four technical
reservations, only that of the Dominican .Republic has ever
affected Feace Committee operations. The Dominican reservation
was a factor in the Peace Committee's first case—that of the
Dominican Republic and Cuba in 1^48. When the Dominican Repub-
lic requested Committee action in that case, the Cuban representa-
tive, Ricardo Sarabasa, stated that, because of the Dominican
reservation, Cuba, by reciprocity, was exempted from accepting
the competence of the Committee. However, because of the friendly
and fraternal spirit shown by the Committee and its members, he
indicated that Cuba was willing to deal with the situation by
pi
direct negotiations. After this initial dispute had been
settled, the Dominican Republic, to bar any further challenges
to its right to take a case to the Committee, addressed a note
to the Secretary General of the CAS in which it formally can-
op
celled its "clarifying precisions."
The doubts expressed by Mexico and Costa Rica on the Peace
Committee's competence to deal with general situations have al-
ready been noted. 2 * ; ore recently, Mexican Foreign Secretary
5UT Corominas, Caribbean Political Areas
,
pp. 15-18.
21. Ibid., p. 43; Tenth Inter-American Conference, Second Report ,
22. Corominas, Caribbean Political Areas, pp. 44-45.
23. Supra
, pp. 32, 67.
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Antonio Carillo Flores stated at the Second Si>ecial Inter-
American Conference Mexico's basic faith in the Fact of Bogota
as an effective and workable instrument for peaceful settle-
ment and praised Brazil's decision to ratify the Pact. For
those states not ratifying, Secretary Carillo Plores suggested
acceptance of the obligatory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice for disputes susceptible of juridical solution.
With regard to non- justiciable disputes of a political charac-
ter, he stated, "Sstas con trover sias, conforme a la experiencia
universal, solo encuentron solucion firme a traves del acuerdo
derivado de una negociacion directa. Los buenos oficios y la
accion conciliatoria es lo mas que razonablemente puede exper-
24
arse que pueda auxiliar en la solucion de estos conflictos.
"
Secretary Carillo Flores, quoting President Diaz Crdaz, stated
that L'exico would pursue a course of strengthening existing
procedures for peaceful ctange and would always extend a friendly
hand toward all countries of the hemisphere, regardless of
25their problems. y
The United States has consistently supported the Peace
Committee and has been a member of the Committee for all but
one year of its existence. (The United States' second term
under the 1956 Statutes ends in the summer of 1966.) Resolution
CII of the Tenth Inter-American Conference in 1954 was sponsored
by the United States and was adopted "substantially in the form
presented by the United States . . . ." In the 1957 tvicaraguan-
Honduran conflict, United States Ambassador John C. Dreier,
24. "Segunda Conferencia Interamericana Extraordinaria, " l'exico





26. U.S., Department of State, Report of U.S. Delegation , p. 14.
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speaking before the Council, suggested that the parties could
find assistance in resolving the basic causes of the conflict
"from the peaceful procedures in effect in the inter-American
system, including the services of the Inter-American Peace
27
Committee . . . . " The United States State Department pam-
phlet on the Organization of American States lists the Peace
Committee, the Pact of Bogota, and the Rio Treaty as the three
procedures available for dispute settlement within the OAS, the
choice depending on the gravity of the situation. Finally,
of course, U.S. support for the Peace Committee is evidenced
by its efforts in January, 1964, to resolve the Tanama Canal
Zone situation through that body.
Proposals for changes to the Peace Committee Statutes con-
stitute another indication of national attitudes. The 1948
Bases of Action and 1950 Statutes were, of course, adopted by
the original five members of the Commit bee: Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, Cuba, and the United States. These same countries pro-
posed the revision of the Statutes to the Tenth Inter-American
Conference. The draft of the revised Statutes proposed by the
Peace Committee was, pursuant to Resolution CII of 1954, re-
ferred to the CAS Council. The Council referred Resolution CII
to a special 13-meraber Committee on Juridical-Political Hatters
which it established on May 19, 1954- 1 "bo study resolutions on
these subjects arising from the Caracas Conference. The Commit-
tee was composed of the representatives of Argentina (Chairman),
Paraguay (Vice Chairman), Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, the United States, Uruguay,
£?. "United States Position on Mcaraguan-honduran Conflict," The
Department of State Bulletin , May 20, 1957 > p. 812.
28
. U.S., Department of State, Organization of American States
,
International Organization and Conference Series 11, American




and Venezuela. y Five months later, on October 20, 195^» the
Committee was increased in size to 14 members and Chile was
30
nominated by Argentina to be the additional member. In its
study of the question of statute revision, this Committee con-
sidered written observations presented to it by the governments
of 3razil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, and the
31
United States. While the particular views of these states
have not been published, it is notable that Peru, whose position
has consistently been in favor of limiting the Peace Committee's
powers, was not one of those presenting observations. The pre-
liminary draft statutes presented to the Council on June 22,
1955» were, the Committee said, a composite—not necessarily
representing the views of any particular government or even the
52
views of Committee members. Observations on the preliminary
draft statutes, also unpublished, were presented to the Council
by Argentina, Brazil, Costa Eica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador,
33Guatemala, and the United States. Again, there was no com-
ment from Peru. However, a comparison of the member states
submitting observations on these draft statutes with those
originally submitting observations to the Committee on Ouricical-
Folitical Matters yields some interesting results. Of the seven
governments submitting observations in the first instance (to
the Committee) four were members of the Peace Committee. And
in the second instance, four of the eight submitting governments
were Peace Committee members. Since three Peace Committee mem-
29. Annals of the OAS , Vol. VI (1954), p. 168.
50. Ibid ., p. 248.
31. Annals of the OAS , Vol. VII (1955), p. 169.
32. Ibiin
33. Ibid" ., p. 194.
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bers (3razil, Cuba, and bhe United States) submitted observa-
tions in both instances and the other two members (Argentina
and Mexico) in one instance each, it can be seen that all five
Peace Committee members found it desirable to formally express
their views on the draft. Of the non-Peace Committee members
submitting observations, Ecuador and SI Salvador submitted them
on both occasions. The members' inclination toward wide Peace
Committee powers can be ascertained from an examination of the
1950 Statutes and the Peace Committee's 1954- draft statutes.
And the position of Ecuador has since been clearly indicated
35
by its 1959 proposal on revision of the Statutes. y Therefore
it seems reasonable to assume that the position taken by the
Committee on Juridical-Political Matters was probably favorable
to restrictions on the Peace Committee's powers— such as those
which were actually incorporated in the 1956 Statutes. In
view of the changes that were adopted, the observations noted
above probably favored wider powers and were undoubtedly a
minority view.
In addition to the 1959 Ecuadorian proposal for revision
of the Statutes, one other specific proposal has been submitted
by an GAS member government. This was a draft resolution on
the Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Peace Committee submitted
by the government of Haiti to the Second Special Inter-American
Conference at .Rio de Janeiro in November, 1965. Haiti, the
country v/hich had originally proposed the creation of the Peace
Committee in 1940 (though the origin of the idea is said to be
Ecuadorian), recommended that the Statutes be amended to per-
W. Supra , pp. 8-10. 11-12.
35. Supra
, p. 16.
36. Corominas, Caribbean Political Areas , pp. 11-12.
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rait the Peace Committee to take cognizance of a dispute on its
own initiative, on request of one of the interested parties,
or in conformity with a petition made by an OAS Council resolu-
tion, by the Organ of Consultation, a Meeting of Foreign Minis-
ters, an Inter-American Conference, or by some other organ of
the OAS or United Nations concerned with peaceful settlement.
The Feace Committee would consider a dispute but would not
make decisions. Its conciliation, good offices, or mediation
could not be rejected. 3y submitting this resolution, Haiti
clearly placed herself on the side of those desiring wider pow-
ers for the Peace Committee.
While the Inter-American Peace Committee and resolutions
directly pertaining to it were considered by Commission III
(Peaceful Solution of Controversies) of the Second Special Inter-
American Conference under Subject (Tenia) IV, that Commission
also considered two very pertinent draft treaties under Subject
III, Perfection of the Methods and Instruments of Peaceful Solu-
tion of Controversies. These two draft treaties were submitted
by Ecuador and Brazil. The Ecuadorian proposal was a draft
Inter-American Treaty on Peaceful Settlement, which proposed
creation of an Inter-American Council of Peaceful Settlement,
composed of one representative from each 0«.S member state, and
which would be empowered to act on its own initiative, at the
request of one of the parties to a controversy (by recommending
procedures or formulas) or on submission of a dispute by both
parties (to resolve the controversy). If the Council's efforts
failed, it would be empowered to determine if peace would be
37* OAS, Segunda Conferencia Interamericana Extraordinaria,
Actas y Documentos , Vol. IV (TCashin^ton: Pan American




endangered by continuation of the conflict and, if so, a meet-
ing of the Organ of Consultation would be convoked in accord-
ance with the Charter and the Rio Treaty. This treaty, if
adopted, would greatly strengthen the conciliatory powers of
the CaS and would transform the Peace Committee into a major
organ of the OAS. It is a lo-ical development of Ecuador's
1959 proposal for strengthening the Peace Committee and shows
the determination with whicii Ecuador is pursuing this approach.
The Brazilian proposal Fas a draft Treaty Establishing the
Inter-American Peace Council- This treaty would create an Inter-
Araerican Peace Council which would be used in situations involv-
ing differences or disputes among American states in a manner
similar to the present use of the Organ of Consultation in cases
of aggression or threats to the peace. On request of the parties
to the OaS Council, the Feace Council could be convoked to con-
sider the problems and suggest methods for solution where the
parties are unable to agree (.article IV). (Presumably, both
parties would have to agree to the request, since the draft does
not indicate that one would be sufficient.) Also on request of
the parties, the Peace Council could prescribe a solution (in
effect, arbitrate). The decisions of the Peace Council would
be made by two-thirds majority vote and would be binding on
all OAS members. The Inter-^merican Peace Committee would be
an advisory organ of the Feace Council and would act as its
investigating committee. Tlie OAS Council would be empowered
to act as Provisional lntex>-.american Peace Council to assist
in bringing about direct negotiations between the disputants
in the case of a situation aJTfecting peaceful relations be-
38. Ibid., pp. 31-36, 39-40,
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tween American slates (Article II). ' This proposal, while
institutionalizing OaS activity in the peaceful settlement of
disputes at a higher level than that of the present Feace Com-
mittee, and possibly reducing the use of the Rio Treaty for
other than actual or threatened armed attacks, has serious
limitations. The lack of provision for the convocation of the
Peace Council on the CAS Council's own initiative or at the re-
quest of only one of the parties to a dispute would, it seems,
limit the Feace Council's activities fully as much as the pres-
ent Peace Committee is limited by its 1956 Statutes. In this
respect, Brazil's position would seem to be close to that of
the member states' desiring restriction of the Peace Committee's
powers, a similarity rnay be noted between this Erazilian draft
treaty and the nine new Charter articles on OAS Council res-
ponsibilities for peaceful settlement recommended by the March,
1966, amendment-drafting Conference in Panama. The recommended
articles would allow the parties to a dispute to request the
Council's good offices, but would not permit the Council to act
40
unless all the parties involved agree. Both the Ecuadorian
and Brazilian draft treaties were assigned by Resolution XII of
the Second Special Inter-American Conference to the Inter-
American Juridical Committee for urgent study. The resolution
provided that the Juridical Committee's study was to be trans-
mitted to the OaS Council which was to "determine whether or
not it is in order to convoke a specialized conference or sub-
mit the study for consideration by the Special Inter-American
41Conference for Amendment of the Charter . . . .
"
With respect
39. Ibid ., pp. 41-45,.
40. The New York Times , news article by Hanry Giniger, April 2, 1966.
41. OAS, Second Special Inter-American Conference, Final Act , p. 26.
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to any new powers to be given to the OAS Council or Co other
organs through amendments to the Charter, Feru, Chile, and
Ecuador made statements for inclusion in the Final Act of the
Second Special Conference. Feru stated emphatically that pow-
ers assigned to the CAS Council should "correspond to those con-
ferred on it by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assist-
ance," and that in performing any functions assigned for the
peaceful settlement of disputes, the Council "should abide by
the fundamental principles of international law set forth in
Articles 5«h and 14 of the Charter of the ( rganization and VI
of the Fact of Bogota." Feru thus held strongly to its posi-
tion that matters settled by treaties between states should
not be reopened through the use of dispute-settlement machinery,
Chile echoed Feru's sentiments in its statement that "with res-
pect to the powers that could be given to the Council in the
future regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes, . . .
such powers should be consonant with the provisions of article
VI of the Fact of Bogota." * Ecuador, true to her consistent
position in this regard, stated her opposition to any Charter
amendment which would prevent the OAS from achieving the peace-
ful settlement of disputes "within a reasonable period" and
was emphatically "opposed to the inclusion of the provision
contained in Article VI of the Fact of Bogota in such amend-
44
ments."
Another area to be considered in determining national
policies regarding the Feace Committee is that of boundary
42. OAS, Second Special conference, Final Act , p. 45.
43. Ibid
., p. 47.
44. TBT3 .. P^ 46.

-82-
disputes. These disputes are responsible for many of the
national attitudes favoring restriction of the Peace Committee's
competence. Largely because of the vagueness of many of the
Spanish colonial boundaries
—
precise boundaries being unim-
portant when Spain controlled almost all of the continent's
colonies—there were many uncertain boundaries in existence
when independence was attained in the 19th century. The result-
ing boundary disputes have plagued Latin America ever since.
;.any of the disputes have been settled, but some still smoulder
and affect national policies. y One of the more troublesome
of these controversies has been that between Ecuador and Peru.
The boundary settlement effected in 1942 at the Third Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has never been
satisfactory to Ecuador. Ecuador's pronouncements on various
occasions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes have
reflected this. For example, Ecuador objected in 1948 to
Article VI of the Fact of Bogota which states that the proced-
ures of the Pact "may not be applied to matters already settled
by arrangement between the parties ... or which are governed
by agreements or treaties in force . . . . " At Caracas in
1954, the Ecuadorian delegation reiterated its 1948 reservation,
stating that, in Ecuador's opinion, the Pact of Bogota "should
be extended to all matters affecting the vital interests of a
state ...."' In February, 1955, as part of a reservation
*5» An excellent chronology and discussion of all of these bound-
ary problems and their status as of the beginning of World War II
may be found in two works by Gordon Ireland
—
Boundaries, Pos-
sessions, and Conflicts in South America (Cambridge, Mass.:
harvard University Press, 1938) ; and Boundaries, Possessions,
and Conflicts in Central and Korth America and the Caribbean
(.Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941).
46. Annals of the PAS , Vol. I (194-9), p. 91.
47. U.S. , Department of State, Tenth Inter-American Conference
,




to the report of the investigating committee in the Costa Rica-
Nicaragua case under the Kio Treaty, Ecuadorian Ambassador Jose
R. Chiriboga V. suggested the creation of an Inter-^merican
Police Force for the surveillance of the frontiers of countries
48
fearing intervention or aggression. It was probably no coin-
cidence that later that year, on September 8, 1955, Ecuador
went before the OaS Council to invoke the Rio Treaty and to
charge Feru with threatening her territory, sovereignty, and
political independence by massing troops and war materiel near
4°
zhe Ecuadorian border. y Ecuador's proposals for revision of
the Peace Committee ' s Statutes and for the creation of an Inter-
American Council of Peaceful Settlement, as well as her reserva-
tion at the November, 1965, Rio Conference, are very probably
influenced by her desire to reopen the boundary settlement forc-
ibly imposed on her in 1942.
Another simmering boundary dispute concerns Bolivia and
Chile. 3olivia still seeks a way of regaining her maritime
provinces and access to the sea—lost to Chile in the War of
the Pacific. Related, although perhaps not directly connected
with this issue, is the dispute over which Bolivia broke dip-
lomatic relations with Chile in 1962. A dispute over Chile's
diversion of waters from the Lauca River which rises in Chile
and flows into Bolivia led to a Bolivian request for action by
the OaS Council in April, 1962. Bolivia's insistence on settle-
ment by mediation and Chile's equally adamant insistence on ar-
bitration or adjudication led to a break in diplomatic relations








Other existing border disputes include those of Brazil
and Paraguay over a border demarcation in the area of a poten-
tial hydroelectric power site on the Parana Kiver and the
Argentine-Chilean border problems presently being arbitrated
by Great Britain. In what is undoubtedly a direct outgrowth
of their positions of opposition to inter-American interference
in these border disputes, Brazil and Argentina opposed, in
n.arch, 1966, United States efforts at the Panama amendment-
drafting conference to give the CAS Council powers to initiate
action for the peaceful settlement of disputes without the con-
51
sent of all the parties.
The adoption of .Resolution XIV of the Second Meeting of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1940 was a major policy change
by the American governments. It was the first indication that
the governments would accept, as an instrument of collective
mediation, a representative committee of a quarter of their
number. Previous inter-American approaches to the peaceful
settlement of disputes had all been through the strictly bi-
lateral procedures embodied in the various treaties, conven-
52tions, and protocals of the 1920' s and 1930* s. The use of
a committee to represent and act for all the American republics
was not a new idea in 1940, but it was of very recent vintage.
Its first acceptance, as Edgar Furniss, Jr. points out, was in
the establishment of the Inter-American Neutrality Committee in
1939 (later changed to the Inter-American Juridical Committee),
5oT OaS, Council, Letter from the Ambassador, Representative of
Chile to the Chairman of the Council of the CAS, dated June 27,
1962, OEA/Ser. G/V, C-d-1000 (Washington: Pan American Union,
1962).
51. The tiew York Times , news article by Juan de Cnis, March 13, 1966.
52. Supra
, Chapter 1, pp. 1-2.
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and the committee principle was subsequently used in 1942
with the creation of the Committee for Folitical Defense by
S3
the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers."
There is, however, some doubt as to the actual strength
of support for the adoption of Resolution XIV. On one hand, it
may well be that, except for the Ecuador-Peru border dispute,
the "existing differences" which were the immediate justifica-
tion for Resolution XIV did not, in fact, endanger continental
unity and therefore, no request was made for immediate installa-
tion of the Committee. (In the case of Ecuador and Feru, the
hostilities which broke out in July, 194-1* were terminated
through the mediation of Argentina, Brazil and the United States,
and Ecuador's threat to stand aloof from any action for contin-
ental defense was sufficient to successfully pressure Feru
into agreeing to a settlement at the Third Meeting of Foreign
Ministers at Rio de Janeiro in 194-2. This was a case of actual
armed attack and occupation of territory rather than a "dispute"
and thus was more like the cases handled under the Rio Treaty
than those handled by the Feace Committee.)^" Cn the other
hand, it may be, as Eargaret Sail states, that "subsequent dif-
ferences of opinion among the governments" on the desirability
of activating the committee prevented the appointment of represent-
atives. ^ Eiss Ball's view is supported by the existence of the
reservations to Resolution XIV cited earlier, even though these
reservations were technical ones concerned with the Committee's
53. Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "The Inter-American System and Recent
Caribbean Disputes," International Organization , Vol. IV (1950),
P. 592.
54. Charles G. Fenwick, "The Third Meeting- of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs at Rio de Janeiro," American Journal of International
Law
, Vol. 36 (19^2), pp. 190-191.
55. M. Margaret Ball, The Problem of Inter-American Organization ,
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1944) , p. 47.
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conpetence and not with its existence or basic function,
//hatever the actual reason for non-activation of the Committee
during the war, its activation and operation were readily ac-
cepted when the first case was brought to it in 194-8.
In spite of the delay in the actual formation of the Peace
Committee, the American states bave continued to use committees
in handling the problems of peaceful settlement of disputes and
inter-American security. "Subcommittees of information" have
been used by the Peace Committee and both investigative and
ad hoc committees have been employed by the OaS Council acting
as Provisional Organ of Consultation. These latter committees,
used by the Council in handling situations brought before it
under the Pio Treaty, are not specifically authorized by either
the OaS Charter or the Rio Treaty. They can be justified , how-
ever, by Article 55 of the Charter which allows the Council
to formulate its own regulations and by Article 21 of the Rio
Treaty which provides that "the measures agreed upon by the
Organ of Consultation shall be executed through the procedures
and agencies now existing or those which may in the future be
57
established."^' In any case, the use of investigative and ad
hoc committees by the Provisional Organ of Consultation has
been sanctioned in practice by two-thirds of the states sig-
natory to the Pio treaty which indicates a continuing accept-
ance of the committee principle by the American governments.
The question of the status of the Inter-American Peace
Committee within the structure of the OAS seems to have aroused
little national concern. Since it was neither specifically
W. Supra
, pp. 72-75* ~~~~




incorporated in the OAS Charter at Bogota nor eliminated as
one of the peaceful settlement procedures which the Fact of
3ogoba replaced, the Peace Committee's legal status must be
regarded as being in a kind of "limbo." By placing the ques-
tion on the agenda of the Tenth Inter-American Conference, the
OAS Council obviously intended that a determination of the Com-
mittee's status should be made at that tine. Unfortunately,
Committee I on Juridical-Political Matters, which was respons-
ible for the Peace Committee item at Caracas, was heavily occu-
pied with other matters and did not spend much time considering
the Peace Committee. While there was "general agreement that
the Committee should be continued and that its status within
the Crganization of American States should be clarified," no
attempt was made to consider the Peace Committee's proposals
and no recommendation was made concerning its status. Resolu-
tion CII's request to the CaS Council to prepare new statutes
for the Peace Committee had the effect- of removing the Committee's
self-appointed power of drafting and changing its own statutes,
but there was no change in the Committee's legal status which
continues to be based on Resolution XIV of 1940. Some concern
for the Peace Committee's status may be inferred from the
Ecuadorian and Brazilian proposals at the Second Special Inter-
American Conference
—
proposals which would create new organs
within the OAS structure incorporating the Peace Committee's
CO
functions. J And yet no serious question was raised over the
58. U.S., Department of State, Tenth Inter-American Conference






present status of the Peace Committee nor was any attempt
made to incorporate it specifically into the CAS structure.
The foreign policies of the various American republics
have, then, had significant effects on the structure and opera-
tions of the Inter-American Peace Committee from its beginning
in 1940 to the present day. The results of those policies can
be seen in the Committee's initial inactivity, its installation
in 1948, the various occasions of request for Committee ser-
vices, the agreement to or refusal of Committee action, and
the decisions of 1956 to restrict Committee competence, of 1959
to widen it, and of 1965 to limit it again. The primary factors
involved in the successful efforts to curb the Committee's pow-
ers in 1956 were undoubtedly the existence of the border dis-
putes described above and the Latin Americans' historically
strong opposition to intervention. These same factors are also
the basis of much of the opposition which has since arisen to
the strengthening of CAS machinery for the peaceful settlement
of disputes. And while it is difficult to determine directly
the effect that Peace Committee operations have had on foreign
policies, it seems certain that Committee action in cases in
which one of the parties has refused to accept its services
—
such as the 1954- Colombia-Peru asylum case and the cases involv-
ing the Dominican Republic and Cuba under Resolution IV of
1959—has tended to strengthen the attitudes of those who
would limit Peace Comiaittee competence. A decision to enlarge
the Committee's powers and expand its competence is unlikely
to be achieved unless some compromise can be reached which will
satisfy the objections of these states.

CHaFTER 4: THE FEaCE COKMITT.SE COMPARED
TO OTHER REGIONAL EFFORTS
The record of the Inter-American Peace Committee in the col-
lective mediation of disputes between nations is unique among
regional international organizations. Only two other regional
groups, the League of Arab States and the Organization of African
Unity, provide for any form of collective mediation among their
members. Neither has yet been effective in practice. The more
specialized organizations, such as the Council of Europe and
the regional security groups, have even less efficient arrange-
ments for intra-organizational dispute settlement.
The Pact of the League of Arab States was signed in Cairo,
k§ypt» on iV.arch 22, 194-5, and created, in the words of Azzara
Pasha, its first Secretary General, "an instrument of construc-
tive co-ordination and co-operation on mutual interest." The
Pact provides for two principle organs, the Council, composed
of representatives of each of the member states, and a permanent
Secretariat. The formal dispute-settlement machinery of the
League is described in Article 5 of the Pact. This article pro-
hibits the use of force in settling disputes between member
states and provides for the voluntary submission to Council
arbitration of disputes in which the independence, sovereignty,
or territorial integrity of the parties are not involved. Coun-
cil mediation is required in all disputes in which the differ-
ences threaten to lead to war between member states or with a
third state.
1. Mahomed Shafi Agwani , "The Arab League: An Experiment in
Regional Organization," India Quarterly , Vol IX (1953) i P- 361
2. Robert W. LacDonald, The League of Arab States (Princeton:




The limited machinery for dispute settlement provided by
article 5 has been ineffective in practice. Instead of becom-
ing a tightly-knit regional organization, the Arab League has
evolved as a loose association of states. The sense of nation-
alism common to most newly-emergent states has produced an ex-
treme sensitivity in matters involving national sovereignty
and has limited the usefulness of the arbitration provisions
of Article 5« The mediation provision is weakened by the re-
quirement that a dispute must be so serious that war threatens
to erupt before the Council's mediation becomes mandatory.
Even when such a case exists, the Council's powers of mediation
cannot ensure that a peaceful solution is achieved. As a result,
the League was unable to act in the Lebanese crisis of 1958>
the situation in Yemen since the 1962 coup d'etat, and the
Algeria-Morocco border dispute of October, 1963. In practice,
disputes have been handled by traditional means—mediation, con-
ciliation, and arbitration—or the League has resorted to the
good offices of the Secretary-General and to ad hoc investigating
3commissions.
The Crganization of African Unity (OAU) is the newest of
the regional international organizations, having been formed at
a conference of African states at Addis Ababa in 1963 • The
members of this organization, realizing that peace and stabil-
ity in their mutual relations were essential in order to achieve
the political, economic, and social development they so urgently
desired, made the peaceful settlement of disputes one of the
seven basic principles of the CAU. Indeed, T.O. Elias, Migerian







of the OAU Charter, states that "the fourth principle, that of
peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, con-
ciliation or arbitration, is probably the most fundamental of
all the seven principles enshrined in Article 3." To aid in
the fulfillment of the fourth principle, Article 19 of the Chart-
er created a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion. This Commission, whose composition and conditions of
service were to be defined later by a separate protocol, was
considered to be of such importance that it was made one of the
four principle institutions of the organization, the others be-
ing the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council
5
of Ministers, and the Secretariat.
There is as yet no indication that the Comniission of Media-
tion, Conciliation and Arbitration has considered any disputes.
The new African states have found their most serious political
problems to be internal rather than in their relations with each
other. Of the external problems they have encountered, that of
external assistance to subversive activities was considered
serious enough to warrant a "Declaration on the Problem of Sub-
version" at the Second Session of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government at Accra, Ghana, in October, 1965* The
CaU heads of state, after declaring their agreement not to toler-
ate subversive activities within their states directed against
another state, agreed "to resort to bilateral or multilateral
consultation to settle all differences betv/een two or more Mem-
ber States" and to utilize the procedures specified in the OAU
Charter and the Protocol of Mediation, Conciliation and arbitration,
4. T.O. Elias, "The Charter of the Organization of African Uni ty ,
"
American Journal of International Law (AJIL) , Vol. 59 (1965)*
P. 24-9.
"
5 ' ibid-» P» 264.
6. International Legal Materials, Vol.V, fio.l ( January ,1966) , p. 13*3.
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Although not formally organized as an international organiza-
tion and certainly not fitting the terra "regional" in any way,
the British Commonwealth of Nations is nevertheless a grouping
of nation-states which deserves special mention. The Common-
wealth has no constitutive document and no rule binding upon
its members, yet its greatest strength, based upon "experience"
and "common growth" has been described as "the ability of its
members to act together, despite the lack of any logical series
7
of binding laws and regulations . . . ." In an association in
which this degree of unity of action has been achieved, one
might expect to find some formal arrangement by which disputes
among its members could be resolved. Such, however, is not the
case. The United Kingdom and the Dominions had, in signing the
Optional Clause of the Statute of the Fermanent Court of Inter-
national Justice in 1929, expressly reserved intra-Commonwealth
Q
disputes from the Court's jurisdiction, yet no mechanism for
handling such disputes was created at that time. In 1930, an
Imperial Conference report stated that "some machinery for the
solution of disputes which may arise between Members of the
Q
British Commonwealth is desirable. '" The best that could then
be achieved was agreement on ad hoc arbitration of disputes as
they arose and limitation of the arbitration to questions of a
justiciable nature. After the only attempt at use of an
ad hoc arbitration tribunal failed in 1932 following the refus-
al of the Irish Free State to accept it, Arnold Toynbee, in his
7. Guy Arnold, Towards Peace and aj. ultiracial Commonwealth (London
:
Chapman and Hall, Ltd, 1964;, p. 76.
8. Arnold J. Toynbee, ed
.
, British Commonwealth Relations , Pro-
ceedings of the First Unofficial Conference at Toronto, 11-21
September 1933 (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), P- 107 •
9. Gerald E. H. Palmer, compiler, Consultation and Co-operation in




. , p. 121.
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report of the 1933 Toronto Conference, stated again the desir-
ability of a permanent tribunal to resolve intra-Commonwealth
disputes: "The need for a Commonwealth Tribunal to settle
such disputes between the Governments of the British Common-
wealth arises because the relations between members of the Brit-
ish Commonwealth are of a special character, and this relation-
ship renders inappropriate in the case of intra-Commoiiwealth
disputes the application of the procedure applicable in the case
of international disputes."
Despite the "special character" of the Commonwealth rela-
tionship and the "inappropriateness" of normal methods of inter-
national dispute settlement, no Commonwealth Tribunal was ever
established. Disputes which have occurred among Commonwealth
countries have been settled, if at all, by normal diplomatic
methods. The 1965 hostilities between India and Fakistan in
Kashmir, for example, were ended and agreement reached on with-
drawal of troops through the mediation of the Soviet Union in
Tashkent. 12
Within the specialized regional international organizations
there is even less concern for dispute settlement among members
than is the case in the more general organizations described
above. The regional security organizations, such as NATO, are
primarily oriented toward external dangers. The NATO Council,
composed of government ministers or of permanent representatives
when the ministers are not present, meets weekly and is avail-
able for political consultation among the members. The NATO
Secretary-General, who presides at the Council meetings, is
11. Toynbee, British Commonwealth Relations , p. 107*
12. The New York Times, January 11, 1966.
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authorized to mediate in disputes between I\ATO members if the
15
parties invite him to do so. ~ This NATO machinery, unused for
dispute settlement in practice, nevertheless remains available
for such use in the future.
The Council of Europe is somewhat more generally oriented
than NATO, yet it has even less power to reconcile disputes
among its members. There is, in fact, no mention of dispute
settlement in the Statute of the Council of Europe. This mat-
ter is left entirely to the procedures and obligations of the
14
United Nations Charter.
The dispute-settlement powers of functional regional or-
ganizations such as the European Economic Community (EEC) are
generally confined to issues pertaining to the execution of the
treaty which established the organization. In the EEC, the Coun-
cil of Ministers, composed of representatives of the governments
of the Community members, is empowered to make decisions to
ensure the coordination of the member states' general economic
policies. Legal issues involving the treaty or the acts of Com-
IS
munity organs are decided in a Court of Justice. y A similar
organization, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)
,
does not yet have even the limited peaceful settlement machin-
ery of the EEC. The Montivideo Treaty of I960 which established
LaFTa provided no system for the settlement of disputes aris-
ing as a result of its application. Recognizing the desirabil-
ity of having such a mechanism, the 1965 meeting of LAFTA for-
eign ministers adopted a resolution (Resolution 4) which called
ITi PEP (Political and Economic Planning), European Organizations
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1959), pp. 165-179.
14. M. Margaret Ball, "The Organization of American States and
the Council of Europe," British Yearbook of International
Law (BYIL), Vol. 26 (1949), p. 167.




upon the Executive Committee of LAFTA to draw up before July 31,
1966, a draft protocol for the ministers of foreign affairs
to consider at their next meeting. The protocol was to include
provisions for a) compulsory negotiations between parties; b)
compulsory conciliation, with mediation by the LAFTA Executive
Committee; c) system of ad hoc arbitration tribunals; and d)
provision for acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the ad
hoc tribunals and a system of sanctions to enforce compliance
1 6
with arbitral awards.
The foregoing brief descriptions of the capabilities of
other regional international organizations in the peaceful
settlement of disputes among their members should serve to
illustrate the vast difference between the powers of these
organizations and those of the OAS in this important area. It
nay well be that the lack of success of the Arab League is in
large measure due to the fact that it has not had effective,
institutionalized machinery for the peaceful resolution of dis-
putes among its members. And the resulting dissention has ren-
dered the League incapable of unified policy or action in pur-
suit of its goals. The members of the.OAU have, on the other
hand, recognized the vital role that peace and stability play
in the process of development. In making the Commission of
''lediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration one of its four prin-
ciple organs, the CAU has gone beyond the present state of de-
velopment of the OAS. CAU structure, however, has not yet been
tried and proven. And while the internal political situations
of the African states remain unstable, it is unlikely that the
OAU members will. concentrate on external disputes.
16. International Lep;al Materials , Vol.V, No.l (January, 1966), p. 12?
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While it is likely thab future development may be expected
in the dispute settlement machinery of the Arab League and the
OaU, such development is not probable in the more specialized
regional organizations. The peaceful settlement of disputes
appears to be a function only of the more generalized inter-
national organizations, whether on a regional or a world basis.
It is probably best left outside the scope of the more special-
ized organizations.
* * *
From its obscure beginning in Resolution KIV of the Second
Meeting of Ivinisters of Foreign Affairs in 194-0, the Inter-
American Peace Committee has deveolped into a major peacekeep-
ing instrument v.it,Lin the OAS. There can be little argument
with Frofessor J. Lloyd Leeham's conclusion that "as a security
instrument the Inter-Arnerican Peace Committee has achieved a
status in the inter-American System second only to the Rio
17Treaty." ' Indeed, the Peace Committee has handled 18 cases in
the period 19^8-1965, while only 11 cases have been handled
under the Rio Treaty procedures. during the same period. The
number of cases handled, however, does not indicate the true im-
portance of the Peace Committee as a peaceful settlement mechan-
ism. The Committee represents a distinctly new approach to the
problem of international dispute settlement. By creating the
Peace Committee, the American states appeared to recognize that
the solution of disputes between individual states was of con-
cern to all of them—that there was a community interest in
maintaining peaceful relations among the nations of the hem-
isphere. But how strong was this community interest? Was it
17. J. Lloyd Mecham , a Survey of United States-Latin American Re -
lations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company"! 19b 1?), p. 179.
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only the threat of danger from outside the hemisphere that made
agreement possible? The history of the development of the Peace
Committee's Statutes would seem to indicate this possibility.
In 19^-0, when the external danger and the need for unity were
great, there was general agreement that an inter-A.merican body
was necessary to ensure that disputes between the American
states were settled peacefully. By the 195^-56 period when
che Committee's status was questioned and its statutes revised,
no direct threat to the continent and no urgent need for unity
existed. Therefore, the Feace Committee's competence was so
restricted that it has become merely another procedure that
disputants could use if they jointly agreed to do so. The ex-
tension of Committee powers from 1959 "to 1965 brought no change,
because it applied only to the area of investigation assigned
under .Resolution IV.
The lacK. of a direct threat to the hemisphere is not, how-
ever, an adequate explanation for the restriction of the Teace
Committee's powers in 1956. If interest in the resolution of
controversies through a community organ waned, it was more likely
a result of the uses which had been made of the Peace Committee
and the reaction of the member states to these activities.
Three factors would seem to be primarily responsible for the
change. It will be recalled that the cases handled by the Peace
Committee prior to 1956 involved primarily a small group of
Caribbean stages whose primary interest lay in toppling each
others' governments. Dr. William Manger has correctly noted
that, whereas in each case the dispute was officially settled
through the Peace Committee's action, in reality nothing was
1ft
solved. The parties to most of these disputes were not, in




fact, really interested in settling their differences when they
appealed to the Peace Committee. They were more interested in
airing the dispute before public opinion, building up support
for their own position, and castigating their opponents, in ef-
fect, using the Peace Committee as a political sounding board.
A second factor which led to restriction of Committee pow-
ers was the Committee's action in the face of announced opposi-
tion of one of the directly-interested parties. This occurred
most notably in 1954- in the Colombia-Peru asylum case and in
the Guatemala-honduras-Uicaragua case. In both of these dis-
putes, the Peace Committee pursued its consideration of the case
despite the opposition and. uncooperative attitude of one of the
parties. In the first case the Committee studied the controver-
sy surrounding the asylum of APRA leader Haya de la Torre des-
pite Peru's objections, and adopted a set of conclusions which
suggested further direct negotiations. In the second case, the
Committee continued to pursue the controversy at the behest of
Honauras and Nicaragua even though Guatemala had withdrawn its
request and refused to cooperate. It was not until the three
governments concerned reached an agreement to resolve the dis-
pute themselves that the Peace Committee's investigation was
terminated.
A third factor behind the loss of support for broad Peace
Committee power and competence undoubtedly lies in the changed
international situation—both in the Caribbean and on the world
scene. With the 1948 counter-revolution in Venezuela, the pres-
idential changes in Cuba and Costa Rica in 194-8 and 194-9 and
the 1952 election of Batista in Cuba, the support of democratic-
ally-inclined countries for Peace Committee action against die-
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tatorships was largely eliminated. The attitude of the United
States in this respect also changed during the same period.
The advent of the Korean War, the previously-noted decline of
democratic governments in the area, and the Guatemalan affair
of 1954 led to the United States* grave concern over combating
the spread of Communism into the Western Hemisphere. Because
of a need for hemispheric support, the United States was in no
position to oppose the majority's decision to restrict the Com-
mittee's powers in 1956.
The above three factors, combined with the unchanging
attitude of states like Peru, which had opposed the broad pow-
ers assumed by the Committee from the beginning, and Mexico,
which had indicated in 19^9 that it felt the Committee was ex-
ceeding its competence in considering general situations, were
probably responsible for the support given in 1956 to the re-
quirement of mutual consent by both parties prior to Peace
Committee action. Since 1956, there has been little outward
indication of enough change in national policies concerning
the Peace Committee to support another revision of the Statutes
* * *
Are there possibilities of change in the Peace Committee's
Statutes or its status within the inter-American system? The
Second Special Inter-American Conference had before it four pro-
posals concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes. These
included the proposals of the Peace Committee and of Haiti for
the revision of the Statutes to return, essentially, to the
provisions of the 1950 Statutes, and the proposals of Ecuador
and Brazil to establish new organs within the OAS structure.
It is probable that none of these proposals will be accepted.
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While the former two proposals (Peace Committee's and Haiti's)
were referred to the OAS Council for consultation with the mem-
ber states and possible amendment action, and the latter two
proposals were referred to bhe Juridical Committee for study,
the subject of peaceful settlement of disputes was also placed
on the agenda of the Special Committee which was to meet in
Panama to prepare draft proposals on amendments to the OAS
Charter.
The Special Committee, composed of representatives of all
OAS member states, met in Panama from February 25th to April 1st,
1966. Among the new articles which the committee proposed as
amendments to the Charter are several which, if accepted, will
end the existence of the Inter-American Peace Committee as a
separate entity and will thus end further consideration of the
Committee's Statutes. Under Chapter XIV of the proposed revisions,
the functions of the Peace Committee would be incorporated into
those of the OAS Council, which would then be called the "Per-
manent Council." Articles 5 through 13 of new Chapter XIV cover
the present Peace Committee's functions. Article 5 states:
The Permanent Council shall Keep vigilance over
the maintenance of friendly relations among the
member states, and for that purpose shall ef-
fectively assist them in the peaceful settlement
of their dispute^, in accordance with the follow-
ing provisions. *"
This article, of course, is strongly reminiscent of the
first paragraph of Resolution XIV of 1940 which called for a
19. OAS, Special Committee to Prepare a Preliminary Draft Proposal
on Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American
States, Final Act of the Special Committee to Prepare a Pre-
liminary Draft Proposal on Amendments to the Charter of the
Organization of American States , O&A/Ser.K/XIIl/l.l (vVashing-
ton: Pan American Union, 1966), p. 19 •
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committee to keep "constant vigilance." Proposed Article 6
provides for a committee as a subsidiary organ to assist the
Permanent Council in the exercise of its peaceful settlement
powers. This recommended committee is, in fact, the present
Inter-Ainerican Peace Committee. (The subcommittee working
on this section of the Charter was unable to agree on whether
to keep the present name or to change it to "Peaceful oettle-
20
ment Committee" and therefore left the name blank.) The
proposed Charter articles further provide that parties to a dis-
pute may request the good offices of the Fermanent Council which
could then recommend appropriate procedures (Article 7). The
Permanent Council could determine the facts in the dispute but
would need the consent of the governments concerned to enter
the territory of a party (Article 8). If no other peaceful
settlement procedure were being followed, any party to a dis-
pute could appeal to the Permanent Council which would then re-
fer the request to its subsidiary committee (Peace Committee).
This Committee, however, could not act until an offer of good
offices is made and accepted by the other party (Article 9)»
riefusal of the Committee's offer of good offices would result
in a Committee report to the Permanent Council (Article 10)
and further refusal of Council attempts to gain acceptance of
its good offices would result in a report to the General As-
sembly (Article 11). (The General Assembly is to replace the
Inter-American Conference and meet on a yearly basis.) Articles
12 and 13 provide for the voting rules of the Permanent Council
(two-thirds majority required except for procedural decisions)
20. CAS, Comision Especial para la Preparacion de un Antepro-
yecto de Reformas a la Carta de la Organizacion de los
Estados Americanos, Actas .y Documentos , Vol. 1, OEA/Ser. K/
XIII. 1.2 (Vol. 1) (Washington: Pan American Union, 1966) p. 189.
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and for application of the Charter, international law, and the
treaties in force between the parties in the exercise of their
21functions by the Council and Committee.
The record of voting in the subcommittee (Group "C" of
Subcommittee I) which considered the provisions eventually in-
corporated into the above articles ^ives an indication of the
strength of support for these amendments to the Charter. Eight-
een nations were represented in the Group—Haiti and the Domin-
ican Republic, as well as Cuba, being missing. The votes on
the individual provisions (in favor, opposed and abstentions)
generally ranged from 12-0-5 to 15-0-2. There was only one
provision on which the vote was less favorable—that which
would provide for Permanent Council cognizance of disputes and
which became Article 5 of Chapter XIV in the Special Committee's
Final Act (quoted above). The vote on this basic provision by
Group "C" was S-5-1. The final vote taken by Group "C" on the
entire group of recommended provisions was 12-2-4 and was brok-
en down as follows:
In favor: Mexico, Honduras, Chile, Argentina,
Uruguay, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Col-
ombia, Peru, El Salvador, Brazil and
Panama
.
Opposed: Bolivia and Ecuador
Abstentions: United States, Paraguay, Guatemala,
and Venezuela. 22
3olivia and Ecuador, whose border controversies and nation-
al policies were discussed in Chapter 3, -are conspicuously the
only dissenters on the final vote. Ecuador had, during the
Group's deliberations, introduced a change to the third proposi-
tion which would have changed the phrase "the parties to a dis-
pute may resort to the Permanent Council" to read "any party to
5TT 0AS t Special Committee, Final Act , pp. 19-20.
22, OAS, Comision Especial
„




a dispute may resort . . . • " This proposal resulted in a
Oh.
"long debate" and was defeated by a 6-7-3 vote.
The working group voting figures and the adoption of the
recommended provisions by the Special Committee in its Final
Act indicate that the proposed articles on peaceful settlement
powers for the OAS Council are likely to become Charter amend-
ments without further substantial change. There is, of course,
a possibility that enough additional votes might be obtained
to reverse the defeat of the Ecuadorian proposal and to change
the wording to permit any one of the parties to request Coun-
cil action. But in view of the voting margins favoring the
proposed amendments, such a reversal does not appear likely.
Only a major restriction in the Council's peaceful settlement
powers— such as eliminating from its competence any disputes
involving boundaries and matters of exclusively domestic juris-
diction—would be sufficient to overcome the objections of
such countries as Peru, Chile, Argentina and Brazil. And such
a restriction might well limit the Council's usefulness even
more than the need for mutual consent now limits the Peace Com-
mittee.
For the present, then, it is probable that mutual consent
will continue to be a requirement for OAS participation in the
peaceful settlement of disputes. Agreement on waiving that re-
quirement can be expected only in case of an area crisis such
as that of the Caribbean in 1959 or in that day in the distant
future when greater economic and political integration have oc-
curred. When integration has reached the point where the
23. Ibid
., pp. 181, 187.
24. Ibid ., p. 181.
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juridical and political issues of a dispute can be separated
and dealt with individually, the American states may be willing
to accept OAS intervention without giving consent in advance.
Until that day, the inter-American community will have to de-
pend on the pressures of public opinion, the rationality of
its members, or their willingness to bind themselves to peace-
ful settlement through instruments such as the Fact of Bogota.

CHAPrBR 5: DEV&LOPbSNT aUD DHE NEED FOR PEACEFUL SET I
Economic development has become a primary objective and
rallying point for the underdeveloped countries of the world.
These countries, through organized efforts in the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (ULCTaD) and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT?), are attempting to obtain
the aid and cooperation of the more industrial nations to attain
cheir objective. A major expression of United Nations effort
in this area is the establishment of the United Nations .Develop-
ment .Decade, 1960-1970. One objective of this program is the
attainment of at least a five per cent yearly growth rate in
Che incomes of developing countries.
Latin America has a major interest in these organized ef-
forts to foster economic development. Indeed, the author of
most of the important theoretical work on the basic economics
of the problem is the Argentine economist, Dr. Haul Prebisch,
former Chairman of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America and now Secretary General of UNCTAD. Initial
Latin American organizational efforts in the field of economic
development were the Central American Common r.arket and the
Latin ^nerican Free Trade association. In 1960-1961, Latin
American economic and social development were placed on an inter-
American cooperative basis through the Act of Bogota and the
Charter of Punta del Este. In 1965, at the Second Special Inter-
American Conference in Hio de Janeiro, the American states de-
cided to incorporate the Act of Bogota and Charter of Punta del
Sste into the CAS Charter by amending the Charter to "include
jU united nations, Towards a r.ow Trade Policy for .Deve lopment
,




additional standards for inter-American cooperation in the econ-
2
omic, social, and cultural fields."
In neither the organizations for Latin American economic
integration nor the move to incorporate the economic and
social development of latin America into the OAS Charter, was
much apparent thought given to the relationship between
economic development and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
in contrast, the African states recognized the need for a peace-
ful set clement mechanism as part of the development process in
1^65 when they created the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
.
T. 0. iilias, attorney General and Minister of Justice for the
Federation of Nigeria, clearly states the Africans' concern and
proposed solution for this problem:
. . . the Member States feel that che peace
which they so sorely need is in danger of being
threatened by frontier and border disputes be-
tween some of their number. It is, therefore,
of the first importance to all of them that the
principle of peaceful settlement of all dis-
putes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation
or arbitration snould be enshrined in a unique
manner in the Charter of the Organization of
^frican Unity. This they have endeavored to do
by maKing additional specific provision in ar-
ticle 19 of the Cnarter for the establishment
of a Commission of mediation, Conciliation and
Arbitration, which is not a mere Specialized
Commission but one of the four principle insti-
tutions of the Organization.
3
In the Organization of American States, however, no similar
concern was evident. The Economic and Social Act of Rio de
Janeiro in 1$65 set up guidelines for the Special Committee
v/hich was to prepare the preliminary draft amendments to the OaS
?• UiS , Second Special inter-ximerican Conference, Final Act , p. 7«
3. T. 0. tilias, "The Charter of the Organization of African Unity,"




;harter. Chapter I of these guidelines, entitled Political
Security and Economic and Social Development, states the inten-
sion of applying to the economic and social field the same prin-
ciples of solidarity which form che basis of inter-American co-
deration in the political and mutual security fields:
To achieve the oojectives of the Alliance for
Frogress, the obligation to cooperate in the
solution of economic and social problems is
essential, inasmuch as these problems can dis-
turb relations among peoples, limit the oppor-
tunities co affirm the dignity of the individual,
limit the full exercise of democracy, and en-
danger the peace and security of the nations.'4'
But while suggesting the existence of economic and social
roblems as a causative factor in popular disturbances and
ihreats to international peace, the amendment-drafting <;:uide-
.ines fail to mention the opposite relationship— that is, the
teed for peaceful, stable relations between countries to per-
dt development goals to be achieved. The iatter relationship
exists as much for Latin America as it does for the new African
:ountries even though the Latin American economies may be fur-
ther along the path of development.
The problem of Latin American economic development has
>een eloquently described by Dr. Aaul Prebisch. Dr. Frebisch
tas pointed out that the decline in the growth rate of Latin
Jtterican countries since the end. of .Vorld <var II, coinDined with
Lie rapid rise in the rate of population growth, has resulted
n an annual growth of per capita product of only 1.4 per cent.
CaS, Second Special Inter-American Conference, Final Act , p. 11.
United Nations, The Economic Developments of Latin America in
the Post-war Fcriod , K/C N .
1
2/bbh/ R ev . 1 ( h ew York: United
nations, 1%'i)
, P» 1 •
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The decline in the development growth rate has been caused by
a number of factors, the most important of which have been:
1) the decrease in terms of trade for primary products, and 2)
the increase in the rate of population growth. The swelling
of the excess active population in the period 19^5-1962 has
created what Dr. Prebisch terms a "surplus manpower bottle-
neck." To remove this bottleneck and increase the rate of
economic growth will require the injection of a large amount of
capital
:
The absorption of this surplus would have re-
quired at present an available supply of cap-
ital for the production and transport of goods
about 27 per cent above the existing level;
and the average annual growth rate of the per
capita product in these activities would have
bad to be $.7 instead of 2.5 per cent.
If the rate of Latin-American development is to be in-
creased, where will this vast amount of capital required be
obtained? The alliance for Progress envisions an input of ex-
ternal capital of over 20 billion dollars by 1970, coming from
United States public funds, international institutions such as
the ..'orld Bank, other developed nations, and increased private
7investment. External capital, however, will not be enough;.
internal sources must also be utilized. The Social Progress
Trust Fund of the Inter-American Development 3ank has had, as
a basic condition for the use of its resources for land use,
housing, water supply, and education projects, a requirement
that the recipient countries exercise self-help through the
^~* United nations, Toward s a -Dynamic Development Policy for Latin
America , E/CN . 12/680/Hev . 1 (New York: United nations, 1965)p. 26.
7. Lincoln Gordon, A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for




mobilization of their internal resources/ This mobilization
is currently accomplished in the public sector through improve-
ent in the tax structure and tax enforcement , and in the pri-
vate sector through the development and strengthening of savings
and loan associations, development financing institutions, cap-
9
ital markets, etc.
The magnitude of the tasks to be accomplished in infra-
structure development make it obvious chat the internal resources
oeing mobilized by the aoove methods will be insufficient. There
is, however, another possible source of internal development cap-
ital which is presently untapped. This source lies in the funds
now being expended by most Latin American governments for the
equipping and maintenance of military forces. The military has
been a significant factor in Latin American life since the achieve-
ment of independence, and the military's share of the national
budgets has been correspondingly large, averaging 20-25 per cent
annually, and sometimes significantly greater. Such a diver-
sion of the limited resources available to most Latin American
governments greatly inhibits their development efforts. Despite
che high rates of illiteracy in most countries, the military
sudget often exceeds the amount devoted to public education.
Charles .Volf, Jr., obtained the data shown in Figure 1 for the
average expenditures during the period 1950-1960. It can be
seen that three of the four largest spenders—Argentina, Brazil,
and Chile—averaged a total of almost ij>605 million during the
period. 'These three nations are neighbors, and the question
s» Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Trust Fund,
Fifth Annual Report , 1965 (Washington: Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, 1966), p . 94
•
^ Ibid v» PP. 94-97.
10. Alexander T. Edelmann, Latin America n Government and Politics
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12. Charles Wolf, Jr., "The Political Effects of Military Programs:
Some Indications from Latin America," O^BIS , Vol. VIII, No. 4
(Winter, 1965), p. 889.
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urises as to whether the possibility of threatened aggression is
a cause for high military expenditures. t3ut there have been no
such threats, and the only likely source of ill feeling—a bor-
der dispute between Argentina and Chile--is being arbitrated by
ureat Britain.
The charge is sometimes made that United States military
assistance programs have contributed significantly to Latin Amer-
ican military expenditures and have, in turn, been a factor in
enabling the military to intervene and upset governmental stabil-
ity, according to Edwin Lieuwen, "the strengthening of the armed
forces, for defense or for preserving internal order, seems only
to give encouragement to the Latin American officer corps to con-
vert "themselves into even more highly political instruments than
15
they are already." The facts, however, do not confirm these
charges. The amount of United States military assistance to
Latin America has actually been very limited. Assistance appro-
priations from the U.S. have averaged five per cent or less of
the total Latin American military budgets during the period
1950-196$. Moreover, the charges that military assistance
and large Latin American defense expenditures are causative fac-
tors in governmental instability are disproved by Charles V/olf's
research comparing political development and defense expenditures,
tfolf found that large military programs were not necessarily
associated with restrictive and authoritarian political institu-
tions or with movements toward them. In fact, the per capita
13. Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (Hew York;
Praeger, 1961), p. 2)1.
14. Catherine ' cArdle, "The Role of Military Assistance in the
Problem of Arms Control: The Middle East, Latin America, and
Africa," Research Paper C/64-24 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center Cor
International Studies, M.I.T., 1964), p. 50.
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figures showed the highest annual per capita defense expenditure
to have been made by Venezuela—a relatively liberal country
since l958--while the second lowest annual per capita expend-
1Siture was made oy Haiti, an extremely repressive regime. J Fur-
ther support for wolf's conclusions came in 1964 testimony by
Frank X. Sloan, Deputy assistant Secretary of Defense (Inter-
national Security affairs) for Regional Affairs before the house
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
We wish to state unequivocally that we find no
foundation for the frequent allegation that U.S.
military assistance programs are contributing
to revolutions in latin America. The statis-
tical facts are that the rate of revolutions is
no higher than it has been for many generations
before the LAP program began in 1952.16
Another contention made regarding United States military
assistance programs is that more restrictive selling policies
would inhibit latin American acquisition of expensive modern
military equipment, thus encouraging reductions in military
budgets and possible diversions of funds to economic improve-
ments. But, as noted in Annex C of the 1959 report of the
President's Committee to Study the iv-ilitary Assistance Program
(the Draper Committee):
There is no reason to assume that a nation,
were it cut off from U.S. military aid, will
invest more of its own funds in economic enter-
prises. On the contrary, countries who were
refused U.S. military aid, are apt to purchase
military equipment elsewhere. This is particu-
larly true in Latin America. 17
15^ Wolf, "Political £ffe"cts of I.ilitary Frograms," p. 886.
16. U.S., Congress, house of P^presentatives , Committee on For-
eign Affairs, hearings on the Foreign .as sistance Act of 1964 ,
88th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1964;, p. S02.
1?. U.S., President's Committee to Study the United States
Military assistance Pro gran, Con;
o
si te Per orb , Vol. II.
(Whasi ington, 1959), p. ?0.
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£dwin Lieuwen has noted in bhis regard that United States
pricing and selling policies between 1951 and 1956 resulted in
the purchase of "seventy-four ships, hundreds of airplanes, and
a large variety of army equipment from European and Asian sup-
1 P>
pliers." The largest source of purchases, however, was the
United Kingdom and the most frequent buyers were Argentina, Bra-
zil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. They bought a total of 114
Lleteor jet fighters and Canberra jet bombers plus over 25 naval
1
Q
vessels including two aircraft carriers from IS 50 to 1959.
Since the threat of an extra-hemispheric attack on Latin
America is minimal at present, as is the threat of attack by
neighboring Latin American states upon each other, and the level
of United Ltates military aid appears to have little bearing on
the matter, what factor is responsible for the large allotments
Tor military expenditures in Latin American budgets'* The blame
appears to lie squarely on that bane of international coopera-
tion, nationalism. One result of nationalistic rivalries, notes
economist iarry G. Johnson, is "considerable diversion of econ-
omic resources from productive investment in economic develop-
ment to consumption of the trappings and symbols of nationhood
—
a large and well-equipped army, an elaborate diplomatic bureau-
cracy, impressive public buildings and other constructional monu-
20inents to national pride." This result is amply demonstrated
in Latin American practice.
If we agree that the present Latin American military estab-
lishments are too large for ti < ir nations' needs, then in what
LTi Lieuwen, Arms and Politics^ p7 20~^T~
IS. I.icivrdle, "The Hole of military Assistance," p. 64.
20. Harry G. Johnson, The Wor ld Economy at the Cros sroads (Mon-
treal: Canadian Trade Committee, 1965), p. 46.
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oanner and to what extent should bhey be reduced—and how can
we ensure that the funds released will be used for development
purr oses? The latter problem cannot be solved without estab-
lishing some form of supra-national authority. To solve the
former problem, we must consider the present military needs of
the latin American nations. The threats of extra-hemispheric
and inter-American attacks have already been discounted as
minimal. The remaining threat— the primary one today— is the
threat to internal security. ".National li Deration amies" using
guerilla tactics— such as the FaLU in Venezuela—appear to be
the principal danger to the military security of the Latin Amer-
ican nations in the 1960's. If this is true, then we must ask:
Are conventional armies and navies, equipped with tanks, cruis-
ers, aircraft carriers and jet aircraft, the proper forces to
combat the threat? Charles Wolf, Jr., studied the question of
i;he best structuring of defense forces and budgets in under-
developed countries in research conducted by the Rand Corpora-
tion in 1960-1961. The purpose of the study was to determine
a budget and a militarily effective structure of forces which
would yield, improved economic and political side effects. For
a given hypothetical budget, two alternative programs were
drawn up
:
—one for fairly large, conventionally trained and armed,
forces, and the other for smaller, more lightly armed forces.
Much of the hypothetical dollar savings from use of the smaller
forces was used to expand internal security forces, increase
mobility, expand technical training, and to provide additional
ground and air installations to facilitate effective interven-
tion by free-world forces if necessary.
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"<//ar games," separately pitting each of the above hypo-
thetical forces against an "enemy team," revealed some interest-
ing results with definite implications for the situation in
Latin America. The "war game" results in themselves failed to
show the superiority of either program with respect to direct
military results. The "side effect" analysis, however, indicat-
ed a clear advantage in the program using the smaller, more
lightly armed forces. Operating costs for the armed forces
were lowered, thereby theoretically releasing resources for de-
velopment purposes; "social overhead" capital was increased; and
21
a gain was made in the output of trained manpower.
Thinking in the United States on military assistance for
underdeveloped areas began to shift toward emphasis on the in-
ternal security problem as early as 1957 • * study made that
year by a special U.S. Seriate committee noted that the condi-
tion of political and economic instability in underdeveloped
countries was such that internal subversion was a primary
threat. The Draper Committee in its 1959 report further em-
phasized the need for assistance in the internal security area,
and a new internal security aid program was put into effect
upon passage of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. Counter-
insurgency training programs for Latin American forces were es-
tablished, and antiguerilla advisory teams were sent to provide
23
on-site instruction to Latin American armies. tiy 196^*-, the
21~i Charles v.'olf , Jr. , "Defense and Development in Less Developed
Countries," RAivTD Corp. Paper P-2291-1 (Santa Monica, Califor-
nia: The RAflD Corporation, 1961), pp. 5-8*
22. U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee to Study the Foreign
Aid Fr op-ram, Study No. 10, The ? ilitary Assistance Program of
the United States; two studies and a report prepared by a
Special Civilian-Military Iteview Panel , 85th Cong., 1st cess.
(vVasbingcon^ 1957), p« 10.
2 5 . Rd w in Li euwen , Generals vn. Presidents: Neornil i tarism in
Latin America (New fork: Fra e
,







Jnited States military assistance program—no\v with primary em-
phasis on internal security ( S2 per cent of the appropriated
funds) and "civic action" (the use of military forces for public
works-type projects in economic development— IS per cent) had
been incorporated as an integral part of the alliance for Prog-
24-
ress.
The fact that the United States gives priority to internal
security in its military assistance programs does not, however,
mean that the recipients give it similar priority. While in-
ternal subversion may be the primary threat to the security of
Latin American countries today, there will be little change in
the structure or budgets of the Latin American armed forces un-
til the countries themselves perceive the changed situation.
It is unliKely that large, conventionally armed and trained
forces can be eliminated until each country is assured that the
type of international dispute in which such forces have been
used in the past will no longer occur. And such assurance can
only be based on a belief in the overriding necessity for set-
tling controversies peacefully and an impartial and effective
mechanism for dispute settlement. 'Che former condition may
have to await the further development of Latin American integra-
tion; efforts coward the latter will be examined in the next
chapter
.
24. U.S., Congress, House, Hearings, 1964, p. 93.
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CHAPTER 6: [NT.3R-AMERICAN EFFORTS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
The American states have been seeding a satisfactory system
for the peaceful settlement of their disputes for the last 140
years. The Congress of Panama of 1826, under the influence of
Simon bolivar, concluded a Treaty of Perpetual Union, League
confederation. Phis treaty, which never came into force,
.vould nave created a general assembly one of whose objectives
was "to endeavor to secure conciliation, or mediation, in all
questions which may arise between the allied powers, or between
any of them and one or more powers foreign to the confederation,
whenever threatened of a rupture, or engaged in war because of
grievances, serious injuries, or other complaints." (Article
1$). .rt.ll differences between parties were to be submitted to
the assembly for its friendly advice, and neither wars nor re-
prisals were to be undertaken before the general assembly's con-
ciliation was requested (Articles 16 and 17)
•
After the failure of the 1826 treaty, latin American in-
terest in collective action waned for the next 60 years. The
only occasions of renewed interest in international cooperation
during this period were in 184-7, 1856, and 1865, when confer-
ences were held to consider specific dangers threatening the in-
dependence of the Hispanic American nations. The sources of
danger were: Spain and Ecuadorian ex-President, General Juan
Jose Flores (1847), the United States (1856), and Doth France
Spain (1865). These conferences were concerned only with ex-
It dames Brown Scott , ed . , The International Conferences of Amer-
ican States, 18^-1928 (iNew York: Oxford university Press, 1931)
,
p. xxvii; Ann Van w'ynen Thomas and a. J. T r omas, dr., The Organ-
izat ion o f American states
, pp. 6-7
•
2. Scott, j international Conferences
,
p. xxvii; Thomas and Thomas,
-
(
'' nidation, p. 7*
';• Ihoi Thomas, pp. H-S»
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ternal dangers, however, and throughout the 60-year period, Che
only peaceful settlement agreements concluded were effected on
a bilateral basis. The number of bilateral treaties—both gen-
eral in character and for specific disputes
—
grew until by 1928
they numbered over 250. Dighty-four international arbitrations
involving an American state took place during the nineteenth
century; in forty-four of these only American states were par-
ties. ?
By the early 138C*s the inter-American political climate
was changing. The united States was entering a period of com-
mercial expansion and had begun to look southward to Latin Amer-
ica. The unsettled international relations in that area, how-
ever, were hardly conducive to the initiation of new business
ventures. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay had been in-
volved, in conflict from 1865 to 1870, and the frar of the Pacific
erupted between Chile and an alliance of Peru and Bolivia in
1879. U.S. Secretary of State James G. Blaine was anxious to
bring che American states together to discuss arangements for
coth closer economic ties and arbitration of disputes, and is-
sued invitations in 1681 for a conference in Washington the fol-
lowing year. Unfortunately, the assassination of 1 resident Gar-
field and the continuation of the War of the Pacific resulted
in a recall of the invitations and postponement of the confer-
ence.
Secretary Blaine's project languished until 1888 when Con-
gress passed an act authorizing the President to arrange a con-
W, Charles Evans hughes, Tan American Peace flans (Kew York:
Yale University Press, 1929 ) » ^p. 17-18.
!>. Ibid., p. 18.
6.




ference in Washington and to invite the American States to
7
attend. The conference met from October 1, 1889, to April 18,
1890, with 18 of the 19 independent American Republics attend-
ing (the Dominican Republic was the only state missing)/
Among the resolutions adopted by this First International Con-
ference of American States was a Plan of Arbitration which was
intended to be a model for an eventual treaty. The plan pro-
vided for the acceptance of arbitration as a principle of Amer-
ican international law for the settlement of disputes, and made
arbitration obligatory in all controversies excepting those
"which, in the judgment of any one of the nations involved, in
o
the controversy, may imperil its independence." The plan was
adopted but was signed by only nine delegations: Bolivia, Bra-
zil, Bcuador, juate-nala , Haiti, Honduras, iTcara«;ua, El Salva-
dor, and the United States. a treaty was drawn up and signed
by all of che above states plus Uruguay and Venezuela on April
26, 1890. Failure of all of che signatories to exchange ratifica-
tions within the one-year time limit caused the treaty to lapse,
however, and it never came into force.
Although no treaty resulted from the 1890 arbitration plan,
ixnerican interest in arbitration was not dampened. The United
States and Mexico were signatories to the 1899 Hague Convention
on the Pacific Settlement of disputes and ratified it in 1900
and 1901, respectively. The remaining American states, except
for Costa Rica and Honduras, adhered to the 1899 Hague treaty
1
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in 1907. At the 1907 Hague Conference, another Convention on
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Pacific Settlement was signed and, once again, Costa :<ica and
Honduras were the only American states which did not become
parties.
In the meantime, renewed efforts were being made to con-
clude an inter-American arbitration treaty. at the Second Inter-
national Conference of American States in Mexico City, 1901-1902,
a Treaty on Compulsory Arbitration was signed. "iiational honor"
was added to independence of bhe nation as a criterion for mak-
ing exception to Che requirements of compulsory arbitration,
but neither criterion was to be applicable in disputes "with
regard to diplomatic privileges, boundaries, rights of naviga-
14tion, and validity, construction and enforcement of treaties."
Only nine states signed this treaty and of these, only six ever
15
ratified it. In addition to this general arbitration treaty,
treaties for the arbitration of pecuniary claims were adopted
at the Second, Third, and Fourth Conferences (1902, 1906, and
1910). The greatest number of ratifications of these treaties
was 12, for the 1906 treaty. D
After the 1902 co;.pulsory arbitration treaty, no general
instrument for the peaceful settlement of inter-American dis-
putes was adopted until the Fifth International Conference of
American States az Santiago in 1923, although President Wilson
suggested a ban American Treaty incorporating peaceful settle-
ment procedures in 1916-1917. At the Santiago conference, a
Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts between the American States
jj- roict t t ppt 84--fr5~
14. Scout, International Conferences
,
p. 100.
1>. The six were: ftl Salvador, Guatemala, Aexico, Peru, the Domin-
ican Republic, and Uruguay. Pan American Union, Status of
Inter-American Treaties and Conventi ons (revised to September 1,








was signed. This treaty, the Gondra Treaty, provided for ad
hoc commissions of inquiry which were to be established when-
ever a controversy arose which could not be settled by nego-
tiation or arbitration. After being constituted, the commission
was to have one year in which to complete its investigation and
report to "&he parties. ijpon receipt of the commission' s re-
port, the parties were to hc^ve six months in which to attempt
a negotiated settlement, after which they were to regain full
freedom of action in the matter. although the Gondra Treaty
was eventually ratified by all of the American republics ex-
cept Argen oina , only nine had ratified it by the time of the
Sixth Conference of American States at Havana. Therefore, al-
though the conference desired to provide additional machinery
for peaceful settlement, it was decided not to disturb the Gon-
dra Treaty (which itself had required prolonged negotiation)
but to build upon it as a foundation. The Havana Conference
adopted a resolution recommending the speedy ratification of
the Gondra Treaty and, at the same time, called for a washing-
ton conference to adopt conventions on arbitration and concilia-
Lion. '
The International Conference of American States on Concili-
ation and arbitration (December 10, 1S28-January 5, 1929) con-
cluded three new peaceful settlement instruments. The first
20
was the General Convention of inter-Arnerican Conciliation.
This treaty gave conciliatory functions to both the ad hoc com-
missions of inquiry of the Gondra Treaty and to the permanent
1?. Text, Scott, international Conferences
, pp. 285-28^; discussion:
Renry Lyron Blackmer il , United States Tolicy and the Inter-
American Peace System, 188^7-1^ 'Yd (>aris: University of Geneva
,




lC;< ISZ' PP» 437-438; tm-'hes, Peace flans, pp. 57-58
•
20. Ton, Snott, Internationa] Conferences , Appendix C, pp. '+55-457;
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Commissions which chat treaty established in Washington and
Montivideo for facilitating creation of the ad hoc commissions.
The second new instrument was the General Treaty of Inter-
21
American Arbitration. The parties bound themselves to sub-
rait to arbitration all international disputes of a juridical
character (.article 1) but excepted those within the domestic
jurisdiction of a party and those which affected the interests
of a non-party to the treaty. Because 13 of "Che 20 states
which signed the treaty (Argentina did not attend the confer-
ence) attached reservations—primarily excepting existing dis-
rates and requiring the exhaustion of local remedies in cases
involving the claims of nationals— the conference adopted an
22
additional Protocol ol Progressive Arbitration. This proto-
col provided that any party to the general arbitration treaty
could rescind its reservations merely by depositing an appro-
priate document with the U.S. State Department, thereby maKing
possible an increase in the scope of obligatory arbitration
25
without requiring the negotiation of a new treaty.
The ratification record of the above treaties indicates
the degree to which the American states were then willing to
bind themselves to peaceful settlement. The conciliation con-
vention was the least binding and achieved the most ratifica-
tions— 18. The arbitration treaty gained 16 ratifications,
but restrictive reservations were still attached to 10 of them.
The additional protocol was ratified by only ten states, but
eight of these were among the ten which had made reservations
2TT Text, Scott, International Conferences , Appendix C, pp. 4'3a-461
;
discussion: Blackmer, United States Policy , pp. 4-3-4-5J hughes,
leace Ilans
, pp. 54-37*
22, Text, Scott, International Conferences, Appendix C, p. 462.




in ratifying the arbitration treaty. Unfortunately, none of
che eight has ever ir.ade use of ohe protocol. ^
One of the most serious drawbacks of the Gondra Treaty
and the 192$ conciliation convention was the fact that they de-
pended upon ad hoc bodies, the commissions of inquiry. This
defect was corrected by the Additional Protocol to the General
Convention of Inter-American Conciliation adopted by the 1933
i ontivideo Conference. 'The protocol provided for the immediate
naming of the members of the commissions of inquiry by bilateral
exchanges of notes between signatories. It brought little im-
provement to the conciliation procedure, however, since members
were named to only seven commissions and of these, only two
(united States-Lominican Kepublic and Guatemala-Dominican I?e-
public) were ever organized.
In addition to the conciliation protocol, the 1933 con-
ference adopted a recommendation that the American republics
adhere to the Anti-7/ar Treaty of Kon-Aggression and Conciliation
(Saavedra Lamas Fact) which Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico,
Paraguay and Uruguay had signed on October 10, 1933* This
treaty provided for a conciliation procedure independent of
that set up by the 1929 convention. It was rendered largely
ineffective, however, because it required that no conciliation
commission be formed under its provisions if there existed a
permanent conciliation commission or other international or-
ganization charged with that mission—and the permanent commis-
sions provided by the conciliation i^rotocol fulfilled the first
2^ Pan American Union, Status^ p~. 12.











The final three instruments of the pre-lVorld War II inter-
Anierican peaceful settlement system were signed at the 1936
conference at Buenos Aires. They were: the Treaty on the Pre-
vention of Controversies, bhe Inter-American Treaty on Good
Offices and Mediation, and the Convention to Coordinate, Ex-
tend and Assure the Fulfillment of Existing Treaties between
the American States. The first of these provided for the estab-
lishment of permanent mixed bilateral commissions to study the
possible causes of future controversies and to propose measures
for the applicabion of the treaties already in force between
the parties. The second provided for mediation of controver-
sies between the parties by a prominent cibizen of an American
state. And the third did little more than bo reaffirm the pre-
po
vious breaties. The ratification record of the three 1936
treabies was little better than bhat of the previous ones: the
first obtained 14 ratificabions, bhe second 15, and the third
14.^
The "Inter-American Peace System" described above consisted,
on bhe eve of ;Vorld ;ar II, of nine treaties, conventions and
protocols—all calling for bilateral action between parties to
a controversy. No attempt had been made to establish a single,
corn.iunity-wide procedure for peaceful settlement. A precedent
for such an instrument existed, however, in the Central Amer-
ican Court of Justice of 1907-1917- This court was created by
the five Central American republics (Guatemala, Honduras, Wica-
27i Ibid
., p. 42; Pan American union, Improvement anc Coordination
of Inter-American Peace Insbruments
,
Vol. 1 (Washington: Pan
American Union, n.d.J, P» 2.
28. Blackmer, United Sta bes Policy, p. 46; Thomas and Thomas,
Organization, yy* 279-^HO'
.
29. Pan American Union, ''. l.i bn:;., pp. I'-l-l'j.
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^agua , Costa Rica, and hi Salvador) after a series of controver-
sies in the area resulted in a war between Honduras and an al-
liance o£ Nicaragua and hi Salvador in 1907* Upon the sugges-
tion of Fresidents Roosevelt of the united States and Diaz of
exico, hostilities were ended and a Central American Peace Con-
ference met in Washington. A proposal by Honduras and [Nicara-
gua for rrm.ediate union of the five states was opposed by the
other three, and the conference went on to adopt nine separate
instruments, one of which was a Convention Establishing the
60
Central American Court of Justice.
The Central American Court consisted of five justices, one
appointed by the legislature of each state for terras of five
years. Its jurisdiction included all controversies or questions
between the states not settled by diplomacy; cases of an inter-
national nature between a government and a national of another
state
—
providing that local remedies had been exhausted and a
denial of justice was shown; any case between a government and
an individual if by common agreement; international questions
between a Central American state and a third state by special
agreement; and, by an "optional clause" signed by all but. Costa
Rica, jurisdiction over certain conflicts between the legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial branches of a Central American
51government
.
During the ten year life of the convention which estab-
lisned it, the Central American Court considered ten cases.
?ive of these were brought by individuals and in all five, the
30. Jean hy.uia , La Cour ce Jusbice Centre-Aiiej icaine (Paris: hrnest
oagot, 1S23), pp. 18-19; Manley 0. Hudson, "The Central Amer-
ican Court of Justice," The American Journal of International






plaintiff's case was declared bo be inadmissible. In three
cases, bhe court intervened on its own initiative in revolu-
tionary situations—once, with apparent success in preventing
the 1908 situation in Honduras from deteriorating into war,
and twice without success in the 1910 and 1912 Ricaraguan revo-
52lutions. The two cases which were to prove critical to the
future of the court were brought in 1916 by Costa Rica and El
Salvador, and charged Nicaragua with violating their rights by
signing the Sryan-Chamorro Treaty with the United States in
1914- • In both cases, Nicaragua claimed that the court lacked
jurisdiction. The court, however, considered the cases and ren-
dered decisions against Nicaragua which required that Nicaragua
restore the status quo prior to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty.
5-5
Nicaragua thereupon refused to abide by the decisions.
The 1907 convention which established the Central American
Court expired on I arch 12, 1910* under the shadow of Nicaragua's
adamant refusal to comply with the judgments against it, and
all efforts to negotiate an extension of the convention were
unsuccessful. An attempt to create a new peace instrument was
made in 1923 at a Conference on Central American Affairs in Wash-
ington, but the resulting International Central American Tribu-
nal was a weaK, ad hoc organ which was never organized.
The Inter-American Peace Committee was the second multi-
lateral peaceful settlement agency within the inter-American
system, established this time on a hemispheric rather than a
regional basis. The Peace Committee's establishment, organiza-
tion, and operations have been described in Chapters 1 and 2




, pp. 781, 7^3.
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of this paper. Further comment upon the Committee's operations
and effectiveness will be made in the next chapter.
The Fact of Bogota is the most recent of the existing inter-
American systems for peaceful settlement. It is the culmination
of a process which began in the 1920' s when the "system" of
inter-American treaties on bilateral settlement procedures was
developing. Che 1929 conciliation and arbitration conventions
were adopted after the decision had been made not to attempt a
revision of the Gondra Treaty to incorporate these procedures.
These three treaties formed the basic inter-Araerican peace mach-
inery ac that time. But improvements were still needed. The
possible methods included adding to or modifying existing trea-
ties, concluding new treaties incorporating new procedures, or
coordinating all procedures in a single instrument. ^ Ihe meth-
od initially adopted v/as that of adding new peace instruments
to the system rather than correcting or codifying the existing
ones. In 1933 » however, Mexico submitted a draft Code of leace
which had as its object the coordination of the various meth-
ods of promoting peace into one instrument. It contained gen-
eral principles of international conduct, a definition of the
<essor, procedures for the investigation, conciliation, and
arbitration of disputes, and a statute for a Fermanent Inter-
Ainerican Court of International Justice. The conference re-
ferred the Feace Code to the Fan American Union for submission
to the member governments.
The 1936 conference at Buenos Aires received proposals for
additional protocols or new peace instruments from six states.





t s previously rioted, three of these were adopted. exico pre-
sented a revised Peace Code which was referred to a committee
>f experts for study and inclusion "among the works which shall
>e taken into account when presenting a project on che coordina-
tion of American Peace Instruments at the next conference at
Ama." 57
At Lima in 1938, however, no project on coordination of
)eace instruments was presented. The revised Mexican Peace Code
)f 1936 was resubmitted, and proposals for revising the exist-
.ng treaties were subrrifced by Ecuador, f.:exico, Uruguay, Vene-
:uela, and the Committee of '-.xperts on the Codification of Inter-
38lational Lav/. The Lima Conference again postponed a decision
m the question of organizing the inter-American peace instru-
lents, to the Bogota Conference scheduled for 1943. The Lima
Conference took: one step, however, which w:as to prove highly
significant to the success of the efforts to organize the peace
system. This step was embodied in Hesolution XV entitled "Per-
fection and Coordination of Inter-Ainerican Peace instruments."
?his resolution recognized the necessity for coordinating the
various juridical measures for peaceful settlement into one
>rganized treaty. It provided:
That the Mexican project of a Peace Code, to-
gether with the ante-project of the Committee
of Experts, the project of the United States
of America on the Consolidation of American
Peace Instruments ... be referred to the Pan
American Union in order that the latter institu-
tion may classify and transmit them to each one
of the iiDierican Governments, requesting their
opinions and proposals . . . .5'




59. Kighth International Conference of American states, Final act




Replies were to be sent to the Fan American. Union which was to
transir.it then to the International Conference of American Jur-
ists "which will undertake the definitive work of the Peace
Code."40
The project of codifying the inter-American peace instru-
ments languisned throughout './orld Vvar II. The Fan American
Jricn completed the classification and publication of the var-
4-1
ious projects by 194-3 . In 194-5 » uhe Inter-American Juridical
Committee prepared a Draft of an Inter-American Peace System
which was then circulated amour; the American governments for ob-
servations and comment. The draft was based upon the United
I.ations Charter pacific settlement procedures and distinguished
between juridical and non- juridical disputes. Consultation was
to be relied uj on as the primary procedure, and arbitration was
to be non-obligatory. The definitive project which the Juridi-
cal Conmiotee submitted to the 194-8 Bogota Conference differed
considerably from the first draft. On the basis of .Resolution
X of the Rio Conference of 19'*7 which indicated majority support
for such a move, consultation was eliminated as a procedure,
42
and arbitration was made compulsory.
V/hen the Bogota Conference opened it had two conflicting
views to consider on the requirement for obligatory submission
of disputes for settlement. One view—that held by the Govern-
ing Board of the Fan American Union—was that while the submis-
sion of all legal disputes to judicial or arbitral settlement




41. Pan American Union, Improvement and Coordina tion of Inter-
American Peace Instruments , Vols. 1-3 (Washington: Pan Amer-
ican Union, 194-5).




controversies should be left to the parties. The Juridical
Committee, on the other hand , held the view that no dispute
should be permitted to go unsettled, whether by acceptance of
the results of non-binding procedures such as good offices,
mediation, inquiry, or conciliation, or by binding judicial or
43
arbitral procedures. ^ Neither of the above views fully pre-
vailed in the final treaty, but bhe Juridical Cormnittee
' s posi-
tion carried the greater influence.
The Pact of 3ogota, or American Treaty on Pacific Settle-
ment as it is formally called, is composed of eight chapters,
entitled: General Obligation to Settle Disputes by Pacific
Leans, Procedures of Good Offices and Mediation, Procedure of
Investigation and Conciliation, Judicial Procedure, Procedure
of Arbitration, Fulfillment of Decisions, Advisory Opinions,
and Final Provisions. The first five of these are of most im-
portance insofar as the structure of the peaceful settlement
system is concerned.
Chapter One of the Pact establishes a general obligation
to settle all controversies by pacific means. Article II pro-
vides that in any controversy which cannot be settled by normal
diplomacy, the parties are bound to use the procedures provided
in the treaty "or, alternatively, such special procedures as,
46m their opinion, will permit them to arrive at a solution."
Article V provides an exclusion for matters within a state's
domestic jurisdiction, but provides that any party can submit
an assertion of domestic jurisdiction to the International Court
45. John Lloyd i echam. The U nited States and Inter-American
Security, 1H8Sj-1 c;60 9 p. 311.
44. HlacKirier, Uni t ed States Tolicy
, p. 179.





of Justice in cace of disagreement. Articles VI arid VII pro-
vided the primary grounds for several of the reservations made
at the time of signing the treaty: Article VI precludes the ap-
plication of treaty procedures to previously settled disputes,
and article VII obligates the parties to refrain from making
diplomatic representations or referring a dispute to an inter-
national court in cases involving their nationals when the
nationals have had available recourse to competent domestic
courts.
Chapter Two on Good Offices and Mediation provides for the
utilization of American governments not parties to the dispute
or of "eminent citizens" of any American state not a party to
the dispute for either procedure. If mediation is used, both
4-8
parties must agree to the choice of mediator or mediators.
An attempt was made in Chapter Three on Investigation and
Conciliation to make the obligation on the parties more bind-
ing than it was in previous treaties. The procedure is to be
initiated through a request by one of the parties to the CaS
Council for the convocation of a Commission of Investigation
and Conciliation. Provision is made for the advance appoint-
ment of these bilateral bodies so that they may function as
permanent commissions.; there is no obligation to do so, how-
ever, and the commissions may be appointed ad hoc as the occa-
sion arises. When a request is made to the Council, the parties
are to suspend the controversy and to cooperate with the Commis-
sion. The Commission of Investigation and Conciliation is to






mutually acceptable agreement. The reports and conclusions
of the Commission have the character of recommendations only
and have no binding power. J
The judicial procedure provided by Chapter Four contains
a recognition of the jurisdiction of the international Court
of Justice as compulsory in all disputes of a juridical nature.
Jurisdiction is also compulsory, however, in a case where con-
ciliation has failed to bring a solution, no agreement is
reached to arbitrate, and either of the parties takes the case
to bhe Court. In case of dispute over jurisdiction, the Court
is granted the pow^r to decide the question. If the Court de-
clines to ta^e jurisdiction because the controversy falls with-
in Articles 7, VI , or VII of the Treaty (domestic jurisdiction,
previously- settled disputes, or protection of nationals) the
dispute is "thereby ended, but if the Court declines for any
50
other reason, the parties are obligated to arbitrate.
Chapter Five contains the final procedure, that of arbitra-
tion. It provides that, in addition to the compulsory arbitra-
provided under the judicial procedure, the parties may volun-
tarily submit to arbitration any disputes arising between them,
whether or not they are juridical. The five arbiters are to
be chosen in each case through a complex procedure involving
selections by both parties and by the OaS Council from lists
SI
submitted by the parties.
The above description of the peaceful settlement procedures
incorporated in the Fact of Bogota shows how well the objective
of the IS' 38 Lima Resolution XV was met. The various methods of
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peaceful settlement which had been scattered among nine dif-
ferent treaties, conventions, and protocols Pad, indeed, been
coordinated in one organized treaty. But was this really a
wise action in view of the ratification record of the nine
treaties which the Fact of Bogota replaced? Figure 2 shows
the record of previous ratifications and ratification with
reservations.
FIGURE 2 52
Ratifications of Fre-1°A8 Peace Instruments
Treaty Rd & ARd Rdr & ARcr
1. Gondra Treaty 18 2
2. General Conv. of Conciliation 17 1
J. General Treaty of Arbitration 6 10
4. Protocol of Progressive Art '
n
10 —
5. Add'l irotocol to Conciliation Conv. 8* 1
6. Anti-V/ar Treaty (Saavedra-Lamas) 8 10
7. Prevention of Controversies 13 1
8. Good Offices and Mediation 14 1
9. Coordinate, Zxtend and Assure 10 4
Fulfillment Total 1Q4 $0
Total Possible (9 x 21) 189
* One Accession Ratified 3ut Not Deposited
Rd: Ratification Deposited
ARd: accession, Ratification Deposited
Rdr: Ratification Deposited with Reservation
ARdr: Accession, Ratification Deposited with Reservation
It can be seen that only two of the treaties— the Gondra
Treaty and General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation--
achieved anything near unanimous ratification without reserva-
tion. The General Treaty of Inter-Arnerican Arbitration, the
most restrictive of the treaties in terms of limiting the par-




ties' sovereign powers and upon which the Pact of Bogota's ar-
bitration provisions were largely based, attained the worst
record of ratifications without reservations. as previously
rioted, none of the ten states which ratified the Protocol of
Progressive Arbitration ever T.ude use of it to remove their
reservations from the Arbitration 'Treaty (two of the states
attaching reservations to the arbitration Treaty never ratified
the Protocol) .
The record of ratification of five of the most influential
states in the inter-American system is also instructive. Argen-
tina had by far the worst record, signing only five of the nine
treaties and ratifying only one. -^nd that one— the Anti-
,ar Treaty originated by her own foreign minister, Carlos Saaved-
?a Lanzas—was ratified with a reservation! Brazil ratified five
)f the treaties without reservation and one with reservation;
yhile: six without and three with; the United States: five with-
mt and three with; and .vexico had the best record with eight
)f the nine ratified without reservation and only one (the Ar-
bitration Treat,;/) with reservation.
In view of the meager record of unreserved ratifications
)f the nine instruments which were combined in the Pact of Bogo-
:a (104 out of a possible 189— less than 3/5) » the number of
reservations and record of ratification of the latter is hardly
surprising. Reservations were attached to the Pact of Bogota
it the time of signing by seven states: Argentina, Bolivia,
53Ecuador, United States, Paraguay, Peru, and Nicaragua. ' The
"eservations covered, variously: Article V, on domestic juris-
liction; Article VI, concerning non-applicability of the proced-




ures to previously-set bled disputes; Article VII, concerning
the protection of nationals; and Chapters Four (Judicial Pro-
cedure), Five (Frocedure of Arbitration), and Six (Fulfillment
of Decisions), in whole or part. Argentina, the worst offender
with respect to ratification of the previous treaties, was the
most sweeping in its reservations to this one. The Argentine
reservations covered .article VII and all of Chapters Four, Five
and Six. Argentina objected that arbitration and the judicial
procedure should apply only in future controversies and not in
cases arising from "causes, situations or facts existing before
the signing of this instrument."^ Argentina also objected to
the limitation of Article V on self- judgment by states of the
question of domestic jurisdiction.
The reservations of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua all
pertained to the provisions of Article VI, and all can be traced
directly to border settlements which these states desired to
reopen—Bolivia with Chile, Ecuador with Peru, and Nicaragua
with Honduras. Nicaragua ratified the Pact with bhis reserva-
tion attached, but since the 1906 arbitral award of the King of
Spain was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in
I960 and the decision carried out in 1961 with the aid of the
Peace Committee, it may be presumed that the reservation no
longer carries any Weight.
"
United States reservations included a disclaimer of intent
to submit disputes to the International Court of Justice which
are outside its jurisdiction, a requirement for a special agree-
ment for the submission of any U.S. dispute to arbitration, a





limitation on U.S. acceptance of compulsory International Court
jurisdiction, and a refusal to accept Article VII on the diplo-
matic protection of nationals. The reservations on submission
to arbitration and to the International Court virtually nullify
the compulsory features of Chapters Four and Five as far as the
United States is concerned.
^
Paraguay's reservation was similar to the first U.S. reser-
vation in requiring prior agreement of the parties to arbitra-
tion. 1 eru objected to International Court determination of
Ghe domestic jurisdiction question, and to the Court's determina-
tion of its own jurisdiction over controversies brought before
it under the judicial procedure. Peru further objected to the
possibility under article XLV of setting up an arbitration tri-
bunal without the participation of one of the parties and
claimed a right to request a meeting of the Organ of Consulta-
tion before resorting to compulsory arbitration under article
57
XXXV. ' a common thread seems to run through all of the Peru-
vian reservations— the determination to close any loophole
through which Ecuador could force a reopening of the 19^2 set-
tlement of its border with Peru.
The pace of ratification of the Pact of Bogota reflects
the serious difficulty caused by the attempt to incorporate
so many restrictions to national sovereignty into one instru-
ment, ^fter a spurt of eight ratifications in a two-and-a-half
year period from November, 19^8, to April, 1951, a further four
years was required for the ninth ratification and ten more years
for the tenth. Countries and dates of ratification are shown
in Figure 3.






Ratifications of the Fact of Bogota
Country Date Ratification Deposited
Costa Rica May 6, 194-9
El Salvador September 11, 1950
Haiti 'arch 28, 1951
Honduras ' bruary 7, 1950
;xico November 23, 194-8
Nicaragua July 26, 1950
ianama April 25, 1951
Dominican Republic September 12, 1950
Uruguay September 1. 1955
Brazil November 16, 1965
In addition to the difficulties arising from the reserva-
tions to the Pact of Bogota and the limited number of ratifica-
tions (the Pact being in effect only between those states having
ratified it), Lhe Pact contains a serious loophole which .could
render it largely ineffective even if all states were to rati-
fy it without reservation. This loophole consists of the pro-
visions of Article XXXII which provides that the path to com-
pulsory adjudication or arbitration on the request of only one
of the parties is dependent on two conditions: l)that concilia-
tion has been attempted and has failed to produce a solution,
and 2 ) that the parties have not agreed to arbitration. The
key to the blocking of the compulsory procedures lies in the
conciliation procedure, and specifically, in the provisions of
Article II of the Pact. Article II provides that the
58" Data obtained from: Tre De partment of State Bulletin , April 23,
1951, and Division of "Document Services, Pan American Union
(confirmed by Department of Legal Affairs).
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parties are bound to resort to the procedures of the treaty
only when "in the opinion of the parties" the dispute cannot
5°
be settled by normal diplomacy." If, therefore, one of the
parties refuses to agree that the dispute cannot be settled
by normal diplomatic means, it can block access to the concilia-
tion procedure; and by doing so, it can block, access to both
compulsory International Court jurisdiction and compulsory
... . . 60
arbitration.
The difficulties in achieving acceptance of the fact of
Bogota seem to spring directl;/ from the decision of the Bogota
conference to proceed with the most comprehensive document pos-
sible. Had the advice of the Governing Board of the Pan Amer-
ican union been followed, a more acceptable pact would probably
have resulted. By providing a means for compulsory settlement
of non-juridical disputes, the conference fell into the trap so
ably portrayed by William Manger in describing the failure of
the 0A3 to achieve a comprehensive, acceptable treaty of peace-
ful settlement:
The failure not only emphasizes the difficulty
of the problem, but the attempts that have been
made reflect the tendency that frequently marks
the action of Pan American assemblies of try-
ing to go too far too fast. Conference dele-
gates, in the enthusiasm of the moment, incor-
porate into agreements provisions which the
governments later are unwilling to accept, with
the result that treaties remain unratified.
?rom the moment of signature at Bogota in l cj l\-Q ,
and considering the number of reservations at-
tached to the treaty at that time, it was a
foregone conclusion that this would be the fate
of che Pact of Bogota." 1
5T» Annal3 of the OaS , Vol. 1, p. Sl»
60. BlacKmer, United States Policy, p. 185.
61. William I anger, J an America in Crisis: the Future of the
OAS, p. 51

CHAPTER 7: PiACS COMMITTEE CH FACT OF BOGOTA?
By the adoption of the Pacb of Bogota, the 1948 Confer-
ence intended to provide the American states with a unified
peace instrument which would include all of the available pro-
cedures for settling international disputes. The provisions
of Article LVIII, listing the treaties superseded, rendered in-
effective for the ratifying parties those instruments which
Che Pact replaced. The Inter-American Peace Committee was not
listed under article LVIII; therefore, it was not affected by
the Pact and, through use and experience, developed into a pro-
cedure competing with the procedures of the Pact. While the
fact of Bogota does not exclude the possibility of using other
peaceful settlement procedures, it does indicate a preference
for those which it provides. Article II stipulates that, in
case of a dispute which "cannot be settled by direct negotia-
tions through the usual diplomatic channels, the parties bind
themselves to use the procedures established in the present
Treaty . . .or, alternatively, such special procedures as, in
2their opinion, will permit them to arrive at a solution."
The "or, alternatively" phrase justifies the continued exist-
ence of the Peace Committee even if all CaS member states rati-
fy the Pact. The Committee provides, at the very least, a
procedure which can be applied more rapidly than can those of
the Fact of Bogota. And the ability to apply a settlement pro-
cedure with despatch can be critical in many rapidly-developing
international situations. The inter-American Peace System has








thus developed since 1948 into two separate and competing pro-
cedures— the Pact of Bogota and the Inter-American Peace Com-
mittee .
The Inter-American Peace Committee has achieved by far the
greater acceptability of the two ,-rocec'ures. This can be seen
not only in the slow pace of ratification of the Fact, but in
the variety of circumstances under which the Peace Committee's
services have been requested, and the flexibility with which
it has acted. Indeed, the speed and flexibility of the Commit-
tee in reacting to the different situations presented to it has
probably been its most valuable asset.
The circumstances under which the Inter-American Peace
Committee considered its first seven cases—under the 1$48 Bases
of Action and 1S50 Statutes—were ones of extreme political ten-
sion in the Caribbean area. There was little likelihood of
achieving the agreement between parties envisioned in Article
II of the Pact of Bogota. Such agreement, if it were obtained,
would (assuming both parties had ratified the Pact) have led
directly into a series of procedures which could result in the
compulsory adjudication or arbitration of highly political mat-
ters. Since, in most cases, neither party was desirous of such
a result, only two possibilities were left to resolve the dis-
putes through inter-American procedures— the Inter-American
Feace Committee and the Rio Treaty. The Rio Treaty permitted
fast and effective action through the OAS Council and the Organ
of Consultation, action which could take the form of binding
sanctions if necessary. The first use of the Rio Treaty, by
Costa Rica against Nicaragua in December, 1$48, had proven the
rapidity and effectiveness of action by the Council acting as
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rrovisional Organ of Consultation. The second invocation of
• the Rio Treaty, by Haiti against the Dominican Republic in
February, 1S+S, obtained an entirely different reception. In
contrast to the Costa Rican charge of armed invasion, Haiti
charged only "moral aggression" by means of radio propaganda
attacks. The Council found that this did not come within the
provisions of the Rio Treaty and refused to convoke the Organ
of Consultation, since Haiti's territory, sovereignty, or pol-
itical independence were not affected. The parties were ad-
vised to settle the dispute peacefully through existing treat-
ies, whereupon Haiti requested the services of the Peace Cora-
inittee.
The reception accorded Haiti's attempt to use the Rio
Treaty put the use of this part of the OAS machinery in an en-
tirely new perspective. The Council had acted quickly and ef-
fectively on Costa Pica's charge against the dictator Somoza's
Nicaragua. Perhaps Haiti felt that her request, being directed
gainst a similar tyrant, frujillo, would receive similar action
and possibly a condemnation of Trujillo by the Organ of Consul-
tation. Indeed, in view of the recent overthrow of several
dictators in the area (Cuba, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Costa
Rica) and the strength of feeling against the remaining ones,
ohis was not an unreasonable expectation. The rejection of
Haiti's request by the Council dealt a serious blow to her case,
and instead of a denunciation of Trujillo, Haiti obtained—as
a result of Peace Committee action—only a joint declaration
of both countries' good intentions.
T* Supra





The lesson of Haiti's experience was not lost on the Dom-
j
inican Republic when, in July, 194-9 » that government decided
to go to the OAS Council after the abortive invasion attempt
by exiles and suspected Caribbean Legion elements at Puerto
Plata and Luperon . The Dominicans first sought to determine
the positions of the other OAS governments before raising the
issue. As Argentine Ambassador Snrique V. Coroininas, acting
President of the Feace Committee at that tine notes:
. . . no state wanted to convene the Consulta-
tive Meeting, and the Dominican Republic least
of all, unless it was reasonably sure of the
success of the eventual meeting and its resolu-
tions. To convene the Consultative 'Jody,
through the initiative of any State, for the
solution of a serious problem as specified in
the Treaty, and to fail to get an affirmative
pronouncement, would have served only to strength-
en the seditious groups . . . and to weaken the
Governmental position of the affected State. -^
Although the Dominicans felt that they could obtain enough sup-
port to convene the Organ of Consultation, the United States
considered that the Peace Committee would be a better forum for
discussion of the situation. U.S. Ambassador Paul C. Daniels
said that if the Peace Committee failed to resolve the conflict,
it would still be possible to resort to the Rio Treaty pro-
cedure. This, indeed, was essentially what happened as a re-
sult of the late 19^9 recurrence of the dispute between Raiti
and the Dominican .Republic, The Rio Treaty was invoked by
both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and the Council then
acceded to the requests.
The above cases serve to illustrate the flexibility and





adaptability of the Peace Committee and some of the factors
leading to its acceptance as a useful procedure ..hen a dis-
pute or situation is not yet serious enough to warrant resort
to the Rio Treaty. Such circumstances, however, were not the
only ones which led to a request for the Peace Committee's
services. The Peace Committee ' s cases have been described and
compared in Chapter 2 of Part One, but no attempt was made at
nhat time to compare the causes for resort to the Peace Comniit-
7
tee. In order to determine whether some pattern can be found
in these situations, Figure !\ lists for comparison the various
Peace Committee cases, the "triggering situation" which led to




Figure z l- indicates that there is no real pattern in the
specific situations which "triggered" the requests for Peace
Committee action. In fact, except for the single instances of
aid to terrorists (jjart of Peru's charge against Cuba in 1961)
and riots (Panama Canal Zone, 1964) the instances of each "trig-
gering situation" have been fairly evenly distributed. Never-
theless, there is a pattern which can be seen in the Peace Com-
rcittee's cases. The pattern relates to the general, rather
than the specific, causes for resort to the Peace Committee and
to the powers of the Committee to act without the consent of
both parties. A general situation of political turmoil in the
Caribbean area formed the background of the first seven and the
last six of the Committee cases listed. At the same time, the
Peace Committee had the power, under its 1948 Bases of Action,
1950 Statutes, and Resolution IV of 1959, to consider a case
without the consent of both parties. The coincidence of these
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Case Situa tion Action Solution
Ecuador-Rom. [one— Com. Rep. Refuse
Rep., I960 G Study, Report To Cooperate; Report
To Council
Venezuela- H Study of Hone—Rom. Rep. Refuse
Don. Rep., l c;60 (Human Rights Information To Cooperate; Report
Violations) To Council
Guatemala- Study of iixcusation withdrawn,
Lexico, 1961 a,C Information Ro Reed for Commit-
tee Action
Peru- B,S,G,H Study of Rone—Cuba Refused




two factors— the general situation and the ability to unilater-
ally resort to the Committee— is undoubted l,y the cause for the
profusion of cases in the years 1943-1951 and 1959-1961. .Vhen
the Caribbean tensions eased after 1951, resort to the Peace
Committee also declined, ^nd when tensions flared again in
1959» it became necessary to widen the Peace Committee's powers
to make resort to the Committee practical. It would appear
that any future increase in the incidence of Peace Committee
cases would depend on similar circumsta^os. It will certainly
take a serious general situation to ol the approval of the
foreign ministers or an Inter-American Conference for another
broadening of the Peace Committee's powers.
Although the Peace Committee was the primary inter-American
dispute-settlement mechanism during the period 1948-1965, some
use was made of the Pact of Bogota. He sort to the Pact was
limited primarily by the lack of ratifications. A comparison
of Figures 5 and 4 shows that nine Peace Committee cases
(Figure 4, i-ios. 7,9,10,11,12,15,15,16,17) involved states which
had ratified the Pact of Bogota, but in only one of the nine
(Nicaragua-Honduras, 1961) were all parties to the controversy
bound by the Pact. And in that case, since the controversy
was only a technical one (application of the arbitral award of
1906) , the Peace Committee undoubtedly offered the most expedi-
tious method of settlement.
The two occasions on which the Pact of Bogota was invoked
were discussed in Chapter 5. Costa Pica's lack of success in
obtaining the convocation of a Commission of Investigation and
Conciliation in the first instance can be attributed to her




failure to fulfill the requirement of Article II of the Pact
that both parties must agree that the matter cannot be settled
by direct negotiations. On the second occasion, when the Coun-
cil was meeting as the Provisional Organ of Consultation in res-
ponse to Costa Rica's charge of invasion from Nicaragua, the
Pact was not invoked directly, but its use was part of the solu-
tion recommended by the Council's investigating committee. In
addition to taking measures for better control of their frontiers
against illegal exile activities and arms traffic, the Council
advised both countries to create a Commission of Investigation
and Conciliation under the Pact of Bogota to ensure the settle-
9
rnent; of future difficulties.
Most of the activity concerning the Pact of Bogota since
19^-3 has consisted of attempts to revise it and exhortations
for its ratification. Actually, only one serious attempt has
been made to revise and "rejuvenate" the Pact. This occurred
in 1954- when an item on the possibility of revising the Pact
of Bogota was placed on the agenda of the Tenth Inter-American
Conference at Caracas. Unfortunately, little time was spent on
this item because of the concentration of the Conference on Com-
munism, European colonies, and asylum. a compromise was
reached which called for the member states either to ratify the
Pact or to submit statements of their reasons for desiring amend-
ments. Ecuador made its attitude known immediately by attaching
a statement; to the J?inal Act which reaffirmed its opposition to
Article VI of the Pact and its position that "all matters af-
fecting the vital interests of a state should be subject to the
?> Ann Van w.ynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., The Organization
of American States
, pp. 313-31 ;+.
10
. U.S., Depar v.menu of State, Tenth Inter-Am < pics n Conference, Caracas
Venezuela
y
i/arch 1-28, 1 c; CA
,
il p o r t o f th 0. >;ati on of the United
States of America w:i t,h i fat iments, pi . [2-1 7~,
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procedures of bhe Pact. The Committee on Juridical-Political
matters of the OAS Council was assigned to collect and report
on the observations submitted. Twelve governments replied to
the request for views. The United States' reply concluded that
considerable re-drafting would be needed to r.ake the treaty
generally acceptable, but the Committee reported on March 6,
1957 i that the majority of the 12 governments did not favor re-
vision of the Pact. The Council thereupon declared the inquiry
12
on non-ratification ana revision to be concluded.
Since 195'+, only two additional states have ratified the
Fact of Bogota— Uruguay in 1955 and Brazil in 1S&5. Ko further
proposals have been made for revision of the Pact. Brazil's
ratification was deposited in the Pan American Union the day
before the Second Special Inter-American Conference opened , and
undoubtedly in recognition of this fact, the Conference adopted,
as Resolution XV, an "appeal to those Governments that have not
Ratified the Pact of Bogota." The resolution noted that "it
would be advisable for all member states of the Organization to
be bound by the terras of the Pact of Bogota" and appealed to
those governments which had not yet done so to ratify the Pact
1-5
as soon as possible. y Since this resolution was adopted and
there is no evidence of a proposal to revise the Fact, it may
be assumed that efforts to "rejuvenate" the Pact of Bogota have
ended for the present. Progress in obtaining future ratifica-
tions is liKely to continue slowly, if at all. The remaining
eleven states which have not ratified the Pact include six of
the seven which attached reservations at the time of signing.
HT Ibid
. , pp. 171-172.
12. Charles G . P enwi ch , The Organi zation of American S tates ; the
inte'i rican regiona l system (Washington; Fenwick, l c>63)
,
pp. X52-193.





(uf the seven, only Nicaragua has ratified the Fact, and it did
so with reservation. ) The five remaining states which signed
the Fact without reservation were Colombia, Cuba, Chile, Guate-
14
mala, and Venezuela. liven if these five were to ratify the
Fact, it seems unlikely that the other six will do so without
including their present reservations. Therefore, it would
appear thai; the Fact of Bogota is destined to achieve no great-
er degree of success than the treaties which it was intended
to replace.
Although the question of the Feace Committee's status with-
in the Organization of American States was the reason for includ-
ing it on the agenda at the 195^ Caracas Conference, it is a
curious fact that none of Che proposed revisions of the Feace
Committee's Statutes have ever proposed the formal incorporation
of the Committee into the CAS structure by means of Charter
amendment. Each of them—including the most recent amendment
proposed by the Committee itself in 1965—merely referred to
.Resolution XIV of 1940 as the legal basis for the Committee's
15
existence. y
The proposals of Ecuador and 3razil in 1965 would put the
OaS peaceful settlement mechanism on a formal treaty basis.
Trie Inter-American Council on Peaceful Settlement, proposed by
Ecuador, and the Inter-American Peace Council, proposed by Bra-
zil, would both make Lhe peaceful settlement agency a major or-
gan of the OAS. Similarly, the Charter Amendments proposed
by the Special Committee at Panama in 1966 would incorporate
14. Fan American Union, Status of Inter-American Treaties and
Conventions, p. 8.
15. OAS, Second Special Inter-American Conference, fleport of the
Inter-Amorican Feace Committe e on the Amendmen t of its Stat utes,




che peaceful settlement of disputes into the responsibilities
j
of the CAS Council.
What are the prospects of adoption of the above proposals,
and how effective v/ill any one of them be as a peaceful settle-
ment mechanism if adopted? The Charter Amendments proposed at
Panama undoubtedly have the inside track insofar as prospects
of adoption are concerned. As noted in Chapter 4- , the vote of
the subcommittee which approved the proposals was 12-2-4.
This degree of support makes it very likely that the amendments
will be accepted at the amendment conference. The question of
the effectiveness of the three proposed peaceful settlement
mechanisms is another matter. Both the Brazilian draft treaty
and the proposed Charter amendments require that both parties
to a dispute a.^ree to the OaS organ taking cognizance. The
Ecuadorian draft treaty, on the other hand, incorporates the
essential features of its proposals amending the Peace Commit-
tee Statutes. It would permit the proposed Council of Feace-
ful Settlement to act on its own initiative or at the request
of only one of the parties, in addition to acting on the re-
quest of both parties.
Thus, the three current proi:>osals for making the peaceful
settlement mechanism a major OAS organ come down basically to
the dichotomy between the requirement for consent by both par-
ties or by one only. This dichotomy has provided the primary
divisive issue in obtaining support for the Peace Committee ever
since Peru made its initial reservation to Resolution XIV in
1940. And from 1956 on, the majority of the OAS member states





ing the consent of both parties for the GAS organ to act. That
exception, of course, was Resolution IV of 1959 which tempor-
arily broadened the Commit tee ' s powers for the specific duties
assigned regarding the Caribbean situation. It is unlikely that
another such exception will occur, and even if one does, any
broadening of the powers of the peaceful settlement agency
would probably again be temporary, a permanent and effective
mechanism can hardly be built on temporary grants of power.
Therefore, it seems likely that there will be no greater degree
of success or frequency of use in the new settlement mechanism,
even if it gains the added prestige of being a major OAS organ.

CHAPrER 3: CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR THE OAS
The Organization of American States has reached a critical
stage in its development . The forthcoming conference on the
amendment of the OAS Charter will probably prove to be the turn-
ing point in determining whether the OAS can function effective-
ly in guiding and encouraging the development of a viable inter-
American community. A requirement for the creation of such a
community is the existence of a mechanism for settling disputes
among its members. In the previous chapters of this paper, we
have outlined and discussed the efforts made to date by the
American States to achieve such a dispute settlement system and
the experience they have gained in applying the procedures thus
far developed.
The method most frequently used to establish inter-American
peaceful settlement machinery has been the treaty. The first
attempts were unsuccessful—notably those of Simon 3olivar in
1326 and the arbitration treaty of 1890. Then, following the
piecemeal adoption of several procedures by separate treaties
in the lS20's and 1S'3°' S » the effort to coordinate them in one
instrument was crowned with success in the Fact of Bogota. But
all of the treaty-adopted settlement mechanisms have been bi-
lateral. The treaties have set up standard procedures for the
American states to follow in resolving their controversies, but
the actual settlement of a particular dispute has been left pri-
marily to the parties themselves. The selection of arbiters
from inter-American panels and the use of the International
Court of Justice brings non-nationals into the settlement of




rather than as representatives of states.
The Inter-American Peace Committee has been the only multi-
lateral peaceful settlement mechanism adopted by the American
states. Its establishment, however, came at a time of great
external danger to the Western Hemisphere, when the prevention
of disunity was of the utmost importance. Furthermore, it was
created not as the result of a treaty subject to the process of
ratification, but by a non-binding resolution of a foreign min-
isters' meeting. The subsequent evolution of the leace Commit-
tee and the history of its activities suggests that the Amer-
ican states did not intend in 194-0 to create a multilateral
mechanism with the wide powers which the Committee initially
assumed. In fact, when the members of the CAS gained their
first opportunity to pass judgment on the Peace Committee's Stat-
utes in 1956 » they acted to restrict the Committee's powers to
the extent that the frequency of resort to the Committee was
severely reduced. Although the Committee was still a multi-
lateral body for peaceful settlement, resort to it now required
the bilateral approval of the disputants, and the Committee
could no longer enter a dispute on its own initiative. Thus,
bilateralism was introduced into the multilateral settlement
mechanism, and no state could be called upon to submit its con-
troversies for settlement involuntarily.
Although the American states have indicated a preference
for bilateralism when establishing peaceful settlement mechan-
isms, the treaties they have signed have been generally ineffect-
ive. Only the Inter-American Peace Committee, an agency of
multilateral conciliation, has been able to achieve any degree
of success in the actual resolution of controversies. But most
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of the Feace Committee's successes were achieved under operating
rules which did not require the consent of all parties to the
dispute for the Committee to take jurisdiction, and only two
disputes were taken to it under the more restrictive 1956 rules.
There is an obvious inconsistency between the solutions pro-
posed by the American states to fulfill the need for a peace-
ful settlement mechanism and the degree of cooperation and agree-
ment which they demonstrate when actually confronted by a dis-
pute. Ihe American states can agree on bilateral settlement
mechanisms over the conference table and in the absence of a
specific dispute. But the success of these procedures depends
upon a cooperative attitude which is seldom achieved—either in
ratification of the treaties creating them or in their applica-
tion to a particular controversy. If the required amount of
common interest actually existed, the disputes could in all
likelihood be settled through negotiation.
iYhat appears to be missing in the inter-American system
is a strong sense of community—a feeling of the necessity for
and the mutual benefits to be gained by placing the interests
of the group ahead of those of the individual members. There
seems to be little in the way of a spirit of compromise when
issues arise involving national interests. This lacK of com-
munity interest has been noted by two commentators on the inter-
American scene, Jorge Castaneda and C. ;ieale Ronning. Castaneda,
after examining the "essential norms" for political cooperation,
concludes that
those principles which are most important in the
continent have not yet, because of their nature
or because of other circumstances, formed bonds
of solidarity sufficiently strong to create
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a political Fan American community ....
The lack of continental political solidarity
lias been at the same birae cause and effect of
the absence of a true Fan American spirit.
What has living reality in the conscience of
latin American peoples is the feeling and the
bonds of Latin Americanism. Pan Americanism,
on the other hand, has existed al-ost behind
the back of public opinion both in the Latin
American countries and the United States.
1
Ronning, commenting on the Eighth Meeting of Consultation
of ministers of Foreign Affairs at Punta del Este, noted that
the solutions to the problems besetting the Western Hemisphere
require
a level of community not yet achieved. Hone of
these problems requires a higher level of commun-
ity bhan does that of collective security, es-
pecially when collective action is called for
against indirect agression .... How can gov-
ernments be expected to run risks in the name of
"community interests" until there is some con-
sensus as to what those "community interests"
are?^
Some writers, however, contend that an inter-American
community does exist but that it involves a mixed concept inclu-
ding the acceptance of common standards of action, the recog-
nition and observation of accepted rules, and the establish-
ment and use of institutions and procedures "for the good of
the community even when immediate national interests might be
injured." But is the acceptance of common standards, rules,
and institutions enough? Definitely not, judging from the past
experience of the American states both prior to and since the
1. Jorge Castaneda, "Pan Americanism and Pegionalism: A Mexican
Vi
2. C
ew," International Organization, Vol. 10 (1951)* pp. 387-388.
. Neale Itonning, Punta del Este: The Limits of Collective
Securi ty in a Troubled Hemisphere , Occasional Paper Wo. 3
(Mew York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, l c;63),
p. 30.
3. Ann van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thoma3, Jr., '^n < \
of American States




preation of the OAS. The nations of the Western Hemisphere
have renounced the use of force in their mutual relations,
signed numerous treaties pledging themselves to apply specific
settlement procedures to their disputes, and established a re-
gional international organization for the advancement of their
common interests. But, in spite of all of these efforts, the
American states have not yet achieved a real sense of community
among themselves. Stanley Loffman's comment concerning NATO
in this regard is equally applicable to the inter-American
system:
Abstention from the use of force and the setting
up of regional organizations are one thing; a
consensus of long duration among states on the
procedures for settling disputes and for carry-
ing out various functions in common is quite
another. Only if the latter is achieved does ^
it become legitimate to talk of a community. . . .
What are the prospects of developing a sense of community
in the inter-American system and its application in the field
of peaceful dispute settlement? The past record does not pro-
vide cause for undue optimism. Latin American countries have
always harbored a strong sense of nationalism. This national-
ism is a product of the relative isolation from each other which
these countries experienced as Spanish colonies and of their
long hard struggle for independence. For many years the Latin
American countries existed, not as nations in the modern sense,
but as feudal states. The elite maintained a domination of
the masses which was dependent on the nonexistence of a nation
£7 Stanley Hoffman, "Liscord in Community: The Worth Atlantic Area
as a Partial International System," The Atlantic Community;
Frogress and Prospects
,
Francis 0. vVilcox and H. Field Hav-
iland, Jr., eds. (New York: Praeger, 1S63), p. 113.
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and the absence of modern technology and development. But
the old isolation is breaking down, and a "new nationalism" is
developing in Latin America as the social barriers within the
national societies are broken. The disappearance of these bar-
riers and the resultant development of communication between
the various sectors of society give rise to "nationality" as
Karl Deutsch uses the term. as economic development and social
change progress in Latin America, this "new nationalism" will
undoubtedly spread and grow stronger. It has already reached
the working classes who now provide its "most dynamic and aggres-
7
sive expression."
Latin American nationalism has already caused divisive
effects of lasting influence in inter-American relations. The
economic nationalism resulting largely from the depression of
the 1930* s has produced high tariff walls and many small-scale,
inefficient import-substitution industries. In the political
field, nationalism has developed what Arthur P. v/bitaker calls
"Latin America's matchless devotion to the rule of non-inter-
vention in its most extreme form—most extreme in the double
sense that it is absolute and that it is interpreted by Latin
Americans to cover practically every kind of activity by a foreign
nation that they find objectionable."
The development of economic nationalism was noted by K. H.
Silvert as an aspect of the intermediate level of national emer-
5. Richard W. Patch, "Peasantry and National Revolution: Bolivia,"
Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development , K. H. Silvert,
ed. (Hew ibrk, Random House, 1963) p. 113.
6. Arthur P. Whitaker, "Nationalism and Social Change in Latin
America," Politics of Change i n Latin America, Joseph Maier









gence. "The leaders of underdeveloped lands bend to see the
state as the only agency of sufficient strength, to mobilize
large amounts of capital and to enforce the protectionism
necessary for their growing inaustries. " ' The state has, in
fact, been the agent to which most latin American countries
have turned to provide the resources and. direction for their
economic development. But the state has not been equal to
the task in most cases. The limited mar-vets in many countries
have prevented the development of large-scale industries which
can be competitive without the retention of high tariff bar-
riers. Therefore, under the influence of Raul Prebisch and the
school of economists he developed as Chairman of the Economic
Commission for Latin America, a number of Latin American coun-
tries have turned to economic integration as the most efficient
path to modernization and development.
Economic integration may be a Key to the creation of a
sense of community in Latin America. The theory of functional-
ism would have us believe that by developing and practicing
cooperation in the economic areas, a degree of interdependence
can be established which will "spill over" into the more poli-
tical areas. But functionalism has not proven itself, and, in-
deed, there are serious challenges to the validity of the con-
cept of "spill-over." Nevertheless, there are many who believe
that it can be made to work in Latin America. The two existing
organizations for economic integration, the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAITTA) and the Central American Common Mar-
ket, have made notable progress. The latter includes only the






five Central American states which have a tradition of unity
dating from the colonial period. LAFTA, however, is a much,
broader group with little previous history of cooperation.
Successful economic integration under ibs auspices could very
well lead to significant developments in the political field.
Among the proposals for increasing the degree of political
cooperation is the establishment of a Latin American Parliament
composed of representatives of the area's parliaments. Such a
Parliament would, provide a forum for discussion of the problems
of integration as they arise, and "a climate of opinion would
thus be created which would be favourable to the political de-
cisions needed to set the process in train and to maintain
steady progress towards regional integration.' 1 But whether
or not Latin America is ready for political cooperation lo this
degree is quesbionable . The resolution on Parliamentary Coopera-
tion (Resolution V) adopted by the Second Special Inber-American
Conference in 1965 did- nob propose the establishment of such a
Parliament, but merely directed the OaS Secretariat bo obtain
the member states' views on the ways in which parliamentary co-
operation could contribute to the application of OAS principles
and to strengthening the inter-American system. The govern-
ment of Haiti took exception to even this suggestion of coopera-
tion, making a reservation which stated that "it feels that this
document implies a form of political inbegrabion which is dan-
12gerous for bhe inter-American system."
10. Raul Prebisch, Jose Antonio r iayobre, Felipe Herrera, Carlos
Sanz de Santamaria, "Proposals for the Creation of the Latin
American Common Market," International Legal Materials, Vol. IV,
No. 4 (July, 1965), p. 678.








Another possible path to political cooperation and agree-
ment on a workable system for inter-American dispute settlement
would be through the creation of a dispute settlement procedure
for the economic integration process. Proposals have been made
for the conciliation of integration disputes first by the LAFTA
Executive Board and then, if no agreement were obtained, by an
13
ad hoc conciliation committee "acting as a supreme court."
Although the idea of a conciliation body acting as a court may
not be consistent, a successful dispute-settlement procedure on
a multilateral basis in economic matters could be developed,
perhaps even to the point where the creation of a regional court
might be feasible.
while the growth of a sense of community and a degree of
political integration may well occur through the functional
process of economic integration, it will be a slow process at
best. However, there is no certainty that political coopera-
tion necessarily results from economic cooperation. Haiti is
not a member of either of the organizations for economic integra-
tion, but her negative attitude toward political integration is
by no means unique in Latin ^merica.
The urgency of the political problems confronting the inter-
American system may net, however, permit the luxury of waiting
for the functional approach to bear the fruit of political in-
tegration. If not, perhaps there is a more direct method of
resolving the problem of political cooperation. One such meth-
od has been suggested by Albert C. Hirschman in his book Jour-
14
neys Toward Progress . Hirschman 1 s analysis of problem-
13. Preoisch, et al. , "Proposals", p. 679 •
14-. albert 0. Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Econ -





solving in Latin America revolves around tne concept of Priv-
ileged (I) vs. Neglected (N) problems; that is, chose problems
which lend themselves to mass protest and pressure on the
cecisicn-makers vs. those which do not. y llirschman defines
three categories of problems which are selected for treatment
by the Lauin-.imerican polic:,r makers:
(a) Problems vvhich the problem victims are able to
bring forcefully to the as tendon of the policy-
makers;
(b) Problems which the policy-maKers are persuaded
co tackle because they have become convinced
that progress on them is in some sense pre-
requisite to progress on (a); and
(c) Problems suggested by a widening of the spec-
trum of possiole actions, that is, on which
policy-makers wish to, and think they ought to,
move primarily because new policy actions have
become feasible or new policy instruments have
become available; it will be hoped and claimed
that the resultant progress on these problems
will do much to alleviate problems (a). 16
The creation of Brazil's new capital of Brasilia and the estab-
lishment of LAFTA are cited by Pirschrnan as examoles of (b) or
17(c) problem solutions.
The establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism
for the CaS is undoubtedly a problem of the (b) or (c) variety.
Disputes fall into ohe (a) category when obey arise, but they
are generally—except for the two attempts to probe the causes
of unrest in the Caribbean—dealt with on an ad hoc basis.
Type (b) or (c) solutions for the basic problems which cause dis-
putes and agreement on acceptable machinery for their settlement
may be possible within the inter-American system. Three such










(1) An arms reduction and limitation agreement within
La^Ta or, if possible, within all of Latin America;
(2) In conjunction with (1), agreed reductions in defense
budgets, the reductions to be used for economic or social devel-
opment projects;
(5) Agreement on a peaceful settlement mechanism with en-
larged powers to assume jurisdiction without the consent of both
parties to a dispute. Achievement of agreement might be obtained
by the application of specific limitations on the types of prob-
lems to be considered, possibly including bhe elimination of
boundary disputes; the omission of any power bo impose decisions
unless a definite threat to the peace existed— in which case the
matter could be referred to the Organ of Consultation; and the
granting of competence to define the political and juridical is-
sues involved in a dispute without necessarily granting power to
require their settlement by any specific procedure.
The arms reduction and defense budget reduction possibil-
ities would greatly enhance the development efforts of the Latin
American countries. Such agreements might be worked out within
the framework of the alliance for Progress. Perhaps the offer
by the United States of a guarantee for the defense of the con-
tinent against direct external aggression would facilitate such
an agreement. It must not be forgotten, however, that Latin
Americans still greatly fear the military power of the United
States
—
particularly after the action of the United States in
the 1S65 Dominican crisis. Such a U.S. offer might well have to
be accompanied by a firm guarantee against further unilateral
U.S. military action under any circumstances.
The possibility of agreement on the third suggested solu-
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cion appears slim at the present time. As noted in Chapter 4-
,
,
the American states seem to be moving toward agreement on a
Charter amendment giving the OAS Council powers similar to those
presently exercised by the Inter-American Peace Committee, and
imposing similar limitations with respect to consent of the
parties. Nevertheless, it i s still possible that the proposals
may be modified before the amendment is adopted. If the sug-
gested limitations on .jurisdiction are advanced, and, at the
same time, the dismal record of Peace Committee and Pact of
Bogota activity under the requirement for mutual consent is em-
phasized, it may be possible to persuade a sufficient number of
states to accept the change.
.'mat ever the ultimate form of the peaceful settlement mech-
anism devised for the OAS, and whatever the technique used to
achieve agreement, a solution of the problem is not likely to
come about quickly. Hasty solutions in the inter-American system
have not been lasting ones. The American states have undergone
a significant development in their mutual relations over the
past 76 years, to a point where the interests which unite the
nations far surpass those which divide them. Eut the progress
v/hich has been made has not come about easily, and future prog-
ress will be equally as difficult. The amendment proposed by
the Special Committee in Panama in February-April, 1^66, may be
the only acceptable change to the peaceful settlement mechanism
at the present time. Even though it retains the requirement for
mutual consent of the parties to obtain action, the amendment,
if adopted, will be a significant advance over the present mach-
inery of the Inter-American Peace Committee. It will put the
peaceful settlement of disputes on a much higher level of the
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or^anization, and the dispute settlement agency will have a firm
basis in the organization's constitutional instrument, the Charter
These factors should combine to increase the acceptability of
CaS action in a dispute as well as to increase the moral pressure
on both parties to accept CaS action after a request has been
made by one of them.
The further development of peaceful settlement in the OAS
beyond the procedure of the proposed amendment will depend large-
ly upon experience with the Council's handling of disputes and
the prosress of Latin American integration. The divisive effects
of nationalism must be overcome, and a supra-national sense of
community must be developed before the CaS can achieve a really
effective system for the peaceful solution of controversies.
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